Mitigation Measures on Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Attacks in Mandera East Subcounty, Mandera County, Kenya

Paul Chepkenen¹, Dr. Duncan Ochieng², Dr. Antony Odek³

¹Master of Science in Governance, Peace and Security Studies, Africa Nazarene University, Nairobi, Kenya
², ³Lecturer, Africa Nazarene University, Nairobi, Kenya

Abstract: In the recent years, incidents on the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), particularly by non-state armed groups, have been on the rise. These attacks are usually directed to soft targets to achieve maximum lethal effect, terror and societal disruption. Thus, the 2015 leaders’ summit on peacekeeping resolved that more attention was needed to be put on the issue of IED attacks owing to the effects that these devices were having on the lives of numerous persons. Therefore, this study sought to analyse the mitigation measures on IED attacks in Mandera East Sub County, Mandera County, Kenya. The study was based on the Deterrence Theory. The study employed a descriptive survey design, making use of both quantitative and qualitative data. The study was limited to Mandera East Sub-County, which has a population of 159,638. The sampled respondents were 395 household heads. Qualitative data was classified into major themes based on objectives and presented in verbatim, while quantitative data was analysed and presented in form of figures and tables. It was established that information and intelligence is vital towards stopping the IED attacks. As such, it is recommended that the Government should invest on border security surveillance, and strategically position the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) Units along the Somalia-Kenya border, to provide early warning, deterrence and prompt reactive capability on IED attacks.

Keywords: IEDs, mitigation measures, Counter-IED attacks, livelihoods of the people, Mandera East Sub County

1. Introduction

1.1 Background of the Study

The use of IEDs by terrorist has become a notable security concern throughout the world. According to Iain (2017), in 2016 alone, there were 19,200 reported cases of people losing their lives or getting injured. Most of these casualties involved Civilians who accounted to 74%. This translated to 296 Civilian deaths in 48 countries in 2016 alone. These areas were most affected by IEDs as documented by Action on Armed Violence over the last seven years (Ndubi, 2017).

The Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) Global Information Research attests that IED attacks are a fast thriving threat to the unarmed people. The number of incidents worldwide highlights the growth of IED facilitation networks (Caves, 2016). Further, in the first half of year 2017 alone, 7,000 reported cases of death and injuries involved Civilians (Conflict Armament Research, 2018). The trend has escalated in the following years. In a span of 4 years stretching from the year 2011, 124,000 cases of injuries and deaths caused by these devices, were recorded. According to Dathan (2018), about 81% of these cases involved defenceless Civilians. In 2016, an approximate of 39 non-combatant injuries and deaths from IED attacks were recorded each day, in addition to security personnel and armed actors. These statistics touch only on the immediate physical effect in terms of numbers. However, it does not address the measures in place to mitigate the IED attacks (Dathan, 2018).

During the 2015 leaders’ summit on peacekeeping, it was unequivocally resolved that more attention was needed to be put on the issue of IED attacks because of the effects that these devices were having on the lives of numerous persons, particularly in the countries that were highly vulnerable. According to United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) (2019), the effects of IED attacks can be categorized as primary, secondary and tertiary. The primary impacts include the blasts, fragmentation, burns, casualties and injuries. The secondary impacts include shattering glass and building collapse while the tertiary effects include displacement of people, interrupted occupations, health issues, fear, psychological trauma, staggered development and disruption of livelihoods (UNIDIR, 2019).

By definition, acts of terrorism are strategies described by the purposeful utilization of brutality against, or the course of physical endurance upon regular people or non-soldiers so as to impact different regular citizens, and along these lines, governments or rebels. Terrorism is in this way a technique that is utilized by states or revolts and by ideological conservatives just as radicals. In this manner, it follows that attention is coordinated to the killing of regular citizens in clashes for at least two armed characters; state or non-state actors. This system doesn’t incorporate a wide range of political conflicts against non-soldiers, including, state viciousness against an oppressed ethnic society which is not planned for compelling a movement or state upheld by that ethnic group (Scott, Amenta, & Nash, 2012).

