

Radicalization of Indonesian Independence Movement during Japanese Military Occupation 1942 - 1945

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1. Introduction

This paper is written based on library/literature study and some field study as well as compilation of experiences of a number of people who were historical figures during the Japanese military occupation in Indonesia in 1942-1945. The opinion and perspective presented in this paper are personal viewpoints which, if there is some interest about this topic among researchers, can be used as a reference for tracing historical data for future researches.

1) Japanese Expansion Policy to the South (*Nanpoo Seisaku*)

The Japanese Expansion Policy to the South (Southeast Asia) can be perceived from three interrelated dimensions:

- International Dimension** which is centered in the conflict of interests among the great, powerful countries in competing over colonies and areas of economic market and industry.
- Regional Dimension** which is centered in the Japanese position which was getting pushed backward in China-Japan War and independence movements taking place in Korea and China.
- Internal Dimension** (Japanese domestic problems) which is the conflict between Imperial Army and Navy, between *Koodoha* and *Tooseiha* in military institution. This internal dimension has a strong correlation with both regional and international dimensions.

2) Indonesian Perception on Japanese Expansion to the South.

- The International Dimension** which was centered in the position of the Dutch and its allies toward the conflict between the United States and its ally Britain, against Japan and its ally – in imperialist war – provided an opportunity to the probability of Indonesian independence.
- Regional dimension** promoted by Japanese in the slogan Great East Asia Co-prosperity, raised some hopes among some Indonesian independence movement elites, that Japanese “promised to give independence” and “liberate”

East Asian and Southeast Asian countries from Western occupation.

- National dimension** of some independence movement elites approved Japanese propaganda, while some others raised some objections because of suspicion that the Japanese would occupy Indonesia, replacing the Dutch when they managed to expel the Dutch from Indonesia. These differences triggered some internal conflicts among independence movement elites which consumed their energy.

2. Period of Occupation (1942 – 1945)

The Japanese occupation has caused unbearable sufferings for all Indonesians in one side, while it inspired spirit of unity and courage to mobilize as well as motivated radical armed movements to gain independence. This paper focuses on especially bringing up “spirit dimension” and radicalization to gain independence which was inspired by the brutalities of Japanese military occupation, which recent studies rarely discussed.

3. Japanese Expansion Policy to the South (*Nanpoo Seisaku*)

The Japanese expansion to the South has multi purposes: to search for raw material resources for Japanese industry and to shift war from China to the Pacific. [See, Yano Tooru, *Nihon no Nanyou Shikan* (Japanese Policy to the South), Tokyo: Chuuookooron Shinshou, 1979]

3.1 International Dimension

Approaching the end of World War I, the Imperial Defense Policy was revised from the 1907 policy. The 1907 defense policy stated that the Soviet Union, the United States, and France were regarded enemies and potential threats to Japan. The new policy stated that the Soviet Union, the United States, and China were regarded enemies and potential threats to Japanese Empire. [Fujirawa Akira, “The Role of Japanese Army” in: *Pearl Harbor as History Japanese-American Relations 1931-1941*, (Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, ed), (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1973, pp.189-195)] This change in national

defense policy brought an impact to bigger roles of the Imperial Navy in Japanese political life. Eventually, the Navy was assigned to a special task to strengthen Japanese war equipments in confronting forces and fleets of the American Navy. The operational target of the implementation of this policy was to plan an attack to Luzon Island in Philippines as a main target, although the plan was never carried out.

In 1936 the National Defense and Strategy Policy was revised again, by adding up Britain as a main target and a potential threat to Japan. In the succeeding strategy plan, Division V and Division IX of the Imperial Army were prepared to attack Philippines, and at the same time getting prepared to anticipate threats from the Soviet Union. [Fujirawa Akira, *Ibid*] Although those plans had been quite well prepared, in reality the Japanese Army remained busy dealing with independence movement in China which expanded into an open war. This condition also gave a chance for the Imperial Navy to concentrate on the preparation for expansion to the South.

