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Original Research | Philosophy | Volume 15 Issue 8, August 2026 | Pages: 26 - 28 | India
Rights, Interests and Subject-of-a-Life: A Defense of Tom Regan's Animal Rights Theory
Abstract: Moral rights are the prerogative of all humans and only humans. So is believed and put in practice by the dominant anthropocentric socio-cultural milieu. However, animal liberationist Tom Regan has argued in many of his works, that are epoch-making in the field of animal ethics, that the concept of moral rights, interpreted in the right way, allows for a level-playing field where non-human animals are as much entitled to the rights to physical protection, life, and preservation of liberty as humans. The game-changer in determining the eligibility conditions for moral rights, according to Regan, is the property of being a subject-of-a-life. Certain species of non-human animals, if not every one of them, qualify as a subject-of-a-life given that these animals are aware of the world , aware of what goes on in their surroundings, and also aware of whether the events occurring in their world act in their welfare or in their disfavour, in the same way as humans are aware of what maximizes their psycho-physical integrity and autonomy and what poses hindrance to their welfare. However, philosophers like R. G. Frey argue that non-human animals cannot be logical subjects of moral rights, as they cannot be shown to have any interests, in any which of its two senses the term ?interests? is applied. Animal ethicists like Peter Singer, a champion of the animal liberation movement, despite stopping short of granting moral rights to non-human animals, concede that they possess interests. Singer argues that interests stemming from the rudimentary capacity to feel pain are the fundamental criteria for being entitled to moral consideration. My contention in this paper will be that the ascription of moral rights to a being is entirely conditional upon the being having demonstrable interests. Tom Regan's concept of subject-of-a-life is thus not flawed, and can legitimately show that animals are logical subjects of moral rights insofar as they have interests, in both senses of the term.
Keywords: propositional attitude, reflective consciousness, simple desire
How to Cite?: Dr. Sharmistha Dhar, "Rights, Interests and Subject-of-a-Life: A Defense of Tom Regan's Animal Rights Theory", Volume 15 Issue 8, August 2026, International Journal of Science and Research (IJSR), Pages: 26-28, https://www.ijsr.net/getabstract.php?paperid=MR26802040914, DOI: https://dx.doi.org/10.21275/MR26802040914