

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe: Disputes over US Military Base in Okinawa

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Abstract: *The existence of US military bases in Okinawa reaped pros and cons at the domestic and international level to relocate Marine Corps Air Station or MCAS Futenma from Ginowan city to Nago city in Henoko. The relocation of MCAS Futenma that has been agreed since 1996 by Japan and the United States was still not fully approved by Okinawa people. The Okinawa people do not want the military base to be relocated to Nago city, because they wanted the US military base to be completely removed from Okinawa. This research will analyze the policy of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in addressing the issue of relocation of US military base in Okinawa (MCAS Futenma). This research used theory of decision making process proposed by William D. Coplin. The results of this study indicated that Prime Minister Shinzo Abe continue efforts to relocate the US military base in Okinawa, namely MCAS Futenma to Henoko by looking at various policy determinants. The factors that boost Shinzo Abe's policy were Japanese domestic factors, economic and military capabilities, including the international context.*

Keywords: Relocation; Okinawa; MCAS Futenma; Shinzo Abe

1. Introduction

The security alliance between Japan and the United States is one of the most important military ties in the Asia Pacific region. As an alliance, Japan and the United States worked together to carry out defense and security strategies in protecting their respective interests. In a symbiotic relationship of mutualism, Japan which had no military power after World War II was assisted by the United States to support its military power. One of the military cooperation undertaken by Japan and the United States was to build a US military base in Okinawa. The issue of US military bases in Japan, precisely in Okinawa, was a complex issue. At the international level, US military base in Okinawa was vital to support Japan's security, so Japan allowed United States to build its military base in Okinawa. However, at the domestic level, there were pros and cons on the issue of Okinawa's military base between the central government, local government, and also the Okinawa people including Japanese people who live outside Okinawa region.

Although Japan and US alliance was regarded as security footprint in the Asia Pacific region, pros and cons of the presence of US military bases in Okinawa was still hot topic to discuss until now. Okinawa was perceived as "keystone of the Pacific" because of its strategic location and close proximity to cities in other countries. The distance from Okinawa to Taipei, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Seoul, Manila, and Tokyo are all within a 1,500 km radius. This explains why Okinawa remains an important key for US troops in Asia. Okinawa is the largest island in the Ryukyu archipelago, located in the southern part of the Japanese archipelago. Okinawa Island is a small island located 1,500 km from Tokyo with a length of 100 km and a width of 15 km. Okinawa's area is only 0.6% of Japan's total land area but become home of 75% of US Armed Forces stationed in Japan (Pajon, 2010: 5).

Okinawa has a long history and set of characteristics that distinguish it from other regions in Japan. In the past, the kingdom of Ryukyu was an independent state that gave tribute to China. The island was conquered and occupied by the Japanese Satsuma clan in 1609. After the Meiji Restoration, the kingdom of Ryukyu was fully integrated into the country of Japan in 1879 (Hook & Siddle, 2003: 1). As Japan's involvement in World War II, in 1944, Okinawa became the only Japanese territory that became battle ground. More than 10,000 US troops and about 90,000 Japanese soldiers were killed in the fighting (Japan Communist Party, 2000: 1). The most striking news was the huge number of civilian casualties. More than 100,000 people or nearly one-third of the population of Okinawa died in this war.

The war was the bloodiest war in the Pacific. Okinawa Island was destroyed. The Allied Forces then used Okinawa as a base to prepare invasion to main islands of Japan. The US military forces occupied Okinawa and sent survivors to camps they set up in other areas, and continued until after the war against Japan. On August 15, 1945, after the atomic bombing on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan made an unconditional surrender that marked the end of World War II in East Asia and the Pacific. US forces then occupied the military base of the Imperial Japan from 1945 to 1952 (Pajon, 2010: 7).