Terrorism is a problem globally and to the citizens collectively; it poses threat to security, to the principles of democratic societies and to the rights and freedoms of citizens especially through the indiscriminate targeting of innocent people.
In Africa, IED attacks have developed into the greatest damaging and the severest threat to ground combat and infantry troops. Kenya has been a target of the most major terrorist attacks in the last three decades. It is notable that the current terror in Kenya are led by Al-Shabaab trained Kenyan youth, organized to fight Kenya’s key economic nerves, tourist dependent coastal cities and key commercial arteries in Nairobi and North Eastern areas. Numerous terror assaults have been witnessed in Somalia in comparison to Kenya, and apparently, the Al-Shabaab has honed usage of Suicide Vehicle Borne IEDs (SVBIEDs), Command Wire IEDs (CWIEDs), Remote Controlled IEDs (RCIEDs), and Roadside IEDs (Goldman, 2018).

According to the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (2017), Al Shabaab persistent aim to destabilize and potentially overthrow the Federal Government of Somalia, and spillover effects to bordering countries, led to regional military forces intervention in Somalia under the auspices of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Ever since the military intervention was deployed in Somalia, there have been a myriad of reported cases involving the use of IEDs by the Al Shabaab militants, targeting both security agencies and Civilians.

Similarly, Kenya has witnessed complex IED attacks such as the September 2013 attack on the Westgate Mall (John, 2017), and the Garissa University attack in April 2015 (United Nations Mine Action Service, 2019) in which dozens of innocent civilians were killed. It is notable that the threat of IEDs by terrorist groups continues to remain present in Kenya with several reported incidents occurring in most parts of North Eastern region. It is against this backdrop that this research sought to analyse the mitigation measures on IED attacks in Mandera East Sub County, Mandera County, Kenya.

1.2 Purpose of the study

The general objective of this study was to analyse the mitigation measures on IED attacks in Mandera East Sub County, Mandera County, Kenya.

2. Theoretical Framework

This study was premised on the deterrence theory by Gibbs (1975), which emerged to explain the probability of detection of criminal behaviour. As postulated by Gary (1974), the criminals reflect on various simple queries in advance obligating their action namely, whether he/she will be seen, then if he/she is seen whether he/she will be noticeable and if he/she is seen and noticeable, the action that will be taken. The three questions have direct linkage to the environmental wrongdoing deterrence approaches of situational crime prevention and through environmental design.

As a sub-theory of Rational Choice Theory (RCT), deterrence of IED attacks is usually hard given to people being dynamic. According to Shughart (2011), extremists compute threats and develop selections to increase the most gain for the minimum rate in currency, people and weaponries. They also change strategies when countries legislate counter measures touching on them. Atran (2016) has also indicated that the price of equipping a suicide-bomber is the most expensive one. Caplan (2006), considers that the subsidizing establishments have great inspiration to exaggerate their impact and inclination to use IEDs. Caplan (2006), also classifies acts of terrorism into three categories namely sympathizer, active terrorists, and suicidal terrorists. While there are several free-riders that achieve gains without experiencing charge in this situation, IED attacks takes 4 up to 13 times more lives than customary radicalism, and is therefore, an added operational and damaging terrorism type.

To understand how to deter IED attacks, it is imperative to understand the reasons behind these attacks. The most widely recognized thought regarding what causes IED assaults is the idea that the militants go to terrorism when they are extremely feeble, lack help, but are urgent to change their complaints. This explains why IED perpetrators target non-combatant oppression, when they are anxious to be victorious in combats (Downes, 2008). Additionally, the case appears to be mainstream among numerous areas and states that utilize terrorism. The impression thought here is that Al Shabaab lack the capacity to pressure their opponents through conventional fighting, and hence be unsuccessful in attaining their objectives when they use these approaches.

