Shift in Understanding and Religious Attitudes of Muslim Students in Kendari (A Study on Halu Oleo University Students in Kendari)

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Abstract: *This research was based on the results of qualitative descriptive research on 100 students and Focus Group Discussion (FGD) as well as in-depth interviews with 9 Muslim student organizations which in this study are divided into two groups, namely the first is group of Muslim student organizations (old) and the second is Muslim student organization (new). The results of this study showed that: firstly, there had been a shift in cultural and moderate religious understandings represented by Islamic (old) student organization groups such as HMI, PMII, IMDI and IMM, shifting to the movements and understandings of Islamic neo-Puritanism and Islamic politics (khilafah) represented by Islamic student organizations (new) such as the Wahdah Islamiyah Students (MWI), Salafi students, and ex HTI through Gema Pembebasan (Echo of Liberation), LDK KLMD, and FOSIL; secondly, the religious attitudes of Muslim students in Kendari. The case studies at UHO can be characterized, namely apathy, moderate attitude, the fundamentalist attitude and Islamic extremism, and the attitude of Islamic political extremism.*

Keywords: Shifts in Understanding, Religious Attitudes, and Muslim students

1. Introduction

The emergence of various types and patterns of organizations, groups and religious schools can be seen in two perspectives. *First*, reform has become a space for expression of religious freedom celebrations in a creative sense. The religious group that was originally heard was a result of the penetration of the new order policy such as waiting for the right moment for expression. It means that Muslims in Indonesia are very creative and responsive to the realities and contemporary problems faced as well as shows that religion is still a major force in the social configuration of the Indonesian people.

Second is the emergence of new potential conflicts. These diverse expressions appear at different points, even tend to be extreme and radical. In 2008, The Wahid Institute (WI) report shows that this second group provides a room for justification for acts of violence as a form of profound religious expression, the acts tend to be puritanical, denounce fellow Muslims and are intolerant in religious social life, and in the context of their state of life which is anti-*Pancasila* and the law as a whole which is not taken from the Qur'an and *hadith*. Furthermore, at some point this group will provide justification for theorists' actions as a term of jihad. This flow group is actually a big threat to the unity of the nation and the Republic of Indonesia and even humanity itself.

Both perspectives provide an illustration that change is not always directly proportional to improvement and problems. The emergence of conflicts and violence in the name of religion is a phenomenon due to wrong understanding. Azra (2014) said that the potential for violence justified by that understanding may occur in any religion, however, various findings and testimonials, potential conflicts and terrorism cases in Indonesia were born from Islamic groups rooted in the construction of an understanding of jihad. Testimonials

from Ali Fauzi, the younger brother of Amrozi, (convicted of death in the Bali Bomb terrorist case) the former *Jamaah Islamiyah* (JI) bomb assembling instructor said that the wrong doctrine was against extreme understanding of Islam which led to attitudes and acts of violence and terror in certain groups.
https://www.merdeka.com/22/5/2018.html.

In term of students, a shift in religious understanding, especially among Muslims towards extremism, fundamentalism and radicalism has continued to increase since the post-reform era (Saprillah, 2008). Even though there are many religious patterns and understandings, in general, the old Islamic student groups that are commonly referred to as the followers of *ahlunnunah waljamaah* can be laid out. Then, a new group that is more aggressive offers *puritanization* and *fundamentalism* and even the pattern leads to extremism and radicalism. Saifuddin (2011) found that ideological factors were the cause of the development of radicalism among students. Theoretically, people who already have students' level of knowledge if they hold radical beliefs must have gone through a miracle process or exchanged opinions long enough and intensely in order the student could receive radical understanding at the end.

In various phenomena of violence in the name of religion lately can be a reinforcement of this thesis. After the publication of Law of Mass Organization in 2017, it does not reduce the escalation of violence in the name of religion; precisely the facts and motives are increasingly diverse. After the church bomb terror incident in Surabaya, the terrorist case reappeared among the students of the University of Riau in less than a month (Pekanbaru, Kompas.Com, 6/2/2018). Then, by looking at this incident, acts of violence and even terrorism among students are not simultaneous and independent, but are the result and infiltration of the construction of extreme understanding as narrative and findings from Saifuddin (2011), radicalism arises because of the communication process with radical

networks off campus. Thus, radical movements that have been there along this time have tried to make metamorphoses by recruiting students, as educated circles.

Although religious radicalism is not identical with terrorism, it takes Rizal Sukma's language (2004): *"radicalism is only one step short of terrorism"*. The attitude of being a terrorist is not independent; experiencing escalation and changes that tend to be intolerant. Derived from ordinary understanding, then experiencing indoctrination, understanding to be extreme and radical, finally metamorphose in radical action (R & D of Religion, 2015).

For this reason, radicalism does not work spontaneously. Passing the process of changing understanding or in Saprillah language (2008) calls it the term shifting religious understanding. Even some studies especially The Wahid Institute (2008) found that religious radicalism occurred because of the attitude of extremism which begins with an ideological process, including among students. Even though some Religion Research and Development findings also indicate that some religious groups that are concerned about *puritanization* movements do not always intersect with the radicalism movement, but merely spread the understanding that they think is right. The motives, foundation and orientation of a movement can vary. Then, it is necessary to map in detail the shift in religious understanding and attitudes, then, various programs and policies that are appropriate in order to strengthen religious harmony especially among students and de-radicalization programs can be formulated appropriately.

