Nuclear Deterrence in South Asia: Failing or Not?

Nusrat Tayef
Nusrat Tayef is a lecturer at the Department of International Relations in Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman Science and Technology University, Gopalganj-8100.
Email: nusrat.tayef[at]bsmrstu.edu.bd

Abstract: In South Asia nuclear deterrence is failing or not? How far the nuclear deterrence is able to stop wars in South Asia? Scholars have different arguments upon the aforesaid questions, principally divided into two blocs’ i.e. nuclear pessimist and nuclear optimist. Nuclear optimists stated that nuclear weapons can bring balance in South Asia whereas nuclear pessimists affirmed that nuclear weapons can only bring tension and arms race in South Asia. Different literatures desired to come in a solution through empirical test, in this paper we aspired to focus on both scholarly literature and empirical test and draw a conclusion. Through Scott Sagan’s “models of building nuclear weapons” we tried to find out the reasons of India and Pakistan to build nuclear weapons. Despite other reasons security concern is the principal reason to build nuclear weapons by the states that bestows security-insecurity dilemma in South Asia instigating arms race. It is plausible to argue, though multiple conflicts and border skirmishes these two countries still have not used conventional military and nuclear weapons against each other, which supports the idea that state is not an irrational actor rather they can act rationally. Though the chances of accidental war and problems posed by the non-state actors, India and Pakistan aspire to avoid nuclear and conventional war and pursue the way of diplomatic solution. The article draws a conclusion that nuclear power is not capable to stop all the wars but it can provide a balance and discourage states to engage in a nuclear war or conventional war and opt for diplomatic solution. This article contributes to understand the reasons of India-Pakistan to achieve nuclear weapon, how far nuclear deterrence is successful in South Asia, through giving scholarly as well as empirical foundation.

Keywords: Nuclear deterrence, Optimist-Pessimist debate, South Asia

1. Introduction

Since the Partition of 1947, India and Pakistan have been facing critical moment. They already have fought several wars, and in most of the time they have engaged in border conflict with each other on the issue of Kashmir. India tested its first nuclear weapon in 1974 and Pakistan followed the suit made a trial in 1998. Now there are two nuclear powers in South Asia which are hostile to each other. After achieving nuclear weapons, they are more cautious to use conventional military artillery against each other and there is no use of nuclear munitions till today. There exist two conflicting arguments to explain the behavior of India and Pakistan. One is nuclear optimist argument and another is pessimist argument. The former argues that nuclear weapon has made the region more stable and the latter says that nuclear weapon has made the region more vulnerable although there is no use of nuclear weapon despite frequent conflicts in South Asia. Thus, the question of nuclear deterrence comes in front. According to Scott D Sagan, there are three prominent models which are crucial for understanding the development of nuclear weapons in South Asia. Models are important for the reasons showing why India and Pakistan had developed nuclear weapons. These three models are: security model, domestic model and norms model. In this paper, it is an attempt to shed our light on security model which definitely argues that India and Pakistan had developed nuclear power for their own security and survival. On the basis of this model, we can link it with two different arguments like optimistic arguments and pessimistic arguments. They tried to show that whether nuclear deterrence is working or not. Prominent scholar Kenneth Waltz established the idea of optimism where he basically offered the balance of power and wanted to show that nuclear deterrence in South Asia is crucial for maintaining balance of power. This balance of power is prohibiting both the country to engage in a conventional war or nuclear war. Although there is geographical proximity and other problems of non-state actors exist in the region, both the countries behave rationally. This argument largely questioned by Sagan’s pessimism where he argued that nuclear deterrence is not preventing states from engaging in a war rather it is instigating both countries to engage in an arms race which is farther destabilizing the regions, through this paper we illustrate how the expansion of nuclear weapons has stopped war or not, in South Asia, shedding light on the debate between nuclear pessimists and nuclear optimists. Searching bomb, if it is security based then how much security it is giving to South Asia? Deterrence is failing or not?

This study is based on secondary data which encompasses books, journal articles and websites. Qualitative method for data collection has been used.

