International Journal of Science and Research (IJSR)
ISSN (Online): 2319-7064
Index Copernicus Value (2016): 79.57 | Impact Factor (2017): 7.296

Refractions of Philosophy in the Origins of Psychology: From Soul to Science

Vijay Kumar Yadavendu

Abstract: ***Philosophical Ideas do not exist in a vacuum; they are always embedded in a specific historical, social, and cultural context. This paper traces the historical and philosophical foundations of psychology, examining its evolution from early modern metaphysical speculation to the establishment of psychology as an independent empirical science. Beginning with the etymological origins of "psychology" and its institutionalization in sixteenth and seventeenth-century thought, the discussion highlights Christian Wolff's systematic division between empirical and rational psychology and Immanuel Kant's critique of psychology's scientific status. Kant's limitations on rational psychology and his turn toward anthropology marked a pivotal moment, shaping subsequent debates on consciousness, empiricism, and freedom. The paper then explores the transformation of German idealism through Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, whose revisions of Kantian thought emphasized will, unconscious processes, and social mind. Finally, the analysis turns to Wilhelm Wundt's establishment of psychology as an experimental discipline, bridging philosophical traditions with scientific methods. By situating these shifts in broader intellectual contexts, the study underscores psychology's enduring negotiation between philosophy and science.***

Keywords: Psychology, Enlightenment, Rational, Empirical, German idealism, Paradigms, Philosophy of mind

1. Introduction

THE INTELLECTUAL transformations of the Enlightenment created the conditions for psychology to emerge as a distinct discipline. The scientific revolution, marked by the astronomical observations of Johannes Kepler, (1992) and Galileo Galilei, (1967) and the formulation of Newtonian physics (Newton, 1999), signaled a decisive shift away from religiously infused natural philosophy. The world increasingly came to be viewed as governed by universal, mathematically expressible laws. This mechanistic outlook challenged Renaissance naturalism, which had emphasized the unity of spirit and matter (Cassirer, 1951), and instead promoted the idea of the human body as a machine operating under causal principles. René Descartes (1996, 1998) played a pivotal role in this transition by rejecting Aristotelian and mystical accounts of nature (Aristotle, 1986; Gilson, 1987) and proposing a mechanistic model of the body. Although Descartes preserved a dualistic distinction between mind and body, his conceptualization of the body as an automaton amenable to mathematical analysis deeply influenced subsequent approaches to human behavior (Hatfield, 1992).

The positivist movement of the nineteenth century consolidated these tendencies. Using Cartesian and Newtonian ideas (Comte, 1975; Mill, 1969), positivism promoted the idea that authentic knowledge must come from methodical experimentation and observation (Simon, 1963). In doing so, it offered a methodological foundation for the sciences while also reinforcing the notion of the individual as detached from broader social and economic forces (Pickering, 1993). Positivism thus functioned simultaneously as a scientific paradigm and as an ideological framework, supporting the stability of the new capitalist order (Simon, 1963).

These developments directly informed the emergence of psychology. Although reflections on the mind and behavior can be traced back to antiquity (Aristotle, 1986; Robinson, 1995), the term *"psychology"* itself predates both *biology*, coined by Jean-Baptiste Lamarck in 1802 (Lamarck, 1964), and *sociology*, introduced by Auguste Comte in his *Cours de Philosophie Positive*. Comte's philosophy of positivism had important implications for the study of human beings, particularly in his insistence that society could not be reduced to the sum of individuals any more than a geometric surface could be reduced to lines or points (Comte, 1975). While Comte envisioned sociology as the queen of the sciences, his methodological emphasis on empirical observation and scientific laws profoundly influenced the trajectory of psychology (Richards, 2010).

This review paper examines, in its different sections, the philosophical origins of psychology. It traces its development from Enlightenment natural philosophy and Cartesian dualism through the rise of positivist thought, culminating in Wilhelm Wundt's establishment of psychology as an independent scientific discipline. By situating psychology within its broader intellectual and social contexts, the paper seeks to clarify how philosophical debates and socio-political transformations converged in the nineteenth century to make possible the birth of modern psychology.