At this point, this study is urgent because it contains how to shift the religious attitude map of Muslim students and whether these conditions have the potential for radicalism in Kendari or not and UHO itself as a public university in Southeast Sulawesi which has always been a central and diverse embryo of various movements in Southeast Sulawesi. This paper also serves as a preliminary assessment in formulating a strategic plan for students *de-radicalization* programs in Kendari.

In answering and finding out the focus point of the discussion related to these problems, this study formulated two formulations of the problems, they are; *first*, how is the shift in religious understanding of Muslim students in UHO Kendari, Southeast Sulawesi?; *Second*, what is the religious attitude of Muslim students towards radicalism in the UHO of Kendari, Southeast Sulawesi?

2. Literature Review

The term shift in this study is used to negate a current religious phenomenon. A phenomenon that occurs as a result of globalization that participates in building ideological contestation is often faced with local interests and identities.

Globalization encourages cosmopolitanism but at the same time there is a strengthening of identity that bases itself on social traditional communities and institutions. If globalization offers a variety of new understandings produced from outside, in a society, a nation seeks its representation of something local. Then, this is said by

Ulirch Beck in Woodward (2007), the term contradiction of globalization. This condition will then lead to a shift in self-representation both in the context of offering changes and new religious views or strengthening religious characteristics with their local contents.

According to Gail Moloney (2007), the movement of groups of people along with ideologies which become their mission from one country to another is now more massive. Systematically change the understandings in certain countries because the actors who spread the agenda. In Indonesia itself, religious understandings in Islamic societies are increasingly diverse with new religious sects; however, in general this flow can be categorized in two forms, namely the first with a fundamentalist pattern and carrying out the *neo-Puritanism Islamic* movement, and the second with a *secular Islamic liberal* pattern.

Rumadi (2009) detailed the mapping of movements and shifts in religious understanding of Muslim groups today can be divided into four groups: *first*, cultural Islamic groups with more moderate style of religious understanding. This group represents itself in the form of a strong Islamic tradition as a form of acculturation between religious teachings and culture. Various cultural traditions (cultural rituals) as long as they do not conflict with the basic principles of religion, they will do it consistently and for generations, offering it as an identity and a distinctive diversity that must be supported by the religion itself. *Second*, the group promotes the *neo-Puritanism Islam* movement. This group is based on the *Wahabi* understanding movement in the Middle East. The renewal movement offers purification by separating religious principles from culture itself. *Third* is groups that are patterned on *Islamic secular liberals*. This group offers the concept of religion with the basis of Islamic rationalist sect, separating religious values from politics as well as adopting various liberal (Western) products as a value of goodness to be actualized in the life of a liberal society. *Fourth*, the group that moves Islamic politics by offering the concept of *khilafah* or *Islam al-dhaulah* (Islamic country). The four groups are increasingly developing and contesting including in Indonesia. Seek supporters and target various segments of the population including students. The mapping is the reference in seeing the shift in religious understanding of Muslim students as the unit of this study.

The second aspect that is the focus of this research is related to religious attitudes. According to Riffat Hasan (1993), each religion has different religious configurations and attitudes. In general, religious attitudes are divided into two parts: fundamentalism and moderate groups. Fundamentalism itself emerged and became popular in the 20th century which was associated with the framework of conservative Protestants in America. They put the Gospel as a holy book without error and interpretation was unneeded. Then, according to Rifat Hasan (1993), in Islam, there are groups as well that are deeply textual and rigid in understanding the Qur'an as a holy book. This group is included then in the Fundamentalism group with closed religious attitudes even rejecting diversity. The coming of Islam as the last religion and the perfect for them, it should

be that the people or other religious groups consciously unite themselves in Islam.

The foundation of this understanding if drawn in a simpler and easier measured religious attitude refers to E Marty in Karen Armstrong (2005) placing 5 attitudinal indicators namely (1) ways to understand religious texts that are textual and monopolistic in religious interpretations, (2) intolerance to different with him which could commit violence or approve violence against different groups, (3) reject or not modernity, especially concepts related to diversity appreciation, (4) carrying out a structured and massive movement through a political movement of power to overthrow a legitimate government, and (5) not believing in and not recognizing the concept of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia and *Pancasila* as the basis of the country. Some findings and phenomena show that various acts of violence and acts of terrorism originate from 5 (five religious attitudes). One will be exposed strongly if goes through a process of shifting and changing religious attitudes towards more extreme.

3. Research Methodology

This type of research is included in the scope of qualitative descriptive research with data collection methods carried out through a technique. *Firstly*, structured interview was conducted with questionnaire as instruments which given the questionnaires to 100 students as informants/respondents who represented 17 faculties in Halu Oleo University. *Secondly*, in-depth interview was done to examine more deeply about religious attitudes, especially relating to the map of religious change in students' post-reform era. *Thirdly*, Focus Group Discussions (FGD) was conducted as well in order to enriching data and building consensus related to forms of recommendations and strategies for strengthening de-radicalization programs among students especially in Kendari.