According to Horgan (2017), acts of terrorism are cheaper and easier than techniques that require a lot of mobilization, particularly when government repression makes mass assembly troublesome if certainly feasible. In circumstances where ways to the legitimate law are blocked and where the system's suppression is wasteful, progressive terrorism is doubly likely, as tolerant and direct causes occur (Marongwe, 2015). Al Shabaab utilizes categorical terrorism on the grounds that it is considerably less expensive and more proficient than specific terrorism. Therefore, it is imperative to institute effective Counter-IED measures.

3. Literature Review

Pico (2017) noted that, IED attacks present complex issues that merit support from National and Worldwide consideration. USA Counter-IED and philanthropic IED removal arrangements are advancing strong collaboration with state, neighbourhood, ancestral, and regional governments, alongside invested partners, accomplice countries, and private sectors, to propel consciousness of IED dangers and improve Counter-IED and helpful IED removal capacities. Close by partners and the worldwide network, the USA keeps on creating systems to address the IED danger and accomplish harmony and security.

Hummel, Burpo and Bonner(2019) observed that mitigating IEDs centres around deflecting, identifying, and forestalling IED work before dangers become inescapable (Pico, 2017). Counter-IED activities try to disrupt the systems that utilize IEDs, train the manpower battling those systems, recognize and secure against IEDs, and keep IED perpetrators from completing their detestable plans.

Malhotra (2019) noted that, IED attacks are key dangers which should be dealt with in the coming five years. IEDs
are at the moment the significant reason for fatalities of military, who are basically secured counter-extremism activities confronting an enemy who is practically concealed, frequently unpredictable, and constantly risky. The assessment here recommends that this kind of fighting will wait for the next ten years and will prompt activities in the Middle East and potential clash in North Africa. Vehicle shield requests will be on the higher side in these areas as it is a need for the military powers sent there as a Counter-IED measure (Malhotra, 2019).

Malhotra (2019) notes that Counter- Remote Controlled Improvised Explosive Device Electronic Warfare (C-REW) frameworks are vehicle mounted and man compact frameworks which are utilized to Counter Remote Controlled IEDs. Military staffs are prepared completely on use of these CREW frameworks to jam the correspondences connections of an IED. With the achievement of CREW in Iraq by the American military, more interest has been seen for such frameworks in the ongoing occasions.

The presence of Al Shabaab in Kenya was a security threat to the territorial integrity. In a bid to neutralize the activities of Al Shabaab, the Kenyan government launched the “Operation Linda Nchi” which means ‘Protect the Nation’ (Odhiambo, 2014). The operation came at a time when Al Shabaab was becoming notorious for kidnapping of aid workers in the northern part of Kenya and tourists in Lamu. The operation was aimed at repulsing the group and diluting their offensive. Further, the presence of Al-Shabaab in the southern part of Somalia was a threat to not only Kenya’s territorial integrity but also tourism industry. Thus, in compliance to its constitutional mandate to protect territorial integrity against external aggression, the KDF executed the operation. In contrast, the Al Shabaab retaliated by carrying out targeted IED attacks, particularly in social places and along Main Supply Routes (MSRs), and hence, the threat of IED attacks is still present in Kenya (Mbaka, 2019).

Regarding boundary security, the Kenya-Somalia border goes profoundly unregulated. The US has equally assisted to improve Kenyan border security, yet the absence of boundary security is limited just as a lack of hardware and subsidies to improve such security has left the outskirt open to terrorists crossing. The boundary stretches from Border Point 1 (BP1) at Manderato BP 29 at Port Dares Salaam, where there are only three controlled entry points to Kenya, with only Mandera entry point conducting screening. Thus, it is extremely simple for terrorists to enter and leave Kenya through the porous border (Ndubi, 2017).

