# An Asymetric Cryptographic System with Double Key

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Abstract: We will present in this document a new cryptographic system with double key.

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# 1. Approach

- 1) Bob creates the message.
- 2) Alice must read it. She makes public two keys: e; e0, two reals and  $n = p_1 q_1$

With  $p_1$ ,  $q_1$  two other reals known only by her. Bob sends to Alice C

and C0: with MM the integral message and M = log(MM)

$$C = M^{\frac{e}{(p-1)(q-1)}}$$

$$C' = M^{\frac{e'}{(p-u)(q-u)+b}}$$

p; q; u; b are known only by Bob with n = pq. But u for which

$$(p-u)(q-u)(p-1)(q-1) = wC_1 = w(p_1-1)(q_1-1)(p_1-u_1)(q_1-u_1)$$

Alice does not know w. But

$$\frac{e'\log(C)}{e\log(C')} = \frac{(p-u)(q-u)+b}{(p-1)(q-1)} = a$$

$$(p-u)(q-u) = a(p-1)(q-1)-b$$

Let 
$$C'' = M^{\frac{e}{(p-u)(q-u)}}$$

Let 
$$C'' = M^{\frac{e'}{(p-u)(q-u)}}$$
  
But
$$\log(C)\log(C'') = \frac{ee'}{(p-1)(q-1)(p-u)(q-u)}\log(M)^2$$

$$= \frac{ee'}{(a(p-1)(q-1)-b)(p-1)(q-1)}\log(M)^2$$

$$= \frac{ee'}{a(p-1)^2(q-1)^2 - b(p-1)(q-1)}\log(M)^2$$

$$= \frac{ee'}{(a(p-1)(q-1)-b)(p-1)(q-1)} \log(M)^{2}$$

$$= \frac{ee'}{a(p-1)^2(q-1)^2 - b(p-1)(q-1)} \log(M)^2$$

$$= \frac{ee'}{ae^2 \frac{\log(M)^2}{\log(C)^2} - be \frac{\log(M)}{\log(C)}} \log(M)^2$$

$$= \frac{e'}{ae \frac{\log(M)}{\log(C)^2} - b \frac{1}{\log(C)}} \log(M)$$

$$(\frac{1}{ae} \frac{\log(C'')}{\log(C)} - e') \log(M) = b \log(C'')$$

$$\log(M) = \frac{b \log(C") \log(C)}{\frac{1}{ae} \log(C") - e' \log(C)} = \frac{(p-1)(q-1)}{e} \log(C)$$

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$$(p-1)(q-1) = \frac{eb \log(C'')}{1} \frac{1}{\log(C'') - e' \log(C)}$$

$$(p-u)(q-u) = \frac{wC_1}{(p-1)(q-1)} = a(p-1)(q-1) - b = \frac{e' \log(M)}{\log(C')}$$

$$= \frac{ae \log(M)}{\log(C)} - b$$

$$b = (\frac{ae}{\log(C)} - \frac{e'}{\log(C')}) \log(M)$$
But for Alice e0 = f(e); f known only by Alice, then  $e' = f(e)$ 

$$b = (\frac{ae}{\log(C)} - \frac{f(e)}{\log(C')}) \log(M)$$

$$e = g(b, \log(M))$$

$$b = (\frac{ag(b, \log(M))}{\log(C)} - \frac{f(g(b, \log(M)))}{\log(C')}) \log(M)$$

$$b = \frac{h(\log(M))}{1} \log(C'') - e' \log(C')$$
And we have M if we know  $\log(C'')$  but
$$w = \frac{(p-1)(q-1)(a(p-1)(q-1) - b)}{C_1}$$

$$\frac{1}{ae} \log(C'') - e' \log(C)$$

$$\frac{1}{ae} \log(C') - e' \log(C')$$

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 $= e'(\frac{a}{\log(C)} - \frac{e}{e'\log(C)})\log(M) = b$ 

 $\log(M) = \frac{be' \log(C)}{ae' - e} = (p - 1)(q - 1)\log(C)$ 

 $= (\frac{ae}{\log(C)} - \frac{e'}{\log(C'')})\log(M)$ 

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$$\begin{split} \log(M) &= \frac{h(\log(M))e'\log(C)}{ae'-e} \\ (p-1)(q-1) &= \frac{be'}{ae'-e} = \frac{eb\log(C'')}{\frac{1}{ae}\log(C'') - e'\log(C)} \\ \log(C'') &= \frac{e'(\frac{1}{ae}\log(C'') - e'\log(C))}{e(ae'-e)} \end{split}$$

And we have log(C'') and then log(M)

## 2. Advantages of the Method

Comparing to other systems like RSA, the advantage is that we do not work with great numbers, because it is very difficult to identify p; q knowing pq.

## 3. Inconvenients

It is in the function f which must be hidden. The challenge is to find one which can not be broken.

### 4. Conclusion

The analytic approach has allowed to put in evidence a new method of cryptography.

#### References

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