4. Result

4.1 The Condition and Development of Muslim Student Organizations in Halu Oleo University Post-Reformation

This study uses the term new Islamic student movement group with the intention to distinguish Islamic student groups that emerged before the 2000s (before the reform era). Apart from the temporal aspect, it is different in terms of issues and the content of the movement as well. Islamic student groups identical to the old or mainstream group at the time were the Indonesian Islamic Students Association (HMI), the Indonesian Islamic Student Movement (PMII), and the Muhammadiyah Students Association (IMM). Research and Development of Religion (2005) noted that mainstream (old) organizations have been developing since the 1970s with their dynamics, whereas in UHO itself the organization began to develop rapidly between the mid of 1980s - 2000.

In 2000 was a monumental year of the development of a (new) Islamic-based student organization at UHO. In the current year, Islamic student organizations are just starting to build strength. The Islamic (formal) issues which are offered by them to Muslim students around the campus get good attention. Some of these organizations can be identified in three groups: *first*, KAMMI with *akhlaki* Islamic issues and moral movements; *second*, LDK-BKLMD (ex Hidzbu Tahrir Indonesia abbreviated HTI) with the issue of Islamic caliphate and political movements; *third*, LDK Ulul Al-bab who are affiliated with *Wahdah Islamiyah* (WI) with the issue of purifying the Qur'an and reviving the *Sunnah*. These three organizations began to control mosques and campus prayer centers.

The 2000s were indeed a year of expansion of new organizations in Kendari. Islamic organizations (new) such as (1) Wing organization (underbow) of ex HTI which is currently metamorphosed in several organizations such as LDK-BKLMD, FOSIL, and Gema Pembebasan (Echo of Liberation), (2) Wahdah Islamiyah also develops its wings in several student groups, especially LDK Ulul Al-bab, and (3) KAMMI developed with a model of the characteristics of Islamic politics, all of which increasingly showed its extension on this campus. This is inversely proportional to the old religious organizations such as NU and Muhammadiyah. Both developments are relatively stagnant. Observations show that almost all of the two organizations' affiliations among students experience a drastic stagnation both in terms of quantity and movement. The presence of the Islamic organization (new) shifted the role of the old Islamic student organizations (HMI, PMII, and IMM) on campus in terms of managing religious issues. This map is also reinforced by the results of Saprillah's research (2008), finding that Islamic studies are more dominated by the new group. Meanwhile, the activities of older groups such as HMI, PMII and IMM are more politically and reactive oriented towards certain issues (which are not related to religious issues). As a result, the presence of the old organizational acquisitions on campus is not too pronounced.

The development of new Islamic organizations in particular (WI and various affiliates from Ex HTI) has grown massively since the last 6 years. Even though it was true that since the release of the Law of Mass Organization in 2017 which was followed by the dissolution of HTI, this group suffered a bit of pressure. However, the stretching of several student groups that had been a wing organization from the former HTI from the beginning continued to be conducive, studies and *khalaqah* continued to be carried out in several campus corridors. Some of their activities are often carried out in the courtyard of the UHO Monument roundabout. The influence of the models of *khalaqah* and *tarbiyah* in this courtyard is quite interesting for students as well due to the conditions which are shady and comfortable through the concept of cross legged position. Even though occasional campus security forbids students from using the pillar's court, yet they still keep going on. Especially ex HTI students can be grouped into two categories: *first*, as their activists are incorporated in several organizations namely (1) LDK-BKLMD with mastery orientation and campus mosques, (2) Gema Pembebasan (Echo of Liberation) which is a movement group that conducts various political studies economic and culture and aggressively agitating the

government and the country, (3) FOSIL which can be said to be a study group which studies and assists various learning problems experienced by students. FOSIL are scattered and formed in several faculties. FOSIL has been formed in all 16 faculties. *Second* is the sympathizer. The number of sympathizers is quite a lot; they are sympathetic and agree with the movements carried out by the groups.

Likewise, WI, which developed its affiliates not only in mosque activists through the LDK Ulul Al-bab, however, through campus study groups as well. They call themselves Students of Al-Wahdah which have quite intense moves. Observation of this research shows that in a week, in every faculty, WI student group conducts 2-3 times for study which is centered at the mosque of faculty, even they start occasionally using the campus grounds, looking for shady and rounded places facilitated by a student whom called as *ustadz*. Along with the announcing of the Law of Mass Organization in 2017, a certain pressure was happened among HTI students due to the dissolution, this group increasingly showed its extension with the issue of reviving the Qur'an and *Sunnah* among students. Although among the students themselves, this group experienced configuration with various groups and different *salafi* characters of their affiliated centers.

Thus, Islamic student groups (new) other than HTI which are currently developing in Kendari, are actually not only the Wahdah Islamiyah (WI) group which is ideologically Islamic with the Saudi Arabian Wahabi sect, yet there are other groups as well that have same character and physical appearance, which when confirmed they are not part of WI, for example the *first*, students affiliated with the *Muaz Bin Jabal* Organization. In Kendari, this group developed especially around the UHO campus area by establishing an education center and proselytizing which is called the Islamic Center Muaz bin Jabal (ICM) that established in 2007. Based on an interview, *Muaz bin Jabal* was originally part of WI, however, after developing, each of them have their own paths and then having their respective congregations. *Second*, there are other students groups who are affiliated with *Salafi* Islamic organizations with an understanding of religious sect same with *Salafis*. *Third*, students groups that are included in the Islamic political movement namely KAMMI, the members are mostly from WI. *Fourth*, student groups affiliated with *Jamaah Tabliq* also show their existence in campus mosques and faculties, although sometimes they have to compete with other WI or *Salafi* groups.