The background condition of the giving of a bigger authority to the Navy was not only the fact that the Japanese Army at that time concentrated on China in dealing with Chinese independence movements but also the fact that there was a geopolitical change in the United States containment against Japan through the Washington Treaty in 1922. The Washington Treaty is a series of policy of the war winning allied countries on the limitation of Japanese expansion to Asia, as well to Pacific areas. The Washington Treaty stated that it was necessary to set a limitation of fleets of navy owned by countries that were involved in World War I. The number of naval fleets owned by certain countries should be based on the following ratio: the United States 5, Britain 5, and Japan 3. For Japan, the Washington Treaty was perceived that Japanese Navy was stripped of its forces, so that it will limit the space for Japan both in mainland East Asia and Southeast Asia areas.

3.2 Regional Dimension

Independence movements against the Japanese military occupation in Korea, Japan and Manchuria caused Japan to generate an idea that someday Japan would give an independence to its colonies in East Asia, after the circulated President Wilson's statement which was known as "the Wilson Doctrine" in 1918 which declared that "colonies are to be given a trust to manage themselves or to be given an independence". The Wilson Doctrine seemed to have a correlation with the idea of the East Asia Regional Geopolitical Development which was circulated by Japanese in a form of the slogan and propaganda "Great East Asia Co-prosperity" (*Dai Tooa Kyo-eiken*). This slogan and propaganda were done by the Japanese to face the expanding and lengthy wars in Asia, for example, the guerilla war which was done by the People of China Liberation Army under Mao Zedong. Most of the centers of resistance of the Liberation Army were in peasants' villages in remote areas so that the Japanese army failed to defeat the People of China Liberation Army and the resistance from Chinese people. Consequently, the Japanese Army only managed to occupy areas as far as small towns or areas alongside the

railroads. The war against China drained quite a lot of Japanese economic potency and it had been predicted by some strategy experts in the Japanese Imperial Army that there was no certainty when the war would end.

In the institution of the Japanese Imperial War Forces, there was a conflict between senior generals (*Koodooha group*) and *Tooseiho group* which consisted of middle-rank officers, about which enemy Japan had to face. *Koodooha group* argued that Japan's potential enemy was the Soviet Union and if the Soviet Union could be conquered, the economic resources in Siberia which was rich in natural gas, oil, and other natural resources could be utilized by the Japanese. However, from the strategy dimension, moving to attack to the North was far more difficult to do since there were geographical obstacles such as cold, harsh winter. On the other hand, according to *Tooseiha group* the main enemy and potential threat to Japan was the United States and its ally Britain which had occupied the Southern Japan. Southern areas which include Malay Peninsula, Sumatera, Borneo, Java and so on (Dutch colonies) were relatively rich in natural resources such as oil, iron ore, bauxite, etc, which were required by Japan to support its war and domestic industrial needs. Geographically, those areas in the south were relatively easier to conquer because of their tropical climate. If Malay Peninsula could be captured, Allied forces most of which was in Europe (Britain) and in Hawaii (the United States) would be disconnected. Ultimately the attack to the South became a strategic decision in the Japanese War Forces.

3.3 Internal Dimension

The internal conflicts inside the Imperial War Forces were followed by political conflicts between conservative-minded political parties and progressive-minded political parties. In accordance with "the Wilson Doctrine", the progressive-minded political parties which were supported by 'liberalist intellectuals' focused their attention primarily to the settlement of internal economic crisis and the intensifying democratic movement. Similarly, civilian groups which supported International Communism movement focused their attention to the settlement of problems in capitalistic economy which was developing in Japan at that time. According to their perception, the capitalistic economy implemented in Japan triggered injustice in Japanese domestic economy and forced Japan to get involved in imperialistic war to compete over colonies and international market. Regions which were rich in natural resources and potential market were areas in East and Southeast Asia. The expansion policy to the South could not be separated from the policy to meet supplies of raw materials needed by the Japanese industry.

In 1940 the Japanese Army decided to attack and occupy the Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia). With this strategy, it was expected that the British force could be disengaged from the United States' force. Shortage of naval ships – which were concentrated to support wars in the Pacific – resulted in the incapability to transport raw material resources especially from Java and Sumatera, although one of the main purposes of the expansion to the South was the

exploitation of natural resources which were required by the Japanese industry.