Following the increase in number of IED attacks in Mandera, Garrisa, Lamu and Wajir counties, Kenya mooted the idea of the construction of border fence in March 2015. The project involved erection of two equal chain link fence of substantial work and razor wires running in the middle of them. The twin chain link fence is evaluated to be over 700km when completed, and will have assigned movement and custom section focused with a 2 feet tall solid divider fitted with Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) cameras. Additionally, a 3meter-profound channel on the Kenyan side runs along the fence, and beside it is a patrol road to be utilized by security work force to police the boundary (Sambu, 2018).

The Kenyan National Police Service have made huge strides in countering IEDs and fighting terrorism. The police have a particular Bomb Disposal Unit (BDU) that was set up in the year 2002, and which works in a joint effort with the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU). The BDU share obligations regarding care of exploding, defusing bombs, explosives and IEDs. Further, they are responsible for leading post-blast examinations so as to follow the materials to the sources and producers, and thus, helps the ATPU in tracing the suspects (Dodd & Perkins, 2014).

A great part of the KDF's ability of clearing activities originates from taking the lead in demining and explosive ordinance disposal endeavours over the region. The KDF conduct training in C-IED from an assortment of sources, such as, the USA, the British Peace Support Team (BPST), and Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) (Ndubi, 2017).

The National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) in Kenya is a strategic organization made to serve as the planning office for all counter terrorism endeavours for the legislature of Kenya. The NCTC endeavours include training law enforcers, boundary control units, and those in the jail administrations (Overview of the Annual Crime Report, 2018). In light of Al-Shabaab’s expanding endeavours to enlist individuals from the neighbourhood networks, the legislature has devised a program with assemblage limit with respect to youth and women groups to counter the increase of extremism in their networks. It is accepted that this will help fortify network flexibility among the groups vulnerable to enrolment.

4. Methodology

The study adopted a descriptive survey design. According to Creswell (2014) this design is appropriate when the researcher seeks to provide detailed explanation about a particular issue. In this case, the issue under investigation was the mitigation measures on IED attacks in Mandera East Sub County. The choice of Mandera East Sub County was premised on the fact that the region is prone to the attacks, has experienced many IED attacks in the recent past, and proximity to the porous border with Somalia (Kaggikah, 2017). The target population in the study comprised of 159,638 household heads in the Sub County.

Based on the Yamane (1967) formula, 395 household heads formed the sample population for the study. The study used systematic sampling, which was used to pick the household heads of Mandera East Sub County by picking every 10th household until sample size was achieved. The primary data collection instruments for this study were through questionnaires and key informant interviews. The reliability of the study was tested using the Cronbach Alpha test and the validity test was ensured by consulting experts and supervisors of the study. The study realized an overall Cronbach Alpha coefficient of 0.83, which meant that the research instruments were reliable and could be used to collect data from the field. The collected data was sorted,
cleaned and coded into SPSS 25 for subsequent descriptive statistics. Descriptive statistics were conducted through frequency counts and percentages to capture the distribution of responses on the key issues addressed in the study objectives. The analyzed data was presented using charts, figures and tables.

5. Findings

5.1 Demographic Information

The study targeted to collect data from 395 household heads. The researcher managed to collect data from 350 respondents and after checking for completeness of the questionnaires, 319 questionnaires were found complete and suitable for analysis achieving 81% response rate. This response was excellent as per Kothari and Garg (2014) who recommended a response rate of 70% or more and therefore sufficient for analysis.

The respondents were required to indicate their gender. The intention of this was to be able to understand the gender dynamics, especially in the Sub County and how they affect the people who live in the area. The study found that a majority of the respondents were male at 288 (90%) while a paltry 31 (10%) were female (Figure 1).

The inference here was that when it comes to the household heads, the ratio of women to men was low. This could be attributed to several factors such as the lower number of women who head their households due to cultural practices. Since the household heads were being targeted, men are the ones who showed up owing to the highly patriarchal nature of the society. Therefore, this sample was deemed as appropriate in understanding the gender dynamics of the area.

