Gossip as Strategic Diffusion and Cultural Evolution: A Game Theoretic, Network, and Cognitive Model of Why Negative, Moralized, and Novel Claims Spread- and Mutate- Faster

Karan Chandra Dey

Abstract: Why does negative gossip spread more rapidly across societies compared to positive information? This paper develops the Strategic Contagion with Behavioral Amplification (SCBA) model, an integrated framework that links (i) micro level strategic communication under behavioral frictions, (ii) meso level network structure, and (iii) macro level contagion dynamics. At the micro level, an informed sender evaluates social, status-based, and instrumental rewards. These are weighed against potential reputational damage and retaliation costs. These benefits are amplified by a Salience Multiplier that aggregates negativity bias (loss aversion), emotional arousal (surprisal), and linguistic abstraction (intergroup bias). A quantal-response mapping translates expected utility into a per edge transmission probability. At the meso-level, propagation occurs on heterogeneous small world/scale free networks; macro dynamics follow an independent cascade/SIS hybrid with a spectral threshold. We prove that behavioral amplification systematically elevates the effective reproduction number R_0 for negative content, crossing epidemic thresholds on realistic graphs even when positive content does not. We then extend SCBA with a cultural evolution layer: each retelling mutates content through lossy memory (rate?distortion) and strategic phrasing (Rational Speech Acts), while network virality tends to favor variants that are more emotionally arousing, morally charged, and negatively framed, yielding quasi-species like dynamics with an error threshold where semantic integrity collapses. The model generates clear, testable predictions and prescribes platform levers (fact check visibility, friction for high ambiguity items, dampening of cross community boosts, prestige debiasing) that reduce R_0 or mute the mutation operator. We outline identification and calibration strategies using text features, re share hazards, and spectral properties of observed graphs.

Keywords: gossip, diffusion, game theory, negativity bias, moral emotion, linguistic abstraction, independent cascade, epidemic threshold, replicator?mutator, rate?distortion, rational speech acts

How to Cite?: Karan Chandra Dey, "Gossip as Strategic Diffusion and Cultural Evolution: A Game Theoretic, Network, and Cognitive Model of Why Negative, Moralized, and Novel Claims Spread- and Mutate- Faster", Volume 14 Issue 8, August 2025, International Journal of Science and Research (IJSR), Pages: 1511-1527, https://www.ijsr.net/getabstract.php?paperid=SR25823223650, DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.21275/SR25823223650