In Japanese Imperial Session in 5 November in regard to the expansion to the South, one of the things mentioned was:

“The economy in the areas in question (areas in the South, translator), should be controlled strictly in an effort to make it easier and support battle equipment which was very crucial and as a main support in Japanese occupation’s forces... independence movement by the locals should not be allowed” [Ienaga Saburo, Taiheyo Sensoo (The Pacific War, 1931-1945) (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978 p. 55)] (writer’s translation)

Then, in Imperial Session (*Gozen Kaigi*) on 14 March 1942, the Secretary of the Cabinet Hoshino Naoki made the following statement:

“There is no limitation for us. . . we can seize them and do whatever we want . . . Areas in the South are currently to be made raw material resources and market to our industry. We must find some efforts to prevent industrial development in those areas. Wage for labor has to be made as low as possible in those areas. [Ienaga, Ibid](writer’s translation)

As a matter of fact, war strategies as well as decisions prior to the Pacific War were mostly designed by the middle-rank officers whose ranks were Major, Lieutenant colonel, and Colonel. [About the roles of Middle rank officers in creating war strategies, see my writing, “Perang Pacific Dirancang Perwira Menengah Jepang” in Sinar Harapan Newspaper, 4 February 1983. References for the writing include Maruyama Masao, Gendai Seiji no Shisoo to Koodoo, Fujirawa Akira, Senso Shidosha no Seishin Koozo]. They were holding important positions in the army’s center of command such as chief or staff of operation field (General Operation Staff Division of Army) and military affairs section (Military Affairs Bureau). All war plans and military strategies were coordinated under the Minister of Army and the Army General Staff. Viewpoints and opinions of the Minister of Navy and the Navy General Staff were also taken into account and when necessary some adjustments were to be made. Only after the final decision was made, those documents were proposed to the Imperial Headquarters (*Dai Hon Ei*) and to the cabinet joint session to be decided as Nation’s Guidelines and Highest Policy. It can be seen here that the middle-rank officers in the army had more prominent roles than those of navy officers. That condition created a discontent in the Navy which emerged as a disguised dispute between the Army and the Navy. Between the Army and the Navy there was a responsibility issue in which each of them claimed that a certain responsibility was the other’s responsibility prior to its defeat in the Pacific War happened and it became one of the consequences of the strategy composition and war decision making.

4. Indonesian Perception on Japanese movement to the South

News about the China-Japan War, independence movements in Korea, independence movements in India under Gandhi, and post World War I fascism movements which were getting expansive had an effect on Indonesian independence movement discourse. The Japanese government in Tokyo had made some preparations for capturing areas in the South by sending some spies who were known as *Bunka Sendenbu* (Cultural Propaganda Section). *Sendenbu*’s function was to gather as much as information about the what happened in the Netherlands East Indies (Indonesia). [About Japanese people who had been in Indonesia before Japanese occupation, see: Goto Ken’ichi, Japan and Indonesian National Movement, (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor, 1998) also see Shiraishi Saya, and Shiraishi Takashi, (ed) “Orang Jepang di Koloni Asia Tenggara Sebuah Tinjauan (translation), (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor, 1998)]

4.1 International Dimension

In 1928, Soekarno (who later became the first President of the Republic of Indonesia) in his writing in *Suluh Indonesia Muda* newspaper had predicted that the dispute among post World War I capitalistic countries had generated nationalism awareness which was getting expansive especially in the colonized Asian countries. The Japanese involvement in the dispute among Western Countries and Japanese position which was getting cornered in Korea and China, as a result of resistance of those nations against Japanese occupation, would give a positive impact on Indonesian independence movement. Soekarno further wrote:

“ soon we are going to witness a huge dispute in the Indian Ocean among imperialistic giants America, Japan and Britain which fight for prey and compete over power: At this moment (the US and Britain, writer) had extended their claws to attack Japan anytime they want . . . from five directions, from Dutch Harbor, from Hawaii, from Tantuilla, from Guam and from Manila. America has surrounded Japan with strong sea fortresses ... Japan has strengthened its weaponry, followed by Britain which has built sea fortresses in Singapore .. Let’s not be unprepared when all our enemies fight against each other with all their efforts in close proximity to our homeland and perhaps in the land of our country too. Let’s not be blinded, when other Asian nations stand side by side and know how to respond to such a dispute.” [Ir. Soekarno, “Indonesia and Pan-Asiatisme” in *Suluh Indonesia Muda*, 1928, republished in *Di Bawah Bendera Revolusi*, Volume I, pp. 73-78](writer’s translation)