2. Conceptual Framework

For understanding the pessimist and optimist debate and the current situation of South Asia it’s important to understand nuclear deterrence. What actually deterrence stands for? According to Williams (2008) Deterrence is the use of threats to dissuade an adversary from initiating an undesirable act the idea of deterrence is an age-old concept. The idea of deterrence got its point through the writings of classical school of criminal justice, notably Jeremy Bentham, Cesare and von Feuerbach’s theory of criminal law on general idea. The idea was that the threat of punishment should be specified in the mind of potential lawbreaker, the fear of punishment can stop them to commit the crime. During cold war, Thomas Schelling, defined deterrence as a military strategy based on the issue of a threat intended to refrain an adversary from starting something [1] Deterrence came in a new form after the invention of nuclear weapon, which came with an idea of
nuclear deterrence. After the attack on Nagasaki and Hiroshima in 1945, the story of nuclear deterrence started and USSR achievement of nuclear power in 1950s showed the world the actual form of nuclear deterrence, how it works. Now the question is what is nuclear deterrence? According to Bernard Brodie, the architect of nuclear deterrence, “Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose” [2] According to L. Johnson (1998), “Nuclear Deterrence is a strategy of nations possessing significant nuclear arsenals for influencing the behavior of other nations, usually also possessing nuclear arsenals. More specifically it is a strategy of putting in place incentives for other nations not to engage in certain kinds of military actions, in particular not initiating a nuclear war”. [3] The greatest success of nuclear deterrence is not to use for destructive purpose after the first explosion in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. One of the finest examples of nuclear deterrence is Cuban missile crisis, where both The US and the USSR restrained themselves from engaging in a war for the fear Nuclear war. In South Asia both India and Pakistan achieved nuclear power, according to some optimist scholar this nuclear facility making South Asia more stable on the other hand pessimist scholar arguing that nuclear weapon is not making South Asia stable rather than making the continent more vulnerable. Now in this paper it will be worth to see that nuclear deterrence is failing or not.

3. Literature Review

Chakma (2014) elucidated South Asia’s nuclear security from two viewpoints. Firstly, India and Pakistan’s capability to secure themselves from the possible attacks by each other and the causes and consequences of nuclear arms race. Secondly, the two states’ nuclear infrastructure’s security from non-state actors’ possible attack. He also criticized the idea of nuclear optimists because of their extreme belief in stabilizing effect of nuclear weapons and pessimists for their over alarmist view. He prescribed that India and Pakistan need to follow minimum deterrence policy to minimize the chance of deterrence failure and the possibility of obtaining nuclear capability by non-state actors.

Mian (1998) explained soon after the Partition in 1947, both Pakistan and India initiated nuclear arms race, although they had different reasons. India cherished to grasp a room in the list of states with nuclear weapons and Pakistan’s drift was to maintain equivalence with India. Pakistan’s policy makers stated publicly that they would not give up the advancement of nuclear weapons as long as India does. The most contentious issue was Kashmir crisis that is mostly influenced by them for building nuclear capability.

Sagan (1996) investigated the question, “why do states build nuclear weapons”? He expounded three models to riposte the question. The first one is security model, which argued that security is the prime concern of a state that influences states to build nuclear weapon. He looked over the examples of US and Russia for security concern that had influenced them to build nuclear capabilities. The second model is domestic model arguing that states aspire to build nuclear weapons for domestic reasons like domestic instability or pressure from interest groups. Sagan tested the proficiency of domestic model in the frame of reference to India. And the last one refers to the norms model extracting the prestige and identity of states through building nuclear weapons such as France.

Sagan and Waltz (2003) expressed their concerns of nuclear spread regarding nuclear optimist and nuclear pessimist views. Waltz contended that nuclear weapon is transforming the universe into more stable because nuclear armaments award security and survival guarantee of a sovereign territory. It likewise offer sa nuclear security shield. Sagan enunciated differently. He outlined that nuclear weapon is causing the world particularly South Asia more vulnerable. The geographical proximity, inadequate warning, secret operations, leaders’ views and lack of technological advancement are some grounds causing the region more unstable. And the other serious concern is that Pakistan has no personal reliability program (PRP) which generates possibility of theft or use by terrorist groups.

Muller (1988) propounded that “although nuclear weapon is a great technological innovation but it has not influenced the great power policy so much in the cold war period”. He also explained that the reason of absence of war during the post-cold war era is subjected to incredible cost and change of people’s mentality toward war rather nuclear weapon. Chakma (2012) focused on American diplomatic intervention in Kargil conflict and also the 2001-2002 military standoffs. He examined that, without American diplomatic intervention it could outbreak Indo-Pakistan war exponentially. It also gave rise to the possibility of nuclear warfare in the region.