Based on the description, the development of student religious organizations in UHO, generally was dominated by Islamic group movements, which were configured in two bases of movement, namely: first, group of old Islamic student organizations (before the reform era) such as HMI, PMII, IMM, and IMDI which are still concentrate in the campus political movement, the dialectic of national discourse, namely social, economic and cultural, as well as conventional patterns of movement and regeneration; second is groups of Islamic students (new) are those born after the reform era, although globally this group has existed since the 1980s (Saprillah, 2016).

This new group shows a fast movement and has a strong expansion in influencing the religious character of students on campus, especially UHO today. If referring to Wood Ward's (2007) theory, this group can be categorized as Moving People and Shifting Representation. This group does not merely organize itself in one group and formulate the agenda of certain activities, yet has an ideology in a strong doctrine of its followers. These groups are mutually affiliated globally that hack into the country's territorial space in one and the same movement. Referring to this theory, it is natural that this group continues to develop in Kendari, with the character and mission of the movement which is more directed at the *puritanization* of Islam, extremism and Islamic fundamentalism, and conducting massive regeneration on students with the Islamic thinking.

On these days, the new Islamic organization groups have more mastery of campus religious discourse especially at Halu Oleo University. They are considered as the pillars of the spread of students' Islamic ideas. They have become a representation of Islamic students' Islamic discourse as well. Older groups such as HMI, PMII and IMM which are expected to instill a moderate understanding of Islam are lost in the movements and strategies of the new groups. Then, the expansion of the new groups seems to begin to affect religious activities and understanding of Muslim students in Kendari especially in Halu Oleo University.

4.2 Shifting Religious Understanding of UHO Muslim Students in Southeast Sulawesi

In general, the basis of students' religious understanding at UHO is cultural Islam. Nurcholis Majid's explanation (1998) of the cultural Islamic movement began to occur rapidly since the 1970s. Cultural Islam is understood as the translation of Islamic concepts that have been acculturated with culture. Islamic values from *Wali Songo* (saints of Islam in Indonesia) and the character of Islam in Indonesian society are portraits of cultural Islam that has become the spirit and mainstream of Islamic religious understanding of the archipelago.

The findings of this study indicate that most informants admit that their parents have habits, especially in life cycle ceremonies (birth, marriage, moving house, and death). They also admitted that they were brought up in such a way of silence. When they were born, *diaqiqah* (haircut) accompanied by *barzanji* (prayer) reading. Similarly, when entering adolescence they will be circumcised and *ditoba*. *Ditoba* is the religious tradition of Muna-Buton community which contains the values of advice and confirms that the child has stepped on *baligh* (stepping the stage of maturity) then the time has come to apply consistently the mandate as a Muslim with good consistent relationship with the God, parents, the environment, even with wide community.

The traditional religious model practiced by parents is an Islamic patron that is received without criticism and any legitimacy. It is a form of Islam *an sich*. Even though in *uhshuliyah* way (religious subject) is still weak, however, this tradition teaches the matter of tolerance and humanity's concern is very strong. The ideological basis for the implementation of student religion at that time was still

dominated by the NU and Muhammadiyah groups which were still in one Islamic ideology platform of *Ahlu Sunna Wajamaah*. *Ahlu sunnah waljmaah* is one of the schools in Islam that puts forward the principles of moderation, *wasyatiyah* (middle/balanced), and *al-adl* (justice). Religious phenomena felt by students before the reform era, for example, *first*, polite and harmonious religious attitudes and mutual respect of opinions between one another. There is usually a tension between the religious organizations of students at that time, HMI, PMII and Muhammadiyah, however, still in the level of campus political contestation, not on the literal and fundamental aspects of religion.

Second is about attitudes and views on national consensus, namely *Pancasila* and The Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). After the crackdown on the DII-TII movement which carried the *Daulah Islamiyah* (Islamic Country) from 1951-1960, since then the consensus of nationality of Muslims began to find common ground and similarity in the framework of the Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia. Likewise, the attitude of students in Kendari until the entry of the reform era is still in the same consensus that supports the establishment of the Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia and *Pancasila* as the nation's ideology.

In the previous discussion, post-reform, the emerging religious organizations of new students besides PMII, HMI, IMDI, IMM, PI, and the old Islamic organizations underbow including *Persis* and *Alwashliyah*. Referring to Martin E Marty in Karen Armstrong (2005), the Islamic-based student religious organizations leads to the *neo-Puritanism* and *Khilafah* movement (politics and power).

The emergence and involvement of students with Islamic organizations (new) influences their previous religious perspective. Student activists from LDK Ulul Al-bab UHO expressly stated that the practice of cultural Islam or traditional Islam carried out by their parents is contrary to the teachings of Islam. The tradition of reading *barzanji*, *yasinan* (prayer), even *ziara* (visit) graves, according to them, was never carried out by the Prophet Muhammad, then it is not worthy of tradition in Islam. Even though such traditions are common and often carried out, for example student groups from NU and *Washliyah*. This student group which is fanatic on the issue of Islamic *neo-Puritanism* emerged from *Wahabi* groups such as WI, *Salafi* students, and some of KAMMI activists who were members of the Campus Spiritual Activity Unit (UKKI).