4.2 Regional Dimension

Enthusiastic responds of Indonesian people toward the Japanese military which landed in Banten in March 1942 indicated that the arrival of the Japanese military was regarded as liberation army from “the older brother” which would liberate Indonesia from the Dutch occupation [The landing of the Japanese military in Padang Galak Coast in

Bali, was followed by a violent battle against Allied army and on 18 February 1942 Denpasar had been taken over by the Japanese army. Brutal behavior of Japanese military frightened the locals. During the first three months of Japanese occupation, the threatening situation remained and many local people evacuated to remote areas. The arrival of Japanese army in Bali (various information : 17 February 1942,) 18 February Denpasar had been occupied (I Gusti Angung Mantra, former editorial staff of Bali Shimbun), 19 February, (Pendit, 1979, Bali Berjuang) See, Putra Agung, "Dampak Pendidikan Pada Masa Pendudukan Jepang di Bali", the paper was presented in International Seminar "The Impact of Japanese Education System on the Development of Indonesia Nation" on 7 May 2006 in Udayana University, Bali] for Indonesian independence. From the Indonesian perspective the "The older brother" image had been embedded even decades before the arrival of the Japanese army, started when Japan managed to defeat Russia in the Japan-Russia War (1904-1905). The sentiment and hierarchy of prominent race was in fact dominating the *zeitgeist* of that era. The Japanese victory over Russia in 1905 was seen more as the superiority of the yellow race (Japanese) over the white race (Russian or European). From the perspective of the history of Indonesian independence movement, race sentiment had been able to lift up Indonesian nationalism spirit.

When Indonesian people and other Southeast Asian people perceived the superiority of the yellow race as the prominence of "the older brother" which would liberate them from the occupation of Western countries, at the same time emotional and irrational relations among nations became the spirit of the era during World War I and World War II. The notion of relations between "older brother" and "younger brother" can still be found in the result of the research conducted by Professor Nishihara Masashi which states:

"Soekarno became the first president of the Republic of Indonesia with the favor from the Japanese military government, with whom he collaborated, and which supported Soekarno as the main figure in Indonesian independence movement. Hadn't Soekarno got material and immaterial supports from the Japanese Navy office in Jakarta, the Proclamation of Indonesian Independence in August 1945 would have faced a tremendous problem. The successor of President Soekarno, President Soeharto had also been trained by the Japanese military and appointed platoon commandant in PETA which was formed by the Japanese." [Nishihara Masashi, The Japanese and Soekarno's Indonesia, Tokyo-Jakarta Relations 1951-1966, (Kyoto: The Center for Asian Studies, Kyoto University, 1976, p.xiii)] (writer's translation)

The view on collaboration between Soekarno and the Japanese military ruler as mentioned by Nishihara, is a political analysis from an expert, while it is merely Soekarno's political strategy as a historical figure. In other words, the collaboration was done for Indonesian independence.

4.3 National Dimension

From the perspective of national dimension, the Japanese occupation in Indonesia has positive and negatives meanings. The positive one is in the spirit; it promoted patriotism, discipline, obedience to teachers and parents, as well as courage (military education in PETA). This spirit served as a "fuel" which triggered the courage to fight against the colonists.

Although Indonesian people had an enthusiastic spirit and were mobilized to gain independence, political figures such as Soekarno, Hatta, Sjahrir, etc, remained taking into account the right time to declare an independence by designing a struggle strategy. In a conversation among Soekarno-Hatta-Sjahrir who gathered in a meeting in Hatta's residence, they agreed that there had to be a strategy in a struggle against the Japanese, which was through an open collaboration with the Japanese which was initiated by Soekarno using his influence on the mass. It was done openly, while Hatta was asked to do an underground movement, although this task was eventually handled by Sjahrir who requested the task himself. Finally, Sjahrir organized an underground movement which communicates that strategy to other figures in independence struggle. The collaboration meant by Soekarno was to make use of the Japanese occupation to prepare Indonesian people, as he said:

"..a huge and very good opportunity to educate and prepare our people. All Dutch employees are now held in prisoner camps. On the other hand, the number of Japanese people is inadequate to run a government. They will need us. Indonesia will soon see that its employer will not succeed well without our help." [About this matter, see : "Pendudukan Jepang", "Kolaborasi atau Pahlawan", in: Cindy Adams, Bung Karno Penyambung Lidah Rakyat Indonesia (Mayor Abdul Bar Salim, translator) (Jakarta: PT. Gunung Agung, 1966, pp.257-296)] (writer's translation)

It turned out that *Nanpoo Seisaku* was applied deceitfully by the Japanese military government in Indonesia. First, at the beginning of the occupation the Japanese promised to liberate Indonesian people from the Dutch occupation, by claiming as "the older brother". The Japanese military chiefs gained support from the leaders of Indonesian independence movement such as Soekarno and Hatta including Islamic religious leaders who persistently fought against the Dutch. Then, the Japanese wanted to use them to mobilize Indonesian people and to exploit Indonesian economic resources for the interest of Japan's wars against the Allied countries, especially the United States.

On the other side, the Indonesian leaders even from the beginning of the Japanese occupation had realized the intention of the Japanese military government. Mobilization policy by the occupying government was utilized well by the movement leaders to bring together all potentials and to make a firm decision to reach a collective dream which was to gain Indonesian independence in the future. Those leaders including the youth were aware of the fact that those

potentials would be useful as a means for Indonesian independence struggle when the time came. [I Ketut Surajaya, Wahono dan Zaman Jepang, Pantang Didahului Matahari, Wahono's autobiography, (draft) has been published]

5. Period of Occupation (1942-1945)

What had been suffered and had been obtained by Indonesia during the Japanese occupation in Indonesia? [See, S. Takdir Alisjahbana, *Kalah dan Menang*, (Jakarta: Dian Rakyat, 1981). This novel is rich in cultural comparison among European culture (Dutch), Japanese culture, and local culture (Indonesia). As a literary work this book is suitable to be read to understand zeitgeist of the period of the Japanese occupation in Indonesia] From various studies conducted by researchers, I have come to some conclusions, among which are:

5.1 Suffering during occupation period

In film *Roomusha* showed in the 1970's (which was banned in cinemas during the administration of President Soeharto), we can see that those pains and sufferings depicted in the film were experienced by Indonesian people during the Japanese occupation. All the pains during the Dutch occupation put together were not as horrible as the sufferings during the Japanese occupation. (Comparative studies about the sufferings during those two foreign occupations haven't yet been found)

5.1.1 A Lot of victims

(a) *Roomusha*

Horrible stories about *roomusha* (forced war laborers) based on accounts told by those who experienced it were truly horrible [See, Ismail Marahimin, *Dan Perang pun Usai*, (Jakarta: (?)). Even though Ismail didn't narrate specifically about *roomusha*, this novel describes a lot of things about sufferings, joys and pains during the Japanese occupation in Indonesia]. Until today there is not any accurate data about how many people who died or were killed while doing *roomusha*. Many people exploited in *roomusha* were murdered after they finished doing a secret work, such as to build fortress for underground protection in Bukittinggi (people in Bukittinggi called it "the Japanese Hole") [workers were from Java or other areas, and when the hole had been done, the workers didn't return to where they were from (perhaps they were murdered?)]. Similarly, it also happened in road works in Borneo, Sumatera, Java, even railroad works in Burma.

(b) Famine

Lack of food during the Japanese occupation period was a common story among elderly people. Most of the people were forced to eat mixed rice (rice mixed with corn, *gerontol* (salted shredded coconut), or banana tuber/root or other roots) as well as green leaves such as cassava leaves. Starvation happened in many regions. People were forced to plant trees that produce castor oil for lighting as a substitute to electricity and oil. People were forced to wear clothes made from gunnysack/jute or tree barks, so that many people got skin diseases. [There are plenty of literary works which describe how difficult life was during the Japanese

occupation, for example, *Kalah dan Menang*, (Sutan Takdir Alisjahbana), *Dan Perang pun Usai* (Ismail Marahimin)]