The return of Japanese sovereignty was marked by the signing of San Francisco Peace Agreement on 8 September 1951 by Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida. This Agreement was implemented on 28 April 1952. In addition, there was also established cooperation between Japan and the United States called the US-Japan Administrative Agreement (USJAA) on 28 February 1952 (Karnell, 2015: 19). The agreement gave US troops access to a military base in Japan's territory to ensure the defense and security of Japan. It was related to the 1947 Constitution of Japan which prohibits the development of armed forces and militarism

things. Thus, US military base in Japan can be regarded as "insurance" that ensures Japan's security. The return of Japanese sovereignty in 1952 excluded the territory of Okinawa and still under US occupation. Twenty years later, in 1972, Okinawa was handed over back to Japan (Hook & Siddle, 2003: 3).

After the Cold War, Japan and the United States further strengthened the security alliances. There are two reasons for strengthening the alliance; first, Japan believes that strengthening the alliance was the most effective strategy for dealing with post-cold war threats. Second, the alliance offered a framework for Japan to develop its own defense capabilities. On the other hand, the people of Okinawa wanted a reduction of US military base in Okinawa, so the issue of military bases in Okinawa was again emerged. The culmination of the issue of US military bases in Okinawa was based on the cases of violent rape by US troops in 1995 (Toshiaki, 2003: 35). About 80,000 residents held demonstrations and protest at US military bases in Okinawa asking to be immediately moved.

The Special Action Committee on Facilities and Areas (SACO) was formed to plan the reduction of US military base in Okinawa in the future. Japan and the United States declared that SACO would develop recommendations for the Security Consultative Committee (SCC) on matters related to consolidate and reduce the facilities and areas controlled by US military and aligning the operational procedures of US forces in Okinawa according to their respective obligations, respectively under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and other relevant agreements (MOFA, 1996). In the final SACO report released in December 1996, it was recommended that eleven military facilities and approximately 5,000 hectares area were to be returned to the Okinawa community (Tanaka, 2000: 19).

Finally in 1996, to find a way out of the problem, Japan and United States agreed to relocate Futenma military base (Furuki Toshiaki, 2003: 35). The relocated US military base was the MCAS base (Marine Corps Air Station) at Futenma located in downtown Ginowan. Issues concerning the relocation of military base occurred after discussion between central government, the Okinawa prefectural government and the city of Nago, as well as the people of Nago city during the process of relocating offshore helicopters from Futenma to the coast near Nago city. The central government wanted to transfer the Futenma US military base to the city of Nago. However, the prefectural government and the majority of the people of Okinawa demanded that the base be moved out of Okinawa, resulting in disagreements between the central government and the prefectural government and residents of Okinawa. The relocation of MCAS Futenma in Ginowan city to Henoko district in Nago city is considered to reduce the impact of military bases on Okinawa people because the area was relatively not densely populated. However, in a referendum held in December 1997 it was stated that as many as 82.45% of the total of 38,176 Okinawa people refused to relocate the Futenma military base (NY Times, 1997). It showed that the majority of Okinawa people at that time did not agree with the decision to relocate the military

base. Okinawa Prefecture is only 0.6% of the total area of Japan, but become home of 75% of US Armed Forces stationed in Japan. The presence of many military facilities had made Okinawa people disturbed and did not want only the relocation of military base but its removal from the Okinawa region.

Japanese leaders have negotiated a lot in tackling the issue of relocating US military base in Okinawa, including in Shinzo Abe's administration. Pros cons of relocation of military base were not only between the government and the people, but also between central and local governments. In the administration of Shinzo Abe, pros cons of relocating this military base were heating up. The election of Abe in 2012 signified the sustainability of plan to relocate the military base from Futenma to Henoko. In February 2013, Shinzo Abe and US President Barack Obama agreed on this despite strong local opposition against the relocation (The Japan Times, 2013).

2. Problem Definition

Responding to the statement, it appeared that Abe still wanted to relocate the US military base from Futenma to Henoko despite resistance from local people. Given the complexity of US military base relocation issues, it would be interesting to analyze more in depth regarding Abe's policy of addressing the issue. The election of Shinzo Abe as Prime Minister in 2012, 2014, and 2017 can also be an objective analysis showing direction of Abe's strategy through policies issued regarding the relocation of US military bases.