The *second* line is the camp that carries the issue of *khilafah* namely the Islamic political movement. This group emerged from the ranks of ex HTI which had filiations or wing organizations in several student groups. At UHO itself, this group has many affiliations, for example, *first*, FOSIL, which are groups of students who are recruited from each faculty that have academic orientation and reasoning studies; s*econd*, *Gema Pembebasan* (Echo of Liberation) is one of the bases of the ex HTI movement among students, has carried out many movements with issues and criticisms on the state, (deconstruct) to weaken the state's extension, realize the ideals of the *Khilafah*.

The *third* row is LDK BKLMD, which is one of the campus *da'wah* (proselytizing) institutions established ex HTI, at UHO itself, which has been established since 2002 and is growing rapidly in 2006 until today and has a mastery orientation of campus mosques which is one of the strategies taken to expedite their propaganda and movements. In several interviews, this group acknowledged that the *khilafah* issues and movements will never cease due to this movement is part of Islamic teachings that must be preached until Muslims are fully aware and equally carry out the movement in order this country can stand in accordance with Islamic law.

Thus, the profile of Islamic student organizations (new) in the UHO orientation and shift leads to two lines. The first line is groups that constantly fight for Islamic *neo-Puritanism*. The second line is groups which continuously fight for *khilafah* through Islamic political ideas. The instant shift in orientation and religious understanding from cultural Islam to the new movement turned out to have an impact on radicalism which triggered strong opposition with other groups as well as the government (state). The thesis was concluded based on the results of the Focus Group Discussion (FGD) together with student groups at UHO. The *puritanization* movement and Islamic political doctrine with the *Khilafah* issue in the group of students who mostly do not have a strong base of religious understanding. Then, there is no comparison (sharing conception) with other Islamic concepts especially in view of religious relations with the state.

4.3 Religious Attitudes of Muslim Students in Halu Oleo University and its Implications on Radicalism

The context and phenomena that occur in Halu Oleo University actually have the same characteristics as the facts of other student movements. Research conducted by Arifudin Ismail on UGM student religious practices (2012) found that the seeds of radicalism appeared on students due to the shifting of fundamentalism through an instant doctrinal process. In UHO itself, the practice of doctrine like this is carried out by new groups through the form of *khaaqah* and *tarbiyah* both in groups and individually.

The link between the phenomenons of shifting the orientation of the movement to the phenomenon of student religious attitudes turned out to be increasingly showing strong extremism. Referring to the criteria of E Marty in Karen Armstrong (2005) puts 5 indicators of one's religious attitudes, namely (1) ways to understand religious texts that are textual and monopolistic in religious interpretations, (2) intolerance to different people then they can commit violence or approve violence against different groups, (3) rejecting or not modernity especially concepts related to diversity awards, (4) carrying out a structured and massive movement through a political movement of power to overthrow a legitimate government, and (5) not believing in and not recognizing the concept of the Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia and *Pancasila* as the basis of the country.

On these five variables, when referring to the responses of respondents from 100 students spread from 17 faculties

showing diverse attitudes. Indeed, in general, it is still dominant in more moderate, tolerant attitude, and recognizes the existence of the Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia and the ideology of *Pancasila*, however, the position that rejects is in the range of 5-8 percent. On the other hand, students who are more in agreement on the concept of the *khilafah* system are in the range of 19 percent. Each of the following variables can be examined in detail.

First, *the way to understand religious texts that is textual and monopolistic in religious interpretation*. In seeing this aspect, there are two things that can be underlined. Firstly, seen from an understanding of the truth of religion, and secondly about the way understand the teaching of Islam.

Table 1: Comprehending of the Truth of Islam

Variable	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
a. Islam is the only one of Islamic teachings	21	21.0	21.0
b. Islam is the main truth for Muslims; however, other religions contain the truth for their people as well.	74	74.0	74.0
c. Not know	5	5.0	5.0
Total	100	100	100

The data illustrates that the majority of respondents said that each religion contained the truth for their people. It is about 74 percent of the statements actually do not justify other religions yet contain an understanding of appreciation for the position of other religions that understand the truth. Meanwhile, respondents who said Islam as the only truth is around 21 people. When explored in in-depth interviews, this attitude has a pretension on the attitude of viewing other religions as a group that is wrong and deserves an unfair need.

Table 2: The way to understand and explore Islamic teachings

Variable	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
a. Direct from the Qur'an and the *Hadith*	63	63.0	63.0
b. Read and listen through the explanation of the Islam leaders.	35	35.0	35.0
c. Not know	2	2.0	2.0
Total	100	100.0	100.0

The second variable that relates to the perspective of Muslim students' religious texts in UHO shows that the way to understand and explore Islamic teachings prefers the first option, which is directly from the Qur'an and the *hadith*. Meanwhile, through the mediation of the Islam leaders' interpretation, it is only 36 percent. Options that show understanding religious teachings directly from the Qur'an and the *hadith* when crossed tabulation turns out that apart from the Muslim organization groups (new) such as WI, ex HTI, *Salafi*, and some Muhammadiyah activists also come from groups of students who do not have an organizational basis. After conducting a deepening, it turns that there is a misunderstanding and trapped in the term jargon that back to the Qur'an and *Sunnah*.