2. The Emergence of the Term Psychology

From the Greek words psychē (soul) and logos (study or discourse), the word psychology is formed. Etymologically, it implies the "science of the soul." Yet, it is striking that in classical antiquity no independent discipline of psychology existed either in theory or institutional practice. Instead, reflections on the soul were embedded within larger philosophical and metaphysical systems, Plato's dualism of soul and body, Aristotle's *De Anima*, the Stoic materialist psychology, and later Scholastic elaborations. In these frameworks, inquiries into human nature were subordinated to theological or metaphysical concerns rather than organized as a distinct field of study (Kenny, 2012). The soul was typically approached through *pneumatology*, the doctrine of spirit. As, explained, pneumatology comprised

three domains: God, angels and demons, and humans, with psychology representing only a subsection of the last category (Bouthoul, cited in François (1970).

2.1 Early Uses of the Term in the Sixteenth Century

The sixteenth century marked the first appearance of *psychologia* as a formal designation. Philipp Melanchthon, a German humanist and theologian, is often credited with introducing the term in his academic lectures. According to Roback (1961), Melanchthon's usage was significant because, although philosophers had long spoken about the soul, none had dignified their reflections with a designation that suggested a systematic or scientific discourse. Around the same time, Joannes Thomas Freigius employed the term in his *Ciceronianus* (1575), indicating that psychology was beginning to circulate as a recognized category distinct from broader metaphysical or theological investigations (Hamilton, 1967).

2.2 Seventeenth-Century Development: Goclenius and Casmann

By the end of the sixteenth century, psychology began to take on a clearer identity. Rudolph Goclenius, published *Psychologia, hoc est, de hominis perfectione* in 1590. This treatise, and subsequent works in the 1590s, used psychology explicitly as a title and thereby consolidated its legitimacy as a subject of study. Yet Goclenius's psychology retained strong moral and theological overtones. As noted, the interest in human behavior was framed less in scientific terms than in the practical aim of guiding individuals toward righteousness or, in modern terms, social adjustment (Zilboorg, cited in François, 1970).

Goclenius's student, Otto Casmann, advanced the terminology further. In *Psychologia anthropologica* (1594), he placed psychology within a broader science of man, which he named *anthropologia*. *Psychologia*, or the doctrine of the mind, and *somatologia*, or the doctrine of the human body, are the two categories into which Casmann separated anthropology (Hamilton, 1967). This was a significant conceptual shift. By embedding psychology within anthropology, Casmann signaled that the study of mind and body could be approached systematically as aspects of human nature. His framework anticipated later Enlightenment efforts to construct a comprehensive "science of man."

2.3 Christian Wolff and the Systematization of Psychology

Despite these early uses, it was Christian Wolff who gave psychology its systematic form and widespread acceptance in the German intellectual tradition. Although Wolff did not coin the term, his authority as the "preceptor of Germany" ensured that psychology became the standard designation for the study of the mind (Ibid.). Wolff distinguished between two branches: Empirical psychology, which employed observation and induction to generalize about the soul and its activities. And Rational psychology, elaborated in his *Psychologia rationalis* (2016), which formed a branch of metaphysics concerned with the necessary truths about the essence of the soul. For Wolff, rational psychology complemented empirical psychology by providing explanatory foundations for observed phenomena. Conversely, empirical psychology, alongside cosmology and ontology, furnished the data upon which rational psychology could build (Robert, 1980). This dual classification was influential: it granted psychology both an empirical and a metaphysical identity and integrated it into the broader rationalist system of knowledge.

Wolff's framework was not without problems. By embedding psychology within metaphysics, he perpetuated the tension between speculative and observational approaches. Later philosophers, most notably Kant, would critique Wolff's rational psychology for overstepping the bounds of reason by attempting to deduce substantive truths about the soul beyond possible experience (Kant,1998). Nonetheless, Wolff's efforts to classify and systematize psychology marked a decisive moment in the discipline's intellectual genealogy.