3. Literature Review

There are several literatures used as references in this research, including an article entitled "When Domestic Factors Matter: The Relocation of US Bases in Okinawa" by HyonJooYoo (2014). This paper described domestic elements that created barriers to Japanese government in fulfilling its commitment to the United States on US military base in Okinawa. According to Yoo, although internationally the country may chose cooperative policies on the alliance, domestic variables may limit the efficiency of implementation of the policy agreed by Japan and the allies (2014: 403). If we analyzed more, there was clear division of domestic actors in various social and political layers as major obstacle that delayed the implementation process of the alliance cooperation (Yoo, 2014: 403). The study found that the problem of relocating US military base from Okinawa is in form of various challenges and conflicts from various local political actors in Japan, including disagreements between local government, Okinawa residents and central government in implementing the relocation plan.

There are several factors explained by Yoo in his article regarding obstacles of relocation of US military base from Okinawa. First, the Okinawa governor showed support for the military base but occasionally kept aligning themselves with the anti-military bases group. Aligning with anti-military base group could help governor to be re-elected. Then, by showing support for military base relocation plan, they also gained economic program to Okinawa from the central government and could improve their political

position in Okinawa (Yoo, 2014: 418). Second, Okinawa people are divided into two groups, those who support the existence of military bases and groups who opposed to military bases. This condition also added to the complexity of the relocation problem of US military base in Okinawa (Yoo, 2014: 418). Third, Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama held administration in 2009. Unlike his predecessor, PM Yukio agreed to relocate the military base to Honshu, Japan's main island, or even abroad (Yoo, 2014: 416). The controversial statement remained unfulfilled and eventually returned to the original plan. This showed that cooperation of Japan and the USA has a very strong bond. This study focused on elements inhibiting the relocation of US military base in Okinawa. However, Yoo was not focused his research on Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's policy on relocating the base. The study was conducted in 2014 so there has been no update on the current response of Okinawa residents.

Jenny Lin, (2015) in "The US-Japan Alliance in Transformation: The Management of the US Marine Corps The Futenma Airfield Relocation Facility (FRF)" analyzed Japan and US alliance in the relocation plan of the US military base in Okinawa. Jenny Lin believed that, in order to deal with aggressive awakening power of Russia and China, alliance relation and management with USA is crucial for both Japan and the US in maintaining peace and security in the Asia Pacific region (2015: 1). For that reason, Japan allowed United States to build military bases in Japan, especially in Okinawa.

Lin said the existence of US military base in Japan did not go smoothly, because in the domestic territory, there was strong disagreement between the central government and the Okinawa regional government. In this study, Lin also explained that some Okinawa people felt discriminated and betrayed by Prime Minister Hatoyama's campaign which initially promised to move US military base out of Okinawa (Lin, 2015: 50). Lin in her research revealed that there was political distrust between the central government and the local government of Okinawa. This was based on the discovery that Okinawa regional government received a relocation notification of the Futenma military base but did not know the detail of the relocation implementation (Lin, 2015: 50). In addition, two-way communication was very important between the central government of Tokyo and the Okinawa regional government. According to Lin, there were several processes that must be done to improve communication between the central government and local government (Lin, 2015: 50).

First, the policy should be communicated informally in advance to the governor of Okinawa. After the governor of Okinawa approved the idea, the governor of Okinawa also communicated the idea to other regional officials. Once the governor and local officials reached an agreement, the responsible Ministry must design execution plan to inform the public. Then, a public meeting was held to announce the policy and communicate to the public how the policy will be implemented (Lin, 2015: 50).