The aforementioned literatures frequently extracted the reasons of why states build nuclear weapons and its impact on South Asia. It also tests the stability or instability of the region. The differences between South Asian nuclear capability and safety measures comparing with other states having nuclear weapons. In this study, the attempt has been taken to focus on the different reasons of India and Pakistan’s building nuclear weapons and their policy behind it. These literatures strive to explain nuclear pessimists and optimists’ debate on this region as well. Another argument is how far the deterrence successful in South Asia.

4. Models of Building Nuclear Weapon


Security Model: Security model inherits its idea from Kenneth Waltz’s neo-realism that unfolds international system as responsible for states’ behavior to escalate more power for the sustainability in international system. The system relies on power politics and self-defense. In this case, states take a fancy to build nuclear weapons for their survival in international arena. If we put the empirical
Evidence of US, Russia, UK and other nuclear facilitated countries, we may observe the affirmation that states are building nuclear weapons for their own security working as deterrence as well as providing security shield over them.

**Domestic Politics Model:** Nuclear weapon is not always for security issue in some cases. States build nuclear weapons for the interest of internal actors. Three types of internal actors are more important for pressuring the government to become a nuclear weapon-state. Such as, the states’ scientists who are engaged with nuclear energy establishment; military or bureaucrats and politicians who have thirst for increasing popularity through the acquisition of nuclear power. In some cases, governments shot to regain popularity thorough security driven nuclear establishment. In this circumstance, security is not always the ultimate reason to achieve nuclear weapons but for internal actors’ interest.

**Norms Model:** It contends that states build nuclear weapons for not only security and domestic politics but also for nuclear symbols and states’ identity. States joining in a nuclear hub increase prestige of a state to become an important country in the international arena. The US humiliation of France in Suez crisis [5] compelled France to set foot in a nuclear hub. Nuclear symbolism is important for a state to identity in international system. The norms model is quite an important construction to understand the nuclear bomb and identity politics.

These three models are crucial for interpreting the reasons why states have nuclear ambition. These models are fit appropriate to understand South Asian nuclear paradigm as well. In the following sections, we intend to investigate the reasons behind nuclear ambition in South Asia.

5. **Implications of Sagan’s Models in South Asia**

The subcontinent is one of the conflicting areas in the world with the two nuclear powers like India and Pakistan. At first India built nuclear weapons and then Pakistan followed the suit. The reasons why both countries built nuclear ammunitions are to be described according to the lens of Sagan’s models of building nuclear weapons.

5.1 **India’s Reasons**

Security Model: The security model explains that states build nuclear weapons for its security from other potential threats. If we escort to the case of India, we will discern the defeat of India in 1962 border war with China and nuclear tested by China in 1964 had much influenced the nuclear projects of India. The NIE (Nuclear Intelligence Estimate) report after the first Chinese test argued that India is the only state that affirms establishing nuclear weapons. [6] It also argued that, the nuclear proliferation which could happen that is not expected to upset the world’s balance of power, but there might be a risk that regional conflicts could drag the superpowers to a nuclear confrontation. Moreover, the report also gave the warning of accidental nuclear war. [7] As we follow the word of Jawaharial Neheru the first prime minister of India we will see the security concern of India, he said.

“As long as the world is constituted as it is, every country will have to devise and use the latest scientific devices for its protection. I have no doubt India will develop her scientific researches and hope Indian scientists will use the atomic force for constructive purpose. But if India is threatened, she will inevitably try to defend herself by all means at her disposal” [8]

The Domestic Politics Model: It is the second model used to explain the causes of India’s nuclear building. Sagan argued, “whether or not the acquisition of nuclear weapons serves the national interests of a state, it is likely to serve the parochial bureaucratic or political interest of at least some individual actors within the state”. [9] There are three kinds of interest groups in domestic politics. [10] These are nuclear scientists, professional military and politicians. But India’s nuclear aspiration mostly influenced by nuclear scientists and politicians of the state.

**Nuclear Scientists:** In the India’s case Homi Bhaba, the chair of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) [11], had lobbied for the development of nuclear weapons’ capability, his successor Sarabhai opposed the idea and paused the program. In 1971, after the death of Sarabhai, the pro-bomb scientist in the AEC began to lobby with the Prime Minister Indira Gandhi who eventually decided to endorse the scientist’s recommendation. [12]

**Politicians of the State:** In 1972, Indira Gandhi’s government started facing various problems one after another, including a detrimental drought, corruption of senior politicians, high inflation, and massive challenges by workers and growing public opposition against Gandhi government. These incidents played a key role behind Gandhi’s decision to build nuclear weapons to regain her popularity.