2.4 Intellectual Significance and Transition

The gradual emergence of psychology as a term between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries illustrates a broader trajectory in European thought. Initially confined within pneumatology and theology, psychology began to assert itself as a distinct field concerned with human nature. Through Goclenius and Casmann, psychology was linked to anthropology and moral philosophy. Through Wolff, it became both an empirical science and a metaphysical discipline, occupying a recognized place in the hierarchy of knowledge.

This history reflects the broader tension in early modern philosophy between empirical observation and rationalist speculation, between the scientific study of man and the metaphysical quest to define the soul. It was precisely this tension that would set the stage for Enlightenment debates about human knowledge and experience, culminating in the critical philosophy of Kant and the experimental psychology of Wilhelm Wundt.

3. Kant's Critique of Rational Psychology

Immanuel Kant represents a turning point in the historical debate about psychology's claim to be a science. Building on and critiquing the rationalist tradition of Christian Wolff, Kant argued that psychology could neither achieve the status of a rational science nor qualify as a natural science proper. His reasoning shaped how psychology was conceptualized in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, laying the groundwork for later tensions between philosophy and empirical psychology.

Christian Wolff had argued that psychology could be pursued as a branch of metaphysics, what he called *rational psychology*. In this view, the soul was the object of scientific inquiry, and its nature could be determined through a priori reasoning. Kant rejected this claim. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, he argued that all rational arguments about the soul's substantiality, simplicity, and identity rest on the proposition "I think" (Kant,1965, p.329).

However, this proposition is empirical rather than rational, it is derived from a posteriori experience rather than a priori concepts.

For Kant, the "I" that accompanies all acts of thought is not a substance that can be rationally demonstrated but rather the transcendental condition of experience itself. To attempt to treat it as an object of science is to commit a category mistake, since the "I" is not an observable phenomenon but a necessary presupposition for the unity of consciousness. Consequently, rational psychology cannot produce apodictic or necessary knowledge of the soul. Instead, it becomes a "science surpassing all powers of human reason," which leaves only the possibility of studying the soul empirically (Ibid., p.353).

3.1 Psychology as Empirical but not Scientific

Kant's rejection of rational psychology did not mean that he denied the possibility of empirical psychology. Rather, he argued that psychology could only be an empirical discipline, but even then, it failed to meet the criteria of a natural science. In the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, Kant measured psychology against his Newtonian conception of science. For him, a natural science proper required both an empirical and a rational component: empirical observation provided data, while mathematics supplied the a priori framework that made demonstrative knowledge possible (Kant, 1970).

Psychology, however, lacked this mathematical foundation. Its phenomena exist only in the temporal dimension and not in spatial dimensions. Because mathematics requires spatial extension to quantify relations, it cannot be applied to mental states. Kant stated that "there is only so much science proper in every special doctrine of nature as there is mathematics in it" (Ibid., p.8). Without mathematics, psychology could not construct its concepts a priori, and therefore could not rise above the level of descriptive knowledge. Psychology may offer "a natural description of the phenomena of the soul" at most, but it can never be a science that can be proven to exist (Ibid.).

3.2 Limits of Introspection and Experimentation

Kant further argued that psychology is handicapped even as an empirical discipline because of the limitations of its methodology. There was no way psychology could be experimental, unlike the natural sciences. Through introspection, the very mental states that are being observed are changed. Because of the distortion caused by observation, precision is unachievable (Ibid.). Moreover, internal experiences cannot be repeated at will, and external subjects cannot submit their minds to observation in the way that physical objects can be manipulated in laboratory experiments.

This lack of experimental control meant that psychology could never achieve the rigor or reliability of natural sciences. At best, psychologists could only record their own subjective states, but even these reports were necessarily incomplete and unreliable. Thus, Kant concluded that psychology was "merely empirical" and inherently incapable of generating necessary truths (Kant, 1970; Kant, 1965). Its findings could amount only to tentative "laws of experience," which fall short of the universal, apodictic laws required of science (Kant, 1970, pp. 6–8).