Furthermore, Lin also outlined four important actors in Okinawa regional politics that can influence the decision, among them are the governor of Okinawa, prefectural assemblies, Mayor of Nago city, and the City Assembly of Nago (Lin, 2015: 50). Since 1996, the issue of relocation of US military base has been subject to approval and rejection by actors mentioned above. This study focused on steps for a policy to run smoothly and normatively. However, this study did not analyze further on a complex situation in the relocation of US military base, which involved not only central and local government but also public and international community. The study also did not focus on analyzing policies of the Prime Minister of Japan, especially Shinzo Abe.

4. Research Methods

This research was explorative analysis, which is analyzing and exploring more about Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's policy related to relocation of US military base in Okinawa. The qualitative type used in this study is based on a grounded theory approach, a research strategy where researchers associated general and abstract theories of a particular interaction, process, or action (Creswell, 2009: 13).

Data used in this study are from two sources, namely primary and secondary. Primary data sources are data sources originating from the Japanese government directly, such as official documents, government websites, the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Japan's Ministry of Defense website, documents of agreement & cooperation undertaken by the Japanese government with other countries, and direct data others related to the study. For secondary data sources, this research uses library data, ie various books, journal articles, internet media, and other secondary data related to this research.

The theory used in this research was the theory of decision making process by William D. Coplin. According to William, foreign policy making is essentially a process formed by the executive and controlled by the elite. In the process, decision-makers develop mutual relationships with many domestic actors seeking to influence government policy and decisions (Coplin 1974: 63). On one hand, decision-makers need political support from domestic political actors to implement government policies across the country. In return for the support of domestic political actors, they make certain demands to decision-makers (Coplin 1974: 65).

According to Coplin, there are several factors that influence Head of State in designing foreign policy. These factors are the domestic political situation of the country, the economic and military power of the country, and the international context (Coplin, 1974). These factors are related to each other and into consideration to produce a country's policy. Coplin stated that to determine how foreign policy work can be observed through the domestic situation of a country (Coplin, 1974). Domestic political conditions can influence foreign policy decision-making.

5. Discussion

5.1 US Military Base in Okinawa

The US military presence in Japan and in Okinawa began at the end of World War II. Although the USA occupation in Japan ended in 1952, Okinawa remained in USA administration until 1972. USA and Japanese security relations were defined in a number of documents, including cooperation and security agreements between two countries and the Status of Forces Agreement, which governed legal status of US armed forces in Japan. US military base in Okinawa occupied about 10% of the Okinawa region.



Image 1: Strategic Okinawa Location

Source: Avery & Rinehart, 2016, The U.S. Military Presence in Okinawa and the Futenma Base Controversy,

The image above showed strategic position of Okinawa, which is adjacent to other countries. Okinawa was only 350 nautical miles or 648 km from Taipei, 570 nautical miles or 1,055 km from Seoul, 770 nautical miles or 1,426 km from Pyongyang, 830 nautical miles or 1,537 km from Tokyo and 990 nautical miles or 1,833 km from Beijing. This strategic position became one of the strongest considerations of US military deployment in Okinawa.

Japan bears some of the cost of military personnel and the need for a military base in Okinawa. It was noted that in 1997 the cost incurred by Japan for US military base amounted to approximately \$ 4.9 billion (GAO, 1998: 2). Japan, in addition, cost more than that as Okinawa people protested US military presence in Okinawa. Their main complaint is that Okinawa region holds 75% of US armed forces stationed in Japan. The Okinawa people also believe that the US presence has hampered Okinawa's economic development. The incident of the sexual rape of an Okinawa girl in September 1995 by three US troops had prompted the USA and Japanese governments to establish SACO (Special Action Committee on Okinawa) in November 1995.

To reduce the negative impact of US military presence against Okinawa society, SACO issued a recommendation to

reduce US military base facilities and adapted its operational procedures. In December 1996, the United States and Japan agreed to approve a number of recommendations to reduce the impact of US military training and operation on Okinawa. These recommendations are set out in the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) Final Report and will be implemented in the next decade.