On in-depth interviews of several groups of WI and *Salafi* suggested that by understanding and reading directly on the Qur'an, it would keep us from the issue of heresy which according to them was born a lot from wrong interpretations, however, we practice prayers, meanwhile, they are still practicing on one of the sects. Along with Saprillah's research (2005), Muslim student groups which often cause tension in religious discussions among them due to the understanding system that tends to be textual and rigid. The point that can be taken from this attitude is that the reluctance and the existence of a religious guardian monopoly in Islam are actually much influenced by ignorance and trapped in acronyms back to the Qur'an and the *hadith* whereas the interpretation and sect as a product of *ijtihad* and interpretation of the Islam leaders of *salaf* also refer to the Qur'an and the *hadith*. It is solely to facilitate Muslims in applying their teachings.

Second, *intolerance to different people so that they can commit violence or approve violence against different groups*. In seeing this aspect, there are two sub-variables given to students as options, namely the attitude of friendship with different religions, and the question of who is the infidel group.

Table 3: Befriending Different Religion

Variable	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
a. May and willing to be friends	95	95.0	95.0
b. Cannot/do not want to be friends with the non-Muslim	1	1.0	1.0
c. Not know	4	4.0	4.0
Total	100	100.0	100.0

The table shows that 95 percent of 100 student respondents chose to be allowed and want to be friends with different religions. The rest is not know, and cannot/do not want to be friends is only one person. Befriending is actually in the surface and for social relations; however, when doing deepening such as "would you like to help other religious houses of worship?" and the answer is only 45 percent, while 50 percent do not want and some have no answer. Another sub-study, for example, "would you like to choose another religion as your leader?", and the answer reveals that there are still 35 percent who do not want it. Thus, the actual pattern of tolerance displayed is still limited in terms of ordinary friendship, however, matters relating to religious and political relations still divide the intolerance barrier. This was also shown by the research of Religion of R & D in the Sulawesi region (2014) that the index of religious harmony was in the range of 2.9 from the highest range of 3.0. This means that even though it is already high, the aspects of harmony still have to be built especially in cooperation in several social aspects of the community.

Table 4: Ones in the *Kafir* (infidel) Group

Variable	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
a. Those who are not religious or embrace a religion that is not carried by the prophets of God	58	58.0	58.0
b. All religions other than Islam	35	35.0	35.0
c. All adherents understand beyond the understanding or	3	3.0	3.0

group which I follow			
d. No answer	4	4.0	4.0
Total	100	100.0	100.0

The majority of respondents choose the first option, which is around 58 percent said that those who are treated as infidels are those who do not adhere to religion. Then, 35 percent said all religions other than Islam are infidels, and the one who chooses the third option who has an understanding beyond their understanding, even same in Islam is an infidel, there are 3 people or 3 percent for this variable. This 3 percent party is crossed tabulations from mosques activists. This group, commonly called by M. Jafar (2009) with the *takfiri* group, which groups who deny them outside Islam and even disagreeable groups, are denounced as a source of tension in interfaith relations.

The most prominent reason in the deepening of the interview: *firstly*, that religion other than Islam has experienced a lot of reduction in the teachings that have changed from the carrier (prophet). *Secondly*, according to them, the presence of Islam as a cover and the completion of the teachings of the previous religions should have been favored after they converted to Islam. Both of these understandings often trigger *takfiri* attitudes so that it is difficult to build deep harmony with other religions.

Third, *reject or not modernity, especially concepts related to diversity awards.* This aspect is seen in two sub-variables, *first*, the attitude towards diversity, especially religious diversity; *second*, attitudes or views of violence against other religions that are considered to be insulting to their religion.

Table 5: Diversity (of all kinds) of Religion can be united in One Religion

Variable	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
a. Agree	20	20.0	20.0
b. It cannot be put together and its diversity is a destiny	51	51.0	51.0
c. Not know	27	27.0	27.0
d. No answer	2	2.0	2.0
Total	100	100.0	100.0

This sub-argument shows that 51 percent of respondents said that diversity is difficult or cannot be put together. They assume that diversity is already destined or something that is given. Then, there are 20 percent who say they can and should be put together, and the remaining 27 percent is not know. When cross tabulated is done, the 20 percent who said they could be united, most of them did not have an organizational basis, nor were they affiliated to the lines of the old group or new group.

Thus, apart from the unclear basis of student organizations, there are 20 percent of the 100 respondents who say that diversity can be united, thus, denying diversity; however, the presumption of analysis in this group's FGD is may be happened due to ignorance about diversity.

Table 6: Attacking, Hurting (even Killing) People Who Are Considered to Harass Muslims Can Be Done

Variable	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
a. Agree	11	11.0	11.0
b. Less agree	53	53.0	53.0
c. Disagree	36	36.0	36.0
Total	100	100.0	100.0

Attitudes related to violence on those who are considered to have harassed their religion most respondents choose to less and disagree about 11 percent. This means that around 89 stated that it should not be done. The problem is that there are still around 11 percent who choose agree.

According to Rizal Sukma (2004), radicalism is often triggered by unilateral understanding or ideology. This condition often triggers violence. It should be said that if one is considered to be harassing his religion, it can be reported directly to the authorities, a series of violence and conflict can be spread to other groups if they judges this harassment themselves. The current UHO context is still at the level of the attitude of agreement to commit violence. Even though the percentage is still small, it requires integrated de-radicalization therapy.