Taken together, Kant's arguments delivered a devastating verdict on the scientific aspirations of psychology in his time. Rational psychology failed because it mistook the transcendental unity of apperception for an object of metaphysical speculation. Empirical psychology failed because its phenomena could not be mathematised and were inaccessible to experimental control. As a result, psychology was neither a rational nor a natural science.

This negative assessment profoundly influenced nineteenth-century debates about psychology. It reinforced the suspicion that psychology, unlike physics or chemistry, could not attain the rigor of science. Yet Kant's critique also opened the door to new approaches, such as his later pragmatic anthropology, which emphasized the empirical study of human beings in social life. His rejection of psychology as a science thus set the stage for his constructive proposals in anthropology, which will be examined in the following section.

4. Kant's Pragmatic Turn in Psychology

Although Kant denied psychology the status of a natural science, he did not dismiss the study of the human mind altogether. Instead, he redirected attention to a different framework: pragmatic anthropology. In this approach, psychology was reframed not as a speculative or purely introspective endeavor, but as an empirical study of human beings in the world. By shifting methodology and focus, Kant laid the groundwork for a descriptive psychology that, while not scientific in the strict Newtonian sense, could nonetheless provide insights of great practical value. This constructive turn in Kant's thought was closely tied to his doctrines of apperception and the unity of consciousness, as well as to his reflections on the tension between human freedom and determinism.

4.1 Pragmatic Anthropology: Toward an Empirical Study of Human Beings

A different understanding of psychology was established by Kant in his 1798 work *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*. He argued that the discipline could become useful if it abandoned the limitations of introspection and turned to the observation of people in social and practical contexts. Instead of attempting to uncover the metaphysical essence of the soul, psychology should study how individuals act, behave, and interact with others in ordinary life (Kant, 1974).

This "pragmatic" anthropology sought to provide knowledge that could serve humanity by improving moral and civic life. The goal was not scientific demonstration but practical wisdom: to understand human beings "as citizens of the world" (Ibid. p. 4). This shift gave psychology a functional role within philosophy, as it could inform ethics, pedagogy, and political theory. By

grounding psychology in observable behavior rather than introspective speculation, Kant offered a way to make the discipline empirically grounded without forcing it into the mold of natural science.

Ironically, however, Kant himself did not entirely escape reliance on traditional introspectionist methods. Large portions of his *Anthropology* were devoted to classifying mental faculties and analyzing internal phenomena. Yet the broader orientation toward human beings as social and pragmatic agents, marked a decisive redefinition of the field (Frierson, 2003).

4.2 The Unity of Consciousness and Apperception

A central feature of Kant's psychology is his doctrine of apperception and the unity of consciousness. In rejecting the empiricists' view that higher mental processes arise merely from associations of sensation, Kant argued that concepts are not passive products of experience but rather the original givens of consciousness. Sensations become meaningful only within the structured unity provided by concepts.

For Kant, the "transcendental unity of apperception" refers to the self-consciousness that must accompany all representations. The statement "I think" expresses this necessary condition for thought: without the unity of apperception, no coherent experience would be possible (Kant, 1965). While the ego cannot itself be an object of knowledge, its activity is evident in the organization of experience. Concepts, judgments, and knowledge are predicated on the mind's unifying activity.

This conception placed Kant in opposition to empiricists like Hume, who treated the self as a mere bundle of perceptions. For Kant, the very coherence of experience demanded an active synthesizing subject. This idea not only established a foundation for his critical philosophy but also had enduring influence on later thinkers such as Fichte and Husserl, who further developed the notion of the transcendental ego (Ameriks, 2000).

4.3 Unconscious Ideas and Degrees of Consciousness

Kant's recognition of the presence of unconscious concepts also expanded psychology's purview. He postulated that there are many levels of consciousness in mental existence, with certain representations persisting below the awareness threshold (Kant, 1974). This was a striking departure from empiricist models and prefigured later theories of the unconscious in thinkers such as Schopenhauer and Freud (Brook, 2001).