5.2 The Dynamics of MCAS Futenma Relocation

Despite the importance of US and Japan alliance in the overall American strategy posture in the Asia Pacific region, people of Okinawais concerned about US military presence in Okinawa has added to the challenge of implementing the relocation of US military bases. In recent years, Okinawa people have been fighting various resistances around MCAS Futenma relocation area. The relocation of MCAS Futenma was the largest and most problematic part of the plan to reassemble the deployment of US forces in Japan and changes in US and Japanese military operations.

This relocation agreement was established in 2006 between US and Japan to relocate the MCAS Futenma from its location in densely populated Ginowan town to a non-densely populated area at Camp Schwab in Henoko (Shimoji, 2010: 5). The area where MCAS Futenma relocated is called the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF). This relocation plan was formed to reduce the negative impact of MCAS Futenma to the settlement and also to return the Futenma land area to the local government as a way to increase economic development in the area.

The relocation will also transfer of about 8,000 marines from Japan to a new military base in Guam. Japan agreed to pay about 60% of the estimated cost of approximately \$ 10.3 billion (Avery & Rinehart, 2016: 1). This agreement was triggered by strong bilateral relationship between Japan and USA. However, in its implementation, this relocation was triggered by various problems, such as political tension in Tokyo and community resistance in Okinawa. The tension between Tokyo and Okinawa is even more serious than the tension between Tokyo and the US. Although San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1952 restored Japan's independence, Okinawa was not returned to Japan until 1972. Within decades, US military presence in Okinawa brought problems especially when Okinawa people became victims of crime committed by US troops.

In 1995, a 12-year-old Okinawa girl was raped by two marines and a member of the US Navy Corps. In 2008, a marine was also accused of raping a 14-year-old girl, but the girl later dropped her suit. The incidents were also source of contention, including US aircraft that have been involved in 44 accidents in Okinawa since 1972 until 2014. This accident caused 84 people dead, injured and missing. The 2004 helicopter crash on Okinawa International University was a highly noted accident (The Diplomat, 2014).

The Japan and US agreement to relocate Futenma's Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) to a non-dense populated area of Okinawa is part of the reorganization of US military base in Japan. This agreement has been in formulated since 1996. However, it was only in 2012 that the relocation was

approved by Okinawa Governor Hirokazu Nakaima after Abe promised to inject 300 billion yen into Okinawa economy every year until 2021 (The Diplomat, 2015).

MCAS Futenma function was related to the capabilities of the US Marine Flight Corps stationed in Okinawa, with assignment to transport Army and Navy troops by helicopter, etc., to the place of operation and refueling of aircraft, as well as to be the base of aircraft. However, because MCAS Futenma was located in urban areas, local people wanted to move the base because of many negative impacts due to the presence of MCAS Futenma, such as security issue, noise and traffic. Therefore, coordination has been made to restore the air base by applying the following steps:

(a) The need to find Futenma replacement facility or Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) in Okinawa Prefecture. Elements in US Marine Corps operation are required, so the determination of the location of the FRF should be placed in Okinawa Prefecture so that aircraft placed in MCAS Futenma will be located near the location they are trained and can operate on a regular basis (DOJ, 2014: 253).

(b) The US military helicopter crash incident in Ginowan city in August 2004 was one of considerations made by Japan and the US to restructure US military base in Japan, in particular, by relocating and restoring MCAS Futenma base as early as possible to resolve discomforts of residents. Based on negotiation and agreement with local administration, including the city of Nago, it was decided to establish the construction of the FRF in the area of Henoko adjacent to Oura. Due to construction of replacement base, a "Memorandum of Basic Understanding" was established between the Governor of Okinawa and the Minister of Defense in May 2006 (DOJ, 2014: 253). After Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama ruled administration in September 2009, the Exploratory Committee for Okinawa Base Issues was established. In May 2010, the Japanese and US governments held a "2 + 2" meeting in an effort to confirm the intention to replace the FRF base in the Schwab Camp area and agreed to take concrete steps to reduce its impact on Okinawa. Subsequently, the "2 + 2" meeting continued on a regular basis in June 2011 and in 2014 as a form of their commitment to complete the relocation project as soon as possible to avoid the use of MCAS Futenma and to eliminate risks (Defense Of Japan, DOJ, 2014: 253). At the "2 + 2" meeting in October 2013, which was the continuation of the "2 + 2" meeting in April 2012, the Japan and US governments confirmed plans to build the FRF at Schwab Camp in Henoko town as the only solution to stop the use of MCAS Futenma (DOJ, 2014: 253).