Fourth, *carry out a structured and massive movement through a political power movement to overthrow a legitimate government*. The attitude of Muslim students from this aspect is seen from two sub-variables, namely: *first*, the view of the existence of the current government in the context of Islam, and *second*, the view of the *khilafah* system.

Table 7: Has the current government been legally and religiously ideal

Variable	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Agree	68	68.0	68.0
Less agree	8	8.0	8.0
Disagree	12	12.0	12.0
No answer	12	12.0	12.0
Total	100	100.0	100.0

The fourth aspect is the attitude of students related to the current existence of the government. The data shows that 68 percent agree that the current government is ideal for legally, politically and religiously. Then, 12 people have no answer, and 12 people choose disagree. This means that this group will still carry out massive movements to make ideological changes to the current government system. Cross tabulation shows that the most dominant groups who disagree or not have ideas are from ex HTI. The depth of the interview shows that their disagreement that the current concept of government cannot resolve the nation's problems in depth; moreover, legal and constitutional programs that are entirely not based on Islamic law.

Table 8: The current government is replaced by the *Khilafah* System

Variable	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
Agree	19	19.0	19.0
Less Agree	17	17.0	17.0
Disagree	58	58.0	58.0
No answer	6	6.0	6.0
Total	100	100.0	100.0

Furthermore, the fourth aspect is also seen from the sub-variables regarding the respondents' agreement from the current government concept to the *Khilafah* system, around 19 percent of the total 100 respondents agree with this. This amount is quantitatively quite a lot from 100 respondents. The movement of the Muslim organization groups (new) shifted the religious attitudes of students, especially the attitude of agreement on the existence of the government. This is indicated by the results of the cross tabulation which mostly comes from Islamic groups (new) especially wing organization of ex HTI such as Gema Pembebasan (Echo of Liberation), LDK BKLMD and Fossils. They prefer *khilafah* because they consider this system that can solve all the problems of this nation and in accordance with Islamic teachings.

Fifth, *not believing and not recognizing the concept of the Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia and Pancasila as the basis of the state*. This aspect of seeing the attitude of Muslim students is measured in two sub-variables, namely: *first*, the perception of the basis of the *Pancasila* state; *second*, the attitudes and views on the publication of the Law of Mass Organization No. 1 in 2017.

Table 9: Perceptions/Views on the Basis State of *Pancasila*

Variable	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
a. Not appropriate with the teachings of my religion	8	8.0	8.0
b. Appropriate with the teachings of my religion	76	76.0	76.0
c. Others	4	4.0	4.0
d. No answer	12	12.0	12.0
Total	100	100.0	100.0

In general, students' perceptions or attitudes show that the basis state of *Pancasila* is in accordance with Islamic teachings and is not contradictory. Even though, there are still 8 people or 8 percent who say it is not in accordance with Islamic teachings. Respondents who choose the option, if seen from their organization base still come from Muslim organization (new). Certainly, through an in-depth interview, the reason is due to the *Pancasila* does not fully choose the teachings of Islam by *kaffah* (faithfully). According to them, the *khilafah* system had been practiced by friends and as Muslims had the obligation to fight for this. Unlike the majority who choose the *Pancasila* option that was in accordance with Islam and the best choice for the Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia. This conclusion goes through the deep review process and the representation of qualified Islam leaders as well from the NU, Muhammadiyah and Persis groups at that time.

Table 10: View of the Issuance of Law of Mass Organization No. 1 in 2017

Variable	Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent
a. Strongly agree	20	20.0	20.0
b. Agree	43	43.0	43.0
c. Disagree	9	9.0	9.0
d. Not know	25	25.0	25.0
Total	100	100,0	100,0

The point that can be taken from the variables about the views of Muslim students on the concept of the Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia and *Pancasila* even though most students expressed support to see *Pancasila* as a final thing as the ideology of the nation; however, there are still groups about 8 percent who disagree and view is not in accordance with Islamic teachings. The results of the cross tabulation of this group come from the category of the new movement group organization which is a group that develops after reform that has a network and affiliation with foreign organizations (trans ideology). Certainly requires a special approach to this group in de-radicalization programs.

Mapping of E Marty (2005) states that a person has been exposed and is in the trap of radicalism by looking at indicators, namely; a method of understanding our sacred texts in a single and textual interpretation, rejecting diversity, especially religious diversity, intolerance in social relations, and disagreement with the state consensus, namely *Pancasila* and the Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia is a simple and rational mapping. This mapping is often used as a reference in other studies in measuring religious attitudes in certain institutions, especially their contact with radicalism, such as WI in 2004 until 2015 and Religion of R & D, and even BNPT through Southeast Sulawesi FKPT in 2016.

These data provide an illustration that UHO students since post-reform along with the shifting religious understanding of students from cultural Islam to Islam *neo-Puritanism* and the Islamic Political movement (*khilafah*) which took place from 2001-2015 grew rapidly, directly proportional to the religious attitudes of students that lead to the attitude of extremism and even some have been exposed in the ideology of radicalism. For example, from the data presented previously, there were 11 percent who agreed to commit acts of violence against those who were different from them, 8 percent disagreed with the ideology of *Pancasila*, and 19 percent strongly agreed with the *Khilafah* system to replace the current system in the Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia. Even though this data underwent changes when compared to the results of Religion of R & D study in 2015 which stated that approximately 40 percent of UHO students agreed with the *khilafah* system; however, after the issuance of the Law of Mass Organization No. 1 in 2017, accompanied by the dissolution of HTI, the data changed. FGD which was conducted on several groups of students formulated that after the dissolution of HTI the campus was very intense in disseminating the dangers of radicalism, strengthening nationalism through the education of defending the country, and dismissing some officials that indicated affiliate with HTI.