Norms Model: This is basically focused on prestige and state’s identity that influenced the idea of nuclear building in India. India had long aspiration to become South Asian regional power resulting in achieving her nuclear power. [13]

5.2 **Pakistan’s Reasons**

Security Model: Pakistan became matted largely in secured by the nuclear capability of India. Pakistan had in addition several experiences of war with India for Kashmir in 1947, 1965, 1971 1999. With these experiences of war Pakistan was in vulnerable position with a hostile neighboring country. Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was repeatedly sought for nuclear weapon for security. His daughter Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto once said that, “it’s our history of three wars with a larger neighbor, India is five times larger than we are, their military strength is five times larger in 1971, and our country was disintegrated. So, the security issue for Pakistan is an issue of survival.” [14]
The Domestic Politics Model: Domestically the interest group was the scientist group. The official journal of the Pakistani Atomic Energy Commission asserted, “The recent war inflicted by India on us, has shown once again, that even the best intentions can lead to battlefield. . . We as scientists shoulder a rather special responsibility. We have accepted the challenge of atomic energy and we must now try to prove ourselves equal to the task, be it peace or war.” [15] In 1998, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif said that, there was extensive pressure from Pakistani scientists to test the nuclear capability and provided them the opportunity. [16]

Norms Model: Pakistan endeavored to become a nuclear capable country because the policymakers viewed it as a prestige issue for them. Through building nuclear capability, they tried to escape from Indian domination. In defense of this argument, General Aslam Beg termed the building of Pakistan’s nuclear project as “geopolitical ambition and matching up with India.”[17]

It can be summarized that Pakistan’s building of nuclear weapon made possible due to all these models. But security concern was the principle issue for Pakistan.


In South Asia with a long hatred history of ‘Two-Nation Theory’ made the subcontinent vulnerable since 1947. Chain reaction instigated two nations like India and Pakistan to build nuclear weapons. Soon after China became nuclear country in 1964, it was an immense threat for India. Consequently, she established her nuclear arsenals. After the achievement of India’s nuclear warheads, it was dying need for Pakistan to balance the Indian nuclear combination. Finally, it achieved nuclear ability and tested it in 1998. Both states felt security threat and security dilemma that influenced them to build nuclear shield. Although there are other models describing the establishment of nuclear capability as well but the security model is more capable to explain the behavior of states. Thus, the security model raises the question ‘How far nuclear weapon is stabilizing South Asia?’ And enthusiastically it is relevant to raise the debate between optimists and pessimists. Does the debate offer security or insecurity?

The debate between optimists and pessimists illustrates that South Asian nuclear ability is creating both security and insecurity dilemma in South Asia. Security breeding insecurity [18] it’s a remembrance of Thucydides Peloponnesian war where he explained how Athenian power fell down for security dilemma and how every state fell in Thucydides trap [19] and started to increase security. As India and Pakistan both split tragic history and are not in a comfortable situation with one another. Both have already fought several wars and engaged in pocket wars as well as border skirmishes. In these circumstances, India attained nuclear capability Pakistan also pursued the suit. Now the question is, ‘Is this nuclear capability creating stable South Asia or vulnerable South Asia prone to engaging in wars for a single misinformation?’

Chakma (2012) argued that, “there are several reasons which can instigate a nuclear war in South Asia. These are: geographical proximity of the adversaries; weak command and control systems; organizational bias and precarious civil-military relations (in Pakistan); and uncertainty about the level of safety of the Indo-Pakistani nuclear assets.” [20] Without these, terrorism is also another threat for India-Pakistan relations that can make the situation more vulnerable in coming days.

Ganguly and Kapur(2010) present a comparative knowledge about South Asian nuclear crisis where the optimist-pessimist debate gets more rejuvenation. In this revitalization, Ganguly explained that nuclear war head offers more stable South Asia though both Pakistan and India fought several wars. Both countries have experienced the ultimate situation of the nuclear war. For this reason, they act rationally; avoid any sort of nuclear war and shot to solve. On the other hand, Kapur argued that nuclear capability is only creating more vulnerable situation where Pakistan got the power to exercise it and making the region more susceptible. He prioritizes tactical and diplomatic mechanism rather than nuclear deterrence. For nuclear capability, states can adopt aggressive and delicate strategies and rather than nuclear stability instigate arms race in South Asia.