In addition to unconscious processes, Kant explored differences in cognitive talents and deficiencies. He analyzed mental illness as a disturbance of rational functions, while also discussing creative capacities such as wit and genius. His treatment of these topics reinforced the idea that psychology, even if not scientific, could offer meaningful insights into the diversity of human mental life.

4.4 The Paradox of Freedom and Determinism

Perhaps the most profound dimension of Kant's psychology lies in his reflections on human freedom. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, he argued that causality is one of the fundamental categories of human understanding: we necessarily perceive events as linked by cause and effect (Kant, 1965, pp.111-115). As a result, all human actions, when viewed empirically, appear determined within the temporal chain of causes.

Yet Kant also insisted, particularly in his moral philosophy, that human beings are free agents. Freedom, he claimed, is not an empirical phenomenon subject to causal explanation but a postulate of practical reason. As rational beings, humans must regard themselves as capable of acting autonomously, bound not by natural necessity but by moral law (Kant, 1956).

This produced a paradox: from the standpoint of theoretical reason, human beings appear determined; from the standpoint of practical reason, they must be free. Kant did not attempt to dissolve this tension but treated it as a necessary duality. Freedom and determinism are not contradictory but complementary perspectives, each valid within its own domain. This paradox had significant implications for psychology. On the one hand, human behavior could be studied empirically as determined phenomena; on the other, psychology could never capture the full reality of human freedom. This dual view preserved a role for psychology as an empirical discipline while simultaneously reserving the ultimate question of freedom for moral philosophy.

Kant's contributions to psychology are deeply ambivalent. On the one hand, he denied the possibility of psychology as a natural science, limiting it to an empirical, descriptive status. On the other, he offered constructive directions through his pragmatic anthropology, his doctrine of apperception and unity of consciousness, and his reflections on unconscious processes and human talents. Most significantly, his paradoxical account of freedom and determinism revealed both the limitations and the potential of psychology: it could describe the empirical dimensions of mental life, but it could not encompass the transcendental freedom at the heart of human existence. This dual perspective profoundly influenced the philosophical and methodological development of psychology in the centuries that followed.

5. German Idealism and the Transition to Scientific Psychology

Idealism emerged as the predominant viewpoint in the thriving era of German thinking that followed Kant's critical philosophy. For roughly half a century, figures such as Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel carried Kant's legacy forward but also radically expanded it. Unlike Kant, who drew strict boundaries around psychology as a merely empirical science, these thinkers sought to ground psychology within a broader metaphysical framework. Their efforts both revived aspects of rational

psychology and laid the groundwork for later psychological developments. At the same time, their philosophical speculations indirectly influenced the emergence of psychology as an independent discipline, culminating in Wilhelm Wundt's establishment of experimental psychology in the late nineteenth century.

5.1 Fichte and the Voluntaristic Turn

Fichte's philosophy was built upon the primacy of the ego as an active and striving principle. In contrast to a passive conception of consciousness, he emphasized that the ego is fundamentally characterized by will and self-assertion (Fichte, 2009). His system of idealism revolved around the idea that the self-posits itself through an act of freedom, making activity and voluntarism central to his conception of reality.

This voluntaristic orientation had clear implications for psychology. Fichte's followers, such as Gottlieb Ernst August Mehmel and Karl Fortlage, drew on his principles to emphasize the active role of consciousness in shaping experience (Leary, 1982). These ideas resonated with Hermann von Helmholtz's theory of perception, which argued that the mind plays an interpretative role in sensory processing (Turner, 1977). Later, Wilhelm Wundt explicitly acknowledged the voluntaristic tradition when characterizing his own "New Psychology" as voluntaristic, thereby situating his scientific approach within a lineage that traced back to Fichte's rethinking of the ego (Danziger, 1980).