The study sought to find out the length of residency of the household head in Mandera East Sub County. This was done to determine whether the respondents were residents or not. The findings indicated that 258 (81%) of the household heads had lived in the area for more than 6 years, 44 (14%) had lived for 3-5 years, and 11 (3%) had lived for 2-3 years while 6 (2%) had lived for less than a year. The findings imply that the majority of the household heads had lived in Mandera East Sub County for more than 6 years, showing that they were residents of the area as shown in Figure 2.

The respondents’ highest education level was also captured in the study to indicate the capability of the respondents to answer questions posed to them. The findings on the highest level indicated that 149 (46.7%) of the respondents (household heads) had attained secondary education level, 79 (24.8%) had attained primary school education, 75 (23.4%) had no formal education, 12 (3.8%) had attained college education level while 4 (1.3%) had attained university education. The findings show that secondary level education is the most attained by household heads in Mandera East Sub County, as presented in Figure 3.

The respondents’ age was captured in the study to indicate the dominant age group for household heads. The findings on the age of the respondents indicated that 134 (42%) of the respondents were aged 36-45 years, 93 (29%) were aged 26-35 years, 50 (16%) were aged 18-25 years, and 39 (12%) were aged 46-55 years while 3 (1%) were aged more than 55 years. The findings show that most household heads are aged between 36-45 years in Mandera East Sub County, as shown in Figure 4.
Marital status was sought in the study to indicate the marital status of the household heads. The findings on the marital status of the respondents indicated that 207 (65%) were married, 88 (28%) were divorced or widowed while 24 (7%) were single or never married. The findings clearly indicate that most household heads are married in Mandera East Sub County, as shown in Figure 6.

**5.2 Presentation of the Findings**

The objective of the study was to examine the measures in place to mitigate the effects of IEDs in Mandera East Sub-County. The study first sought to determine the frequency of IED attacks in Mandera East Sub County. The study found that 147 (46%) identified the IED attacks to be happening every month, 111 (35%) said they happened after every 3 months, 54 (17%) said they happened after 6 months or more while 7 (2%) identified them to be happening every week. The findings indicate that IED attacks were frequent in Mandera East Sub County, as shown in Figure 6.

On the kinds of IEDs are usually experienced in Mandera County, the study found that 256 (80%) of the IED attacks were command wire/roadside, 54 (17%) were remote controlled while 9 (3%) were suicide vest. The findings indicate prevalence of roadside IED attacks, as shown in Figure 7.

On the causes of IED attacks in Mandera County, the study found that the main causes of IED attacks resulted from porous border (n=127, 39.8%) and insecurity (n=111, 34.8%), 40(12.5%) resulted from religion, 19(6%) resulted from ethnic identity while 22(6.9%) resulted from politics. Insecurity and porous border were the major causes of IED attacks, as presented in Table 1.

From the key informant interviews, the study found that the respondents were well aware of the causes of these attacks; they indicated that porous border, insecurity, invasion into Somalia, environmental aspects such as terrain among other factors contributed to increased IED attacks in the area.

The respondents cited the various measures put in to place to mitigate IEDs in Mandera East Sub County. Some of the responses obtained indicated that the respondents identified intensifying military border patrols, promotion of education programmes, and construction of border fence among others. The key informants support these findings as follows:

There is need to establish additional military units along the border and intensifying border patrols; control of border entry/exit points; investing in education to counter radicalization of the young people, offering employment to young people as an alternative to meeting their needs and the construction of the border fence that will restrict entry and exit through controlled points (Source: Household heads, Mandera East Sub County).