Both agreed on the detrimental effect of missile arms race in South Asia and the militancy that can destabilize South Asia although there is nuclear deterrence both authors’ contesting arguments and empirical evidence suggest that nuclear deterrence can create security- insecurity dilemma in South Asia.

Empirical Test

Both India and Pakistan spend a huge amount of money for their defense budget including building missiles. In the fiscal year 2017-18, India’s defense budget was $53.5 billion whereas that of Pakistan has been increased dramatically by 10-11 per cent in the last few years. The government had earmarked Rs860.2 billion for defense budget for the current financial year, 2016-2017, which was 11 per cent higher than the budget of Rs775.8 billion in the year 2015-2016. India’s military expenditure is 3.3% of world military budget and day by day it is increasing. This large economic share has been making use of missile building. India has short range Prithvi (150-350 km) and the intermediate range (1200-2400 Km) Agni ballistic missile. In December 26, 2016 India tested Agni 5 which is intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with range of 5500-8000 km after 18 September 2016 Uri incident. And in response to India, Pakistan built Hatf and Ghuri missile on January 3, 2017, which was 11 per cent higher than the budget of Rs775.8 billion in the year 2015-2016. Pakistan experimented Ababeel with range of 2200 km. And the country also tested Shaheen-3 in response to India’s Agni-3 missile on 9 March, 2015 and its range is 2750 km. It can easily be said that both India and Pakistan are in an ongoing missile race.

7. Debate between Pessimists and Optimists on Nuclear Proliferation

There is an ongoing debate on the issue of nuclear proliferation. Sagan and Waltz are the main pioneers of this
debate. One group of scholars believes that proliferation of nuclear weapon is making the South Asian region more stable and after building nuclear weapon there is such no kind of major war between India and Pakistan without some pocket wars. The other group of scholars’ counts on that nuclear weapon is making the world more vulnerable and creating tension of an accidental war for a minimum misunderstanding.

**Optimistic Views:** This school ventures that nuclear weapon is better for the world. Kenneth Waltz opines that a large collection of nuclear weapons will make the world more stable. And a significant number of rational and neorealist political scientists supported for the bandwagon. According to Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William Riker, spreading of nuclear weapon is “the chance of a bilateral conflict becoming nuclear that decreases to zero when all nations are nuclear armed.” [21]

John Mearsheimer believes that, “nuclear weapons are a superb deterrent.” Other neorealist optimistic scholars also have accorded the same prediction. Peter Lavoy predicts that, “nuclear weapon will prevent future war between India and Pakistan”.

Nuclear weapon has fundamentally changed the nature of statecraft. The character of the state and its behavior change as well. A nuclear power is bound to maintain exceeding caution when dealing with an adversarial nuclear weapon state. According to Shamshad Ahmed, “in South Asia nuclear deterrent may usher in an era of durable peace between Pakistan and India, providing the requisite for resolving all outstanding issue, especially Jammu and Kashmir”.

It is evident from the above optimist discussions that nuclear weapon is making South Asia more stable. If we go through the arguments of Kenneth Waltz, we may glimpse how nuclear weapon is making the world stable.

“State is a rational entity, self-preserving, and risk averse in the sense that it will never go for a large scale of self-destruction, even if the chances are small, so long as the chances are not zero. Doesn’t matter if the state is not unitary enough people in the decision-making processes will conform to the rationality assumptions to allow us to infer unitary preferences?” Waltz in his article “why Iran should get the bomb” extracted that only the achievement of nuclear weapon by Iran can make the Middle East stable. Without the balance of power, it is infeasible to make stable Middle East. Thus, according to his theory, nuclear weapon is the ultimate deterrence that is prohibiting India-Pakistan to engage in a destructive war. And in any war like situation restricting them to engage in conflict and solving the problem through tactical and diplomatic solution. On this basis of the Walt’s assumptions, it can be exemplified Kargil war as an example where both parties made an effort to solve through diplomatic measures.

**Pessimist Views:** Kenneth Waltz’s nuclear optimism is largely criticized by pessimist view of Scott D Sagan and other pessimist scholars. Sagan in his article “The Perils of proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapon” founded the idea of organizational pessimism. He identified several problems which can break nuclear deterrence in a second.