5.2 Schelling and the Emergence of the Unconscious

Schelling extended idealist reflections by emphasizing the relationship between consciousness and unconscious processes. For Schelling, the unconscious was not merely a lack of awareness but a necessary condition for consciousness itself. He linked this view to concepts of creativity, personality, and genius, anticipating later theories that highlighted the depth and hidden dimensions of mental life (Schelling, 2006).

Schelling's philosophy influenced Romantic naturalists such as Lorenz Oken, whose *Naturphilosophie* explored the unity of nature and spirit. Gustav Fechner, who would later pioneer psychophysics, drew inspiration from this tradition in developing his work on the relation between physical stimulation and conscious experience (Woodworth, 1972). Although Fechner's contributions were firmly empirical, the intellectual lineage can be traced to Schelling's speculative exploration of unconscious processes and the unity of nature and mind. In this way, Schelling bridged metaphysics and early scientific psychology, preparing the ground for later discussions of unconscious mental life.

5.3 Hegel and the Social Mind

Among the German Idealists, Hegel developed the most systematic philosophy of mind. His *Philosophy of Spirit* incorporated a psychological component that, while indebted to Aristotle, extended the scope of psychology beyond the individual (Hegel, 1977). Hegel argued that psychology could describe the empirical conditions of mental life, but that true understanding required transcending the individual ego in favor of the "objective mind" embedded in social institutions.

For Hegel, the individual self is realized only within the larger context of language, law, custom, and culture. In this sense, he shifted attention from the subjective "I" to the collective "we," culminating in the Absolute Spirit. This perspective introduced a social dimension to psychology that was later taken up in the development of *Völkerpsychologie* (folk or cultural psychology). Thinkers such as Wilhelm Dilthey and Franz Brentano were deeply influenced by Hegel's insistence on situating consciousness within cultural and historical frameworks (Dilthey, 1989; Brentano, 1973). Wundt, too, acknowledged that higher mental processes, those involving symbolic and cultural activities, could not be studied in isolation but required social and historical analysis (Marx & Hillix, 1988).

5.4 Wundt and the Break with Philosophy

The legacy of German Idealism profoundly shaped the intellectual climate in which Wilhelm Wundt developed his own psychology. By establishing psychology as an experimental discipline, Wundt broke with speculative philosophy, despite being influenced by Fichte's voluntarism and Hegel's social orientation. For Wundt, psychology's proper task was the analysis of consciousness, but he insisted that mental processes were dynamic activities rather than static entities: "Ideas, like all other mental experiences, are not objects, but processes, occurrences" (Ibid., p. 79).

Wundt's contributions made psychology a separate science from physiology and philosophy. This independence was exemplified by his establishment of the first psychological laboratory in Leipzig in 1879. As Murphy and Kovach (1949) noted, before Wundt, psychology "was little more than a waif knocking now at the door of physiology, now at the door of ethics, now at the door of epistemology" (p. 167). Wundt's synthesis of experimental rigor with a voluntaristic understanding of consciousness reflected both continuity with German Idealism and a decisive break toward empirical science.

German Idealism played a crucial role in the evolution of psychology by redefining the nature of consciousness, emphasizing will and activity (Fichte), highlighting unconscious processes and creativity (Schelling), and situating the mind within social and cultural contexts (Hegel). Although speculative in form, these philosophical contributions prepared the intellectual ground for psychology's eventual emergence as a scientific discipline. Wundt inherited and transformed this legacy, moving beyond metaphysical speculation to create a psychology rooted in experimentation while still acknowledging the voluntaristic and social dimensions emphasized by his idealist predecessors. In this way, the trajectory from Kant through the German Idealists to Wundt illustrates the complex interplay between philosophy and science in the birth of modern psychology.

6. Conclusion

The historical development of psychology reveals a persistent tension between philosophical speculation and empirical investigation, a tension that has defined the discipline since its earliest formulations. From its etymological roots in the "science of the soul" to its eventual transformation into a modern empirical enterprise, psychology has been shaped by shifting attempts to reconcile metaphysical questions with scientific methods.