(c) Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) construction project. On March 22, 2013, application for reclamation approvals related to the FRF construction project have been submitted to the Governor of Okinawa. With the approval given by the Governor of Okinawa on 27 December 2013, the central government continued to encourage the FRF construction project (DOJ, 2014: 253). As previously informed, MCAS Futenma was located in downtown Ginowan, Okinawa, surrounded by homes and schools, so it

was important to relocate the MCAS Futenma to avoid the negative impact of the air base at this location (DOJ, 2014: 255).

5.3 Analysis of Abe Strategy

The Japanese government planned to relocate the MCAS Futenma due to its location very close to the community settlement, around houses and schools, in downtown Ginowan. The relocated area plan did not change, which was to build the FRF in the Schwab Camp area, in the city of Nago. The Henoko region was the single most effective solution for relocating MCAS Futenma. The Japan government plans to make further efforts to relocate the MCAS Futenma as soon as possible and to reduce the impact on the populated areas near MCAS Futenma. The relocation of MCAS Futenma was expected to eliminate hazards in the area and to contribute to further growth in Okinawa, particularly in the city of Ginowan, through the reuse of the approximately 481 ha area. It is a land area 100 times larger than Tokyo Dome (DOJ, 2017: 293).

The return of Shinzo Abe to the Japanese administration does not only follow up the relocation agreement but also to accelerate its implementation. His administration also ordered JMOD to carry out the environmental analysis and evaluation required for relocation by the end of 2012 (Hughes, 2015: 68). At a meeting with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the end of December 2012, Nakaima submitted plan to Abe, including the acceleration of Futenma's closure within five years, the return of Camp Kinser, another military facility within seven years, the revision of the Status of Forces Agreement to regulate US forces in Japan which has long been delayed and the re-deployment of 12 from 24 Osprey aircraft outside Okinawa.

In line with William D. Coplin's statement that, in carrying out the policy-making process, the decision-makers, in this case the Shinzo Abe government, developed mutual relationship with domestic actors for government policies and decisions. So that, domestic actor in this analysis was the ruling Governor of Okinawa between 2006 and 2014, Hirokazu Nakaima and also the Governor of Okinawa in 2014 until today, Takeshi Onaga. In carrying out the policy-making process, Hirokazu Nakaima and Takeshi Onaga sought to influence central government policies and decisions in relocating the MCAS Futenma base to Henoko. Initially, Nakaima sought to prevent the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko and wanted the relocation to be moved out of Okinawa. However, Nakaima could not influence the Japan central government, led by Shinzo Abe to continue his commitment in relocating MCAS Futenma to Henoko. So, in the end, Nakaima approved the relocation of MCAS Futenma in 2013 after years of negotiation process (Avery, Cooper, Manyin, & Rinehart, 2014: 1). The Nakaima agreement was based on top priority to close MCAS Futenma. Meanwhile, according to the central government of Japan, MCAS Futenma will not be closed if not immediately relocated to Henoko region.

Nakaima submitted a list of plan to Abe, including the acceleration of Futenma's closure within five years. In addition, Nakaima also got significant budget boost for

Okinawa, which in 2014 has been raised to 340 billion yen, from the previous 300 billion yen (The Diplomat, 2014). Nakaima also asked Abe for another 300 billion yen for a second runway at Naha airport, tax breaks to help boost the local economy and fund for the rail system. This statement showed that the decision maker (Shinzo Abe) needs political support from domestic political actors (Hirokazu Nakaima) to implement the relocation policy of MCAS Futenma. In tune with that disclosed by Coplin, in return for the support of Hirokazu Nakaima, he made certain demands upon Shinzo Abe, as described earlier.

