U.S. Foreign Policy and Strategic Backfire in a Changing Global Order
Abstract: The changing distribution of political, economic, technological, and strategic power is altering the environment in which U.S. foreign policy is formulated and implemented. This article examines when and why U.S. foreign-policy actions generate strategic backfire: unintended consequences that weaken the original policy objective while imposing identifiable strategic costs on the United States. Drawing on Foreign Policy Analysis and complementary international-relations perspectives, the article conceptualizes strategic backfire as an actor-mediated process linking international conditions, decision-maker perceptions, policy choices, external responses, unintended consequences, and strategic costs. A qualitative comparative analysis of three policy episodes- U.S. tariffs toward China, advanced-technology export controls on China, and sanctions against Russia- illustrates how external actors adapt rather than simply comply. The analysis identifies institutional inertia, cognitive bias, domestic political constraints, and ideological rigidity as mechanisms that can sustain counterproductive policies. The article argues that strategic effectiveness depends on anticipating external adaptation and revising policy when strategic costs accumulate.
Keywords: U.S. foreign policy; strategic backfire; foreign policy decision-making; actor agency; strategic adaptation
How to Cite?: Omar Abdi Mohamed, "U.S. Foreign Policy and Strategic Backfire in a Changing Global Order", Volume 15 Issue 11, November 2026, International Journal of Science and Research (IJSR), Pages: 613-624, https://www.ijsr.net/getabstract.php?paperid=SR261106231543, DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.21275/SR261106231543