Tracing this trajectory highlights a gradual evolution: Wolff's systematic integration of empirical and rational psychology provided a framework that sought harmony between observation and philosophy; Kant's critical restrictions narrowed psychology to the empirical domain; German idealists such as Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel reasserted broader philosophical dimensions, influencing later thinkers; and Wundt's experimental psychology marked a decisive step in establishing psychology as a science in its own right. These transitions were not discrete breaks but moments in a larger continuum of debate over the proper scope and method of inquiry. The strength of this trajectory lies in its dual achievement: the establishment of psychology as a distinct empirical science and the preservation of its philosophical depth. Yet the very tension that propelled its growth also exposed its limitations, as unresolved questions about consciousness, freedom, and subjectivity resisted purely empirical treatment.

By synthesizing these historical paradigms, this paper underscores the importance of situating psychology's origins within both philosophical and scientific traditions. The discipline's future will likely continue to navigate this dynamic interplay, as it balances empirical rigor with reflection on the enduring questions of human experience. In this way, psychology remains what it has always been, a discipline suspended between philosophy and science, shaped by their dialogue and sustained by their tension.

Acknowledgments

I am thankful to the anonymous reviewers for their excellent suggestions and reflections on an earlier draft of this article. Any failures of omission or commission, of course, belong to me.

Conflict of Interest

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest concerning the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, or publication of this article.

ORCID ID:
Vijay Kumar Yadavendu, **https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1847-213X**

References

[1] Ameriks, K. (2000). *Kant's theory of mind: An analysis of the paralogisms of pure reason* (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press.
[2] Aristotle. [(350 BCE/1986)). *De Anima* (R. D. Hicks, Trans.). Prometheus Books.
[3] Brentano, F. [(1874/1973)]. *Psychology from an empirical standpoint* (A.C. Rancurello, D.B. Terrell, & L.L. McAlister, Trans.). Routledge.
[4] Brook, A. (2001). *Kant and the mind*. Cambridge University Press.
[5] Cassirer, E. (1951). *The philosophy of the Enlightenment*. Princeton University Press.
[6] Comte, A. [(1830-1842/1975)). *Cours de philosophie positive* (Vols. 1–6). Hermann.
[7] Danziger, K. (1980). Wundt and the conceptual foundations of psychology. *Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 16*(4), 341–352.
[8] Descartes, R. [(1641/1996)]. *Meditations on first philosophy* (J. Cottingham, Trans.). Cambridge University Press.
[9] Descartes, R. [1664/1998]. *Treatise on man* (T. S. Hall, Trans.). Prometheus Books.
[10] Dilthey, W. [(1883/1989)]. *Introduction to the human sciences* (R. A. Makkreel & F. Rodi, Eds. & Trans.). Princeton University Press.
[11] Fichte, J.G. [(1804/2009)]. *The science of knowledge* (P. Heath & J. Lachs, Eds. & Trans.). Cambridge University Press.
[12] François, A. (1970). *History of psychology*. In P. Fraisse & J. Piaget (Eds.), *Experimental psychology, Volume 1* (pp. 639–656). Penguin Books.
[13] Frierson, P. R. (2003). *Freedom and anthropology in Kant's moral philosophy*. Cambridge University Press.
[14] Galilei, G. [(1632/1967)]. *Dialogue concerning the two chief world systems* (S. Drake, Trans.). University of California Press.
[15] Gilson, E. (1987). *From Aristotle to Darwin and back again: A journey in final causality, species, and evolution*. University of Notre Dame Press.
[16] Hamilton, W. [(1868/1967)]. *Lectures on metaphysics and logic* (Rev. ed.). New York: Johnson Reprint Corporation.
[17] Hatfield, G. (1992). *Descartes and the Meditations*. Routledge.
[18] Hegel, G. W. F. [(1830/1977)]. *The philosophy of mind* (W. Wallace & A. V. Miller, Trans.). Clarendon Press.
[19] Kant, I. [(1790/1950)]. *Critique of judgment* (J. H. Bernard, Trans.). Hafner.
[20] Kant, I. [(1788/1956)]. *Critique of practical reason* (L. W. Beck, Trans.). Bobbs-Merrill.
[21] Kant, I. [(1781/1965)]. *Critique of pure reason* (N. K. Smith, Trans.). St. Martin's Press.
[22] Kant, I. [(1786/1970)]. *Metaphysical foundations of natural science* (J. Ellington, Trans.). Bobbs-Merrill.
[23] Kant, I. [(1798/1974)]. *Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view* (M. J. Gregor, Trans.). Reidel.
[24] Kant, I. [(1781/1998)]. *Critique of pure reason* (P. Guyer & A. W. Wood, Eds. & Trans.). Cambridge University Press.
[25] Kenny, A. (2012). *A new history of Western philosophy*. Oxford University Press.