There is need to detect any unauthorized or suspicious activity in the area of the perimeter. This is achieved by vigilance on the part of residents,
The respondents were asked to state whether the measures and strategies put by the government were adequate. All the respondents answered in the negative, an indication that the measures in place were not adequate. They were of the view that the mere fact that the attacks are still prevalent is a direct indictment to both state and non-state actors, and that a lot still needs to be done as far as safeguarding the border points is concerned. The key informants support these findings as follows:

The prevalence of attacks is a direct indictment to both state and non-state actors that a lot still needs to be done as far as safeguarding the border points is concerned. There is need for intensifying the intelligence network and acting promptly before the attacks occur. There should also be sharing of intelligence information between all the security agencies. Furthermore, there should be close collaboration of the locals with the security agencies which will ensure that information is shared concerning the activities. The Nyumba Kumi or Community policing should be supported fully so as the criminal elements can easily be identified and dealt with (Source: Military Commander).

As to what should be done to curb further attacks, the respondents cited measures such as intensifying the intelligence network and acting promptly before the attacks occur. They stated that there should be close collaboration of the locals with the security agencies which will ensure that information is shared concerning the activities. In addition, they stated that the Nyumba Kumi or Community policing should be supported fully so as the criminal elements can easily be identified and thwarted. The responses obtained in the study from key informants support these claims, were as follows:

The solution to these kinds of attacks lies in close collaboration between the governments, Non-Governmental Organizations, communities and the international community. Once all these groups of institutions collaborate closely, then a sound mitigation measure will be generated (Source: Household head, Mandera East Sub County).

Along with promoting mutual understanding, public-private partnerships can lead to joint efforts on terrorist tactics such as use of rental vehicles, falsified documents, stolen uniforms or explosives. Governments can also raise industry awareness through clearly worded websites, guidance, manuals, handouts, and posters that communicate instructions and guidance for understanding of threats and good practices. They can also develop both general and customized materials, such as how to react to an IED attack, or for hardware stores to identify suspicious purchases of precursors to improvised explosive devices (Source: Manager, Civic Organization).

The KDF should adopt a robust border security posture within the framework of proximity to Kenya/Somalia border operations. The concept should be to embrace border security enforcement by positioning KDF to take lead augmented by other security agencies including development of securitized border infrastructure and technology (Source: OCS).

There is need for a comprehensive Kenya/Somalia border securitization strategy. The strategy is to ensure that sufficient levels of border patrols as this will enhance desired rapid response capabilities. Equally, the strategic development of infrastructure to deter illegal movement at the border is vital to success of border enforcement operations. As posited by the key informants;

This includes border fencing alongside detection technologies and censoring platforms, establishing of legitimate border control points, construction of border patrol roads, rehabilitation of existing airstrips and upgrading of access roads to all weather standards. The provision of water by sinking of boreholes and excavations of water pans will support the border community by winning the hearts and minds, a strategy to involve them in border security community policing and curb tribal animosity (Source: Manager, Civic Organization).

6. Discussion

The study examined the measures put in place by the security agencies in a bid to Counter IED attacks, as well as the effectiveness of the measures in countering IED attacks. Several measures were found to have been put in place by the government, such as increase in border patrols; surveillance, construction of border fence, sensitization of the community on the need to volunteer information that could lead to countering of these IED attacks among others. These findings are in line with those of Sambu (2018), who discusses the idea of the construction of border fence in March 2015 that consists of two parallel chain link fences of heavy mesh and razor wires running in between them.

The responses obtained in the study from key informants also indicate that along with promoting mutual understanding, public-private partnerships can lead to joint efforts on terrorist tactics that involve use of rental vehicles, falsified documents, stolen uniforms or explosives. Governments can also raise industry awareness through clearly worded websites, guidance, manuals, handouts, posters that communicate instructions, and guidance for understanding of threats and good practices. They can also develop both general and customized materials, such as how to react to an IED attack, or for hardware stores to identify suspicious purchases of precursors to improvised explosive devices.