(c) *Jugun Ianfu*

Jugun Ianfu (local women employed by force to entertain Japanese soldiers). Stories about *Jugun Ianfu* in Indonesia caused everlasting suffering for young women who experienced it. Some of them especially in Java are still alive, but it is very difficult for them to recount their bitter experiences as *Jugun Ianfu*. [See, Natalia Adriani, *Jugun Ianfu: Pelacuran Pada Masa Pendudukan Jepang di Wilayah Jawa Tengah dan Yogyakarta Periode 1942-1945*. (Undergraduate Student Thesis, Japanese Study Program, FIB-UI, 2003) Natalia conducted a field research in Central Java and Yogyakarta using interview method about *Jugun Ianfu* and from the result of the field research she conducted, some conclusions can be drawn: the main issues of *Jugun Ianfu* are (a) poverty, (b) victory diseases (mental diseases, drunken war) which resulted *Jugun Ianfu* both individual and collective who were systematically forced by Kempetai. *Jugun Ianfu* also had their Japanese names, such as Wagimin (Sakura), Soerif (Ayami), Ribut (Akiko), etc] In Indonesia *Jugun Ianfu* was not as big discussion issue as in Korea and China because officially the government of Indonesia has never claimed for compensation for this issue, unlike Chinese and Korean government which claimed for compensation. [About *Jugun Ianfu*, read among others, Hick George, *The Comfort Women: The Sex Slaves of the Imperial Japanese Forces*, (New South Wales, Australia: Allen & Unwin Pty. Ltd., 1995)]

5.1.2 Depletion of Economic Potentials

It is very difficult to come up with accurate quantitative data about how much material loss Indonesia suffered during three and a half years of the Japanese occupation. However, from the stories recounted by elderly people who experienced life under the Japanese occupation, we can get some descriptions: rice was taken by force from rice barns (this was experienced by peasant villagers in Bali. Jewelry, gold, silver or livestock were also seized). Not only rice, but also other food supply was seized for the interest of the Japanese soldiers. It was a strong indication that massive exploitation of natural resources had happened. However, natural resources such as oil, iron ore, and bauxite which were transported to Japan was not significant in amount since Japan lacked of vessels to load and transport them at that time. It happened because most of the vessels were mobilized for the need of Pacific War. The data on this has not been traced yet.

The official figure which was agreed by both the Indonesian government and the Japanese government when settling the value of captured treasures/resources or booty was US \$ 400.000.000. That includes US \$ 176.910.000 for economic grants, and the rest \$223.390.000 is pure war compensation. It had to be paid in 12 years, paid each year as much as US \$ 20.000.000. The payment of this booty was done in 12 years from 1958 to 1970. [About the topic of seized resources, see: I Ketut Surajaya, "Hubungan Indonesia-Jepang 1950-1965, monograph, part of a project on book of Department of Cultures and Tourism, 2005]

5.1.3 Human Rights Violation

Every occupation on a particular area is always inseparable from human rights violation. During the Japanese occupation, human rights violation could not be estimated quantitatively, but qualitatively it had been experienced by they who lived during the occupation. Issues related to *roomusha*, poverty, *Jugun Ianfu*, and torture are examples of very violent human rights violation.

5.2 Lessons Learned

Although Indonesia experienced a harsh life for about three and a half years under the Japanese occupation, there are some big, positive, and useful things in quickening Indonesian independence and in developing post-war Indonesia.

5.2.1 Establishment of PETA-based New Military System

In his in-depth study, Nugroho Notosusanto, discusses that military organizations in Indonesia adopt Japanese military system which was established through Defenders of the Homeland (PETA). [See, Nugroho Notosusanto, *The Peta Army during the Japanese Occupation of Indonesia*, (Tokyo: Waseda University Press, 1979)] In fact many former PETA personnel later held positions as important officials in the government of the Republic of Indonesia. The strict military discipline took form in the Japanese occupation period.