Referring to the description, the religious attitudes of UHO Muslim students can be laid down, namely, *first*, apathy that is not bothered and not understand the development of the discourse of Islamic organization movements on campus. In some questionnaire questions, the students usually answer do not know or do not even answer, the percentage ranges from 4-5 percent.

Second, the moderate attitude is the attitude that sees the movement of change as something natural yet must continue to respect diversity, acknowledge the existence of the *Pancasila* ideology and be loyal to the consensus of the

Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia. Religious practices still carry out religious traditions inherited from their parents' learning. This group is still the majority in UHO, if it is divided by around 45-60 percent.

Thirdly, Islamic *fundamentalist* and *extremist* attitudes that see the true and other understandings that they have and still have to be straightened out and must follow their understanding, especially those relating to the implementation of *shari'a* and religious rituals. This group is more represented by campus activists who are affiliated with MWI and *Salafi*. There are about 10-15 percent if it is percentage based on data that has been explained.

Fourthly, attitudes of Islamic political extremism are those who hold the *Khilafah* and the concept of the Islamic State (*Islam Al-Daulah*). They basically do not care about the students understanding. The most important is they strongly agree with the *Khilafah* movement and continue to weaken the existence of *Pancasila* and the democratic system adopted in the political system in Indonesia. This group is increasingly finding its developing point around 2014-2016; however, after the publication of the Law of Mass Organization No. 1 in 2017 accompanied by the dissolution of HTI, this group has slackened, even though the wing organization at the student level continued to base it on the grass roots of students. If it is the percentage, this group ranges from 15-19 percent (table 8).

These four attitudes represent the phenomenon and dynamics of the current student movement rapidly. Criticism and Rejection of state ideologies and consensus, yet on the other hand, extreme-fundamental attitudes and a single interpretation of religious texts that are concerned about intolerance, reject diversity and can lead to greater social conflict. Then, at this point, it takes a touch of campus policy and commitment and willingness of educators (lecturers) to always spread teachings and advice on peace and tolerance and always remind of the dangers of negative radicalism especially those that lead to extremism and violence in the name of religion.

5. Conclusion and Recommendation

This research is an initial mapping in order to formulate a strategic plan to strengthen the de-radicalization program among students in Kendari by looking at two important aspects, namely the shift in religious understanding of Muslim students and the religious attitudes of Muslim students. Thus conclusions can be drawn as follows:

1. The shift in understanding referred to in this study is a shift in the face of cultural and moderate Islamic understanding represented by the old Islamic student organization groups such as HMI, PMII, and IMM, to the face of Islamic understanding of Islamic *neo-Puritanism* and Islamic politics (*khilafah*) which was chosen by the Islamic student organization (new) which in the UHO had a movement orientation consisting of two rows. The first line of groups that are constantly fighting for Islamic *neo-Puritanism* are the students of *Wahdah Islamiyah*, *Salafis*, Students of the *Tablighi Jama'at* and some affiliated students of the Muaz Bin Jabal foundation which is in direct contact with the Saudi Arabian Government network based on *Wahabi* ideology. The second line is groups who continuously fight for the *Khilafah* through the idea of Islamic politics are ex HTI and KAMMI. Even though KAMMI was only oriented towards Indonesia with the *shari'a*, however, equally worked on the political territory of power.

2. The religious attitudes of Muslim students towards radicalism can be laid down, namely, *first*, apathy that is not bothered and not understand the development of the discourse of Islamic organization movements on campus. *Second*, the moderate attitude is the attitude that sees the change movement as something natural but must respect diversity, recognize the existence of the *Pancasila* ideology and the Unitary State of Republic of Indonesia. *Third*, Islamic fundamentalist and extremist attitudes that see the most correct understanding that they have and others still need to be corrected especially those relating to the implementation of *shari'a* and religious rituals. *Fourth* is attitudes of Islamic political extremism are those who carry the *Khilafah*.

3. As a recommendation from this study, ***first***, the shift in understanding and religious attitudes of Muslim students is commonplace and is seen as the dynamics of a religious community both globally and nationally. One that must be considered and improved is mutual respect in the religious views and attitudes themselves to actualize tolerance between one another. ***Second***, every text and discourse must reveal multiple interpretations which truth is relative. Likewise with religious texts, then the importance of mutual respect for religious ideas and suggestions to students to study religious resources on parties that are more competent and should be able to learn from various sources. Then, they have a basis for comparison of religious knowledge between one another. ***Third***, the de-radicalization movement for students must be massive and measurable. Besides, it is not only does the cultural approach, but also has to go through a structural approach. Starting from the formal movement to the informal movement of student organizations. Anti-radicalism and terrorism education must also be integrated in learning whether it is independent or integrated in several courses or student lecture curriculum. Certainly, the campus must also have a strategic role through a strategic planning formulation within the framework of the student de-radicalization programs.

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