[26] Kepler, J. [(1609/1992)]. *Astronomia nova* (W. H. Donahue, Trans.). Cambridge University Press.
[27] Lamarck, J.B. [(1802/1964)]. *Hydrogeology* (A.V. Carozzi, Trans.). University of Chicago Press.
[28] Leary, D. E. (1982). Immanuel Kant and the development of modern psychology. In W. R. Woodward & M. G. Ash (Eds.), *The problematic science: Psychology in nineteenth-century thought* (pp. 17–42). Praeger.
[29] Marx, M.H., & Hillix, W.A. (1988). *Systems and theories in psychology* (4th ed.). McGraw-Hill.
[30] Mill, J.S. [1865/1969]. *Auguste Comte and positivism*. University of Michigan Press.
[31] Murphy, G., & Kovach, J.K. (1949). *Historical introduction to modern psychology*. Harcourt, Brace.
[32] Newton, I. [(1687/1999)]. *The Principia: Mathematical principles of natural philosophy* (I.B. Cohen & A. Whitman, Trans.). University of California Press.
[33] Pickering, M. (1993). *Auguste Comte: An intellectual biography* (Vol. 1). Cambridge University Press.
[34] Richards, G. (2010). *A history of modern psychology in context*. Wiley-Blackwell.
[35] Roback, A.A. (1961). *History of psychology and psychiatry*. Russell & Russell.
[36] Robert, T. (1980). *Christian Wolff and the transformation of early modern philosophy*. Springer.
[37] Robinson, D.N. (1995). *An intellectual history of psychology* (3rd ed.). University of Wisconsin Press.
[38] Schelling, F.W. [(1800/2006)]. *System of transcendental idealism* (P. Heath, Trans.). University of Virginia Press.
[39] Simon, W.M. (1963). *European positivism in the nineteenth century: An essay in intellectual history*. Greenwood Press.
[40] Turner, R.S. (1977). The significance of Wilhelm Wundt's psychology. *Historical Studies in the Physical Sciences, 8*, 48–58.
[41] Wolff, C. [(1734/2016)]. *Psychologia rationalis, methodo scientifica pertractata*. Frankfurt an der Oder.
[42] Woodworth, R.S. (1972). *Contemporary schools of psychology*. Appleton-Century-Crofts.

Author Profile

Vijay Kumar Yadavendu (vkyadavendu[at]gmail.com**)** is an Associate Professor at the Department of Psychology, Kisan College Sohsarai, Nalanda of Patliputra University, Patna Bihar. He has a doctorate in public health from the Centre of Social Medicine and Community Health/School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India, 2002. He writes on the philosophical historiography of public health and public health ethics. He is the author of *Shifting Paradigms in Public Health: From Holism to Individualism* (New Delhi, Heidelberg, New York, Dordrecht, and London: Springer, 2013, 2016). Dr. Yadavendu has been published in many international and national journals, including Economic and Political Weekly, Current Science, International Journal of Psychology, Journal of Health Services, and Journal of Health and Development. Howard Journal of Criminal Justice, and Global Journal of Medicine and Public Health.