5.2.2 Establishment of Elementary School System

In Indonesia, the ruling government implemented Elementary School System, replacing elite school from the Dutch occupation. During the Dutch occupation there was an education system that distinguished schools for European people from school for Indonesian people (Bumi Putera). During the Japanese occupation that system was eliminated. Private schools such as Taman Siswa were dismissed, and all schools were made government's schools (public schools). Six-year Elementary School (*shoogakkoo*), Middle School (*Futsu Chuugakkoo*), High School (*Kottoo Shuugakkoo*), School for Teachers in Villages (*Kiin Yosedoo*), School for Teachers B (*Sihan Gakkoo*), School for Teacher A (*Kottoo Shihan Gakkoo*) were schools that were established during the Japanese occupation.

Unlike during the Dutch colonial government when only people from certain social classes who were allowed to go to school, during the Japanese occupation education were for all levels of society. In general, the education principles include (a) the internalization of *Hakkoo Ichiu* ideology in accordance with the development of the Great East Asia Co-prosperity, (b) schools have to teach moral teachings and spirit: promote eastern moral teachings, sacrifice for the interest of the public, have a high regard to or respect parents, teachers, and government officials, as well as obey the Almighty God (c) Orientation to personal and skill building through : skill training, sports, practical works, craftsmanship, farming, and so on, (d) eliminating "Dutch" characteristics including prohibiting the use of Dutch language at schools and encourage the use of Bahasa Indonesia both at schools and government offices. The use of Dutch language was replaced by the use of Japanese language. [See Putra Agung, *Ibid*]

5.2.3 Establishment of Mass Mobilization Mechanism

During the Pacific War Japan was conducting massive mobilization in its home country to support the war. All young people and university students were conscripted to join the war in the front line. Mothers and elderly women were mobilized to deal with industries and backline defense, as women who took care of the family and the country (*Ryoosaikenbo*). In Indonesia such mobilization was also done; all young people had to follow all the Japanese government policy such as the formation of *Sei Nen Do Jo* (Center for Youth Training) which was established in the early 1943 in Tangerang and other military organizations such as *Kei Bo Dan* (Police Auxiliary Troops), *Sei Nen Dan* (Youth Troops) and Heiho (Military Auxiliary Voluntary Troops) and Defenders of the Homeland (PETA) which were prepared to mobilize Indonesian potentials to support the interest of Japan's wars against its enemies. [I Ketut Surajaya, *Ibid*] For women an organization which reached until village level was formed, for example Wives Organization (*Fujinkai*) which was assigned in the backline in supporting the war.

5.2.4 Establishment of Lobbyists

Indonesia-Japan lobbyists appeared at the same time as the inquiry and the implementation of booty payment. [About Japanese lobbyists, see, Masuda Atou, Sukaruno Datoryou no Tokushi (Special delegation of President Soekarno), (Tokyo: Chuuoookoron Shinshou, 1981)] Those lobbyists were mostly Japanese people who had been living in Indonesia for quite a long time, or had known Indonesia long before it was occupied by the Japanese. They worked cooperatively with certain friends or figures who were trusted by the government. The role of these lobbyists was generally as unofficial mediator between Indonesian government and Japanese government in the matter of booty payment, and planning and implementation of booty projects. Later they also functioned as negotiator in implementing the Japanese investment projects in Indonesia during the administration of President Soeharto. Nowadays many of them are deceased or "retired" due to their age.

5.2.5 Establishment of Japanese Alumni

PERSADA stands for Persatuan Alumni Jepang (Japanese Alumni Association) and it is one of the strongest among associations of alumni of overseas university graduates. Members of PERSADA include: *Tokubetso Nanpo Ryuugakusei* group (those who were sent to Japan before the Pacific War broke out, Booty Group (*Baishokin Ryuugakusei*) and Monbusho (*Monbugakusho Ryuugakusei*). PERSADA has established a private university, Darma Persada University which is reputable among other private universities in Indonesia.

6. Conclusion

This short paper does not intent to "dig up bitter memories" during the Japanese occupation, but it focuses its attention to not only historical events but also the meanings of Japanese occupation for the humanity and relations among nations. Based on this brief explanation it seems that there are still many historical events that have not been revealed, because these days young generation in Indonesia has a quite low interest in history of Japanese occupation, compared to their

interests in Japanese pop culture such as comics (*manga*), animation (*anime*), Japanese pop music (*JPop*) which are popular in Indonesia and worldwide.

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