The fact that these attacks were still prevalent was an indication that more needs to be done in order to completely
eradicate these attacks. Some of the suggestions that were given out from the findings were that the government should enhance close collaboration with the residents, especially under the community policing arrangement, in order to easily identify those members who could pose a threat to the lives of others. Furthermore, the issue of de-radicalization of youths came out strongly; the government needs to open up more institutions of learning at all levels in the Sub County so that the youths are not prone to radicalization. At the same time, the government needs to open up economic opportunities to the youth in the area so as they are actively engaged in economic activities as a way of empowering them. Pico (2017) agrees with these findings that mitigating IEDs focuses on deterring, detecting, and preventing IED employment before threats become imminent. Counter-IED operations seek to disrupt the networks that use IEDs, train the forces fighting those networks, identify and protect against IEDs, and prevent IED users from carrying out their nefarious plans. The responses obtained in the study from key informants support these claims that the solution to these kinds of attacks lies in close collaboration between the Government, Non-Governmental Organizations, communities and the international community.

The study noted wide usage of roadside IED attacks in Mandera East Sub County. Malhotra (2019) also posited that IEDs are currently the major cause of fatalities of armed forces, who are primarily locked in Counter-Insurgency Operations facing an enemy who is almost unseen, often indiscriminate, and always dangerous. Specially designed Armoured vehicles demand will be on the higher side as it is a priority for the military forces deployed there as a Counter IED measure. Some key informant responses in the study supported the claims that the KDF should adopt a robust border security posture within the framework of proximity to Kenya - Somalia border operations. The concept should be to embrace border security enforcement by positioning KDF to take lead, augmented by other security agencies including development of securitized border infrastructure and technology.

In line with the study findings that several initiatives have been introduced by the government to Counter-IED, Odhiambo (2014) also found that in a bid to neutralize the activities of Al Shabaab, the Kenyan government launched the “Operation Linda Nchi” which means ‘Protect the Nation’, by invoking article 51 of the UN Charter. This attack came at a time when Al Shabaab was becoming notorious for kidnapping of aid workers in the northern part of Kenya and tourists in Lamu. This operation was aimed at repulsing the militants and dilute their offensive. Their presence in Kenya was a security threat to tourism industry and territorial integrity. The key informants reinforced these findings that there is need for a comprehensive Kenya/Somalia border securitization strategy. The strategy is to ensure that sufficient levels of border patrols as this will enhance desired rapid response capabilities. Equally, the strategic development of infrastructure to deter illegal movement at the border is vital to success of border enforcement operations. This includes border fencing alongside detection technologies and censoring platforms, establishing of legitimate border control points, construction of border patrol roads, rehabilitation of existing airstrips and upgrading of access roads to all weather standards.

The idea of construction of border fence was stated in the study. Sambu (2018) also discusses the idea of border fence. The study noted that following the heightened Al-Shabaab attacks in Mandera, Garissa and Wajir counties, Kenya mooted the idea of the construction of border fence in March. The key informants also support these findings that there is need to detect any unauthorized or suspicious activity in the perimeter. This is achieved by vigilance on the part of residents, CCTV Cameras and Perimeter Intrusion Detection Systems.

7. Conclusions and Recommendations

The study concluded that there is continued IED attacks in Mandera East Sub County, Mandera County, Kenya, that which necessitates more investment by the government of Kenyan community policing and increasing border security monitoring systems, in order to completely outmaneuver the Al Shabaab. The study also concludes that, since the law as established provides for community policing, the security agencies should positively harness this law to encourage collaboration between the Civilians and the government.

Information and intelligence is vital towards stopping the IED attacks and, therefore, the adversarial relationship between the security agencies and the civilian population should be replaced with close collaboration with the aim of detecting and arresting IED perpetrators well in advance. Additionally, there is need for enhanced border security surveillance to provide early warning, and strategic positioning of the KDF units along the Somalia-Kenya border to provide deterrence, and immediate reactive capability on suspected Al Shabaab IED attacks.

References


Volume 9 Issue 8, August 2020

www.ijsr.net

Licensed Under Creative Commons Attribution CC BY

DOI: 10.21275/SR20810152647