There are differences between the nuclear relationship between India and Pakistan from the cold war bipolar system because, the nuclear arsenals in South Asia are much smaller and less advanced than were the US and Soviet arsenals. Thus, made both the countries’ arsenals more vulnerable to counter an attack and less able to prevent an accidental war. There are also differences in civil military relations in the two cases. The USSR and the US both eventually developed an assertive command system with tight high level civilian control over nuclear weapons. On the other hand, Pakistan military has the full control over nuclear weapons and there easily can happen an organizational misunderstanding which can make a nuclear war.

In keeping with optimistic and pessimist ideas of nuclear deterrence in mind, several problems can be identified as nuclear deterrence problem which have been stated below.

- Pakistan has been indirectly under military control for many years. There are some organizational biases within the military system and it has much control on nuclear weapon that can make a preventive war possible. The 1986-87 Brustacks can be explained by this where 250000 troops were deployed for counter offensive attack by India.
- The fear of retaliation is essential for successful deterrence. But both countries have the power to caliber collecting the secret information. If they can secretly destroy their second-strike capability, there will be no deterrence.
- According to optimists, the nuclear arsenals of Pakistan and India are safer causing being small. But they ignored the geographical proximity, inadequate warning system that can make a nuclear war with a minimum misunderstanding. In January 4, 2001 there occurred an accidental missile explosion in India which killed one official and injured many as an example. The false warning is another important thing. In May1998, prior to Pakistan’s explosion, they got a news that India and Israel were launching a preventive war against them. If Pakistan believed the news, it would generate a disaster in South Asia.
- According to pessimists, there is a potential terrorist attack in South Asia that is making the world more vulnerable.

8. Conclusion

There are multiple arguments of two different schools of thought to prove their hypothesis. Although they have ignored many important issues like, Kenneth Waltz constantly ignored the organizational and technical problem of nuclear weapon which can initiate a serious nuclear conflict in this region and he also ignored the non-state actors’ problem in South Asia, principally terrorism, on the other hand Sagan ignored the idea that after all, state can think rationally, state is not an irrational institution.

Despite all the scholarly debate of nuclear weapons, it can be affirmed that nuclear weapons have helped to stop major
conventional wars in South Asia. And in this regard, we have to sacrifice the idea of nuclear deterrence that, nuclear weapons can stop all wars. On the contrary, we need to get that it cannot stop small conflict and pocket wars among states but it can stop major wars which is justifiable for South Asia. Nuclear deterrence is successful in many cases. Being a nuclear country, both the countries like Pakistan and India are informed to the ability of one another and they know how much the war will cost if escalation of nuclear war happens. Before taking destructive decision, both the countries prefer to solve it mutually and in a diplomatic way. The nuclear deterrence is giving South Asia a balance though there is geographical proximity and other tensions, the states are behaving rationally. If there is no balance in South Asia, the subcontinent could face the European history of wars where every state cherished to invade others. Now nuclear deterrence is giving balance in South Asia, and paving the way to solve any problem through diplomatic solution. In South Asia, insecurity is giving security, though the problem of non-state actors can cause sufferings for both of the states in long run. The problem should be solved by the countries’ mutual cooperation. Through the cooperation, it can be possible to build mutual respect and come in one platform for the benefit of states.

In conclusion, though nuclear deterrence is not capable to abolish all kinds of wars in South Asia, but it is capable to stop major conventional and nuclear war in South Asia. After the incidents of Uri and Palwama in recent days, these two countries still manage not to engage in a conventional or nuclear war rather they opt for diplomatic solutions. In accordance with previous and present cases of conflicts between India and Pakistan, it is plausible to argue that nuclear deterrence is not failing in South Asia. Though the insecurity is giving security in South Asia, both the countries need to be more responsible about the safety of nuclear weapons. Despite the risky benefit of nuclear weapon, all the countries should stop to desire for nuclear weapon, it is not always easy to play with fire though its adventures.

References

[5] Suez crisis started on October 29, 1956. Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized Suez Canal which nearly brought the Soviet Union into the conflict and damaged their relationships with the United States. In the end, Egypt emerged victorious, and the British, French and Israeli governments withdrew their troops in late 1956 and early 1957. The event was a pivotal event among Cold War superpowers.
[16] Ibid
[19] The term was coined firstly by Graham T Allison. It is an apparent tendency towards war when an emerging power threatens to displace an existing great power as the international hegemon.