In the next analysis followed by Coplin, factors that influenced policy makers in determining policy are domestic political situation of the country, the economic and military power, and the international context. In this analysis, Japan's domestic political situation greatly influenced the decision to relocate the MCAS Futenma. If the previous Governor, Nakaima, has approved the relocation of MCAS Futenma in Henoko, then the current governor, Takeshi Onaga is still struggling to resist the relocation in Henoko and insisted on pushing the central government to relocate outside Okinawa. Onaga tried to stop construction at a new base in Henoko (McCormack, 2015: 9). He threatened to lift prefectural approval for the construction project, citing environmental issues, even saying that he would bring the matter to court if necessary. Onaga argued that the US base should be evenly distributed throughout Japan, rather than centered on Okinawa.

The central government has so far ignored Onaga's protests, as well as protests from Okinawa people who wanted the construction work to be stopped. US Defense Secretary, Ashton Carter, visited Tokyo in April for assurance from Japan Defense Minister General Nakatani and Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida on the relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko (The Diplomat, 2015).

The next factor was economic and military factors. Economic stimulus factor also become important one. Some Okinawa people blame Tokyo's central government for the economic catastrophe on the island. But in fact, investment from Tokyo was the only solution from economic trouble. The fate of Futenma relocation plan now lies with Abe. In accepting the list of previous Governor's demands, Nakaima, Abe promised to make the utmost effort to reduce Okinawa's burden. Despite the current governor of Okinawa, Onaga still insisted on the relocation of the military base in Henoko, the Central Government still continued the project.

This was due to a strong military factor. Japan, which has no war-military power, was assisted by United States to support its military power. One of the military cooperation undertaken by Japan and US was to build US military base in Okinawa. In the international context, the relocation of MCAS Futenma was heavily influenced by these factors. From the perspective of international security, US forces in Japan cannot be reduced because there was still instability and uncertainty of the security environment in East Asia. In addition, there was concern that the function of the US Military Force will be weakened if MCAS Futenma moved overseas or out of Okinawa.

6. Conclusion

The policy of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in addressing the issue of relocation of MCAS Futenma to Henoko region can be seen through various factors. In the process of determining policy, the government leader (Shinzo Abe) is influenced by various factors. Among these are the unfavorable domestic political situation between the local government and the central government of Japan. Abe's negotiations with the previous Okinawa governor, Nakaima managed to make the Governor approved the construction of FRF in Henoko. While negotiation with current Governor, Takeshi Onaga, is still in difficult stage, despite the FRF construction. The governor of Nakaima agreed because Shinzo Abe is providing economic stimulus, by giving budget to improve the economy of Okinawa. In addition, in terms of military, Japan had no choice but to continue to relocate in the Okinawa region, because of its strategic territory. In terms of international context, Shinzo Abe's policy is influenced by his commitment in US alliance agreement for security in the Asia Pacific region. Thus, looking at factors that have been analyzed, Shinzo Abe continue to develop the FRF in Henoko as a solution of MCAS Futenma relocation policy.

7. Future Scope

In international context, Prime Minister Abe and President Trump held Japan-US Summit on 10 February 2017 in Washington. The two leaders agreed to further strengthen the ties of Japan and US alliance and also confirmed that Japan and the United States will play a key role in ensuring peace and prosperity in Asia Pacific and the World (DOJ, 2017: 282). The country's leaders discussed on rising complex security issues in the Asia Pacific region, including North Korea's nuclear missile development issues and China's unilateral efforts to change the status quo in the East and South China Seas.

In addition, both leaders recognize the importance of strengthening multi-layered cooperation with allies and like-minded countries by building networks with allies centered on Japan and US alliance. Their joint statement was to make special reference in committing to expand deterrence factor, insisting that Article 5 of the Japan-US Security Treaty over Senkaku Islands, the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) development in Henoko was the only relocation solution of MCAS Futenma.

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