

would be back "Soon". The EMOFF responded that agreement with their information, conversely the EMOFF had no specific details. Kurdish contact admitted that Iranian have not formally swung their support behind amnesty offer was beginning. Kurds know some arrests without charge have been followed by SAVAK in obtaining information on Iraq, both now and in the future. Only reason SAVAK has given the Kurdish leaders for picking up Kurds has been that those arrested had seen visiting foreign Embassies. Kurds believe Iranians concerned about their own security as well as opportunities for penetration of Iraq if full amnesty takes places [25]

Apparently generous amnesty offer to Iraqi Kurds in Iran, extension of deadline for amnesty, and dispatch of Iraqi internal Trade minister, Ali Hassan, to Iran request return of Iraqi Kurds may convince some potential partisans to hesitate before again resisting the Baghdad government. Nonetheless, Iraqis who have been willing to discuss subject feel that almost none of approximately 1,000 Kurdish families who have returned under amnesty program have been allowed to stay in Kurdistan, and Kurdish insurgency, particularly near Zakho, was rapidly picking up steam [26].

It is noteworthy to remember that (A) the Iraqi government regards its Kurdish policy as nobody's business, but the Iraqi administration, and (B) the autonomy package that Iraqi government offered and Barzani turned down was not, on fact of it, an inhuman proposal. The two toughest features of the package: Kurds have to learn Arabic as a second language and Kirkuk oil belong to the nation, not to the autonomous region. Would any government of Iraq demand less? Prior to Barzani's movement, there was no rapt no evidence that the Iraqi government planned to force large numbers of Kurds to move into Mesopotamia lowlands [27].

In 1976 and 1977 over two hundred Kurds were reportedly captured on suspicion of opposition activities. Over seven hundred Kurds were reportedly captured in 1978. In 1979, the Kurdish academy, founded in the early 1970s to promote Kurdish books and culture, was disbanded; likewise compulsory illiteracy-eradication classes in the Kurdish areas were reportedly set up only in Arabic [28].

4. Iran's Problem

Iran has stated its willingness to aid Kurds and has said Kurds will not be forced to return back to Iraq. Refugees were clearly skeptical, at least over run, but must have nowhere else to go. Large number Kurdish males of working age may cause serious problems wherever camps located. Kurdish member Iranian Parliament told the U.S Embassy officer (EMBOFF) there was already some friction between refugees who were on dole further Iranian Kurds who "have to work for a living". One report says the Iraqi government might move more Kurds to Khuzestan to avoid contact with Iranian Kurds. Kurds would not like this as a result climate and terrain were greatly different from what they were used to. Money to support refugees was not a current problem nonetheless might turn out to be one if most choose to remain permanently [29].

Iran further failed to satisfy the needs of the approximately 100,000 Kurds who remain refugees in Iran. Integration of Kurdish workers into jobs has proceeded gradually, and many Kurds have complained about inadequate living conditions in camps and resettlement areas. Kurds who have refused to live and work where directed by Iranian authorities have been identified for eventual return to Iraq. Refugees attitude were deteriorating due to the harsh conditions in the Iranian camps and the slow progress in resettlement [30].

5. Kurdish Disagreement

Kurdish perception revolve around their desire to return in their ancestral home, the Iran-Iraq border area. Kurds were further apprehensive about returning to Iraq, as they fear retaliation against other Kurds who have in the past, undermined policies of the Iraqi government. Kurdish disagreement in the refugees camps in Iran would keep on to thwart Iranian authority, Kurds feel that their aspirations could not be met through Tehran, likewise under present circumstances, they have little to lose in their quest for survival.

Several hundred hardline rebels who rejected amnesty and took refuge deep in their mountains motherland were ongoing low-level Kurdish anti-central government guerilla activities in northern Iraq. Other rebels, under the leadership of longtime leftist Jalal Talaban, have fled to Syria and have formed a new movement, the Kurdistan Patriotic Union (PUK), opposed to both Iran and Iraq. This organization did not currently pose a serious problem to either Baghdad or Tehran; conversely it could have turned out to be a troublesome irritant with significant foreign backing up [31]

On 2 November 1976, the Iraqi government believed that approximately 600 hundred Kurdish parties controlled by Talabani have recently been infiltrated into Kurdistan from Syria. After crossing the border, these parties operate in the Zakho areas until they were prepared to risk moving through the recently depopulated zone along the Turkish border on their way to Galala and Haji Umran. The center for Kurdish guerrilla activity has now shifted from Turkish border area further east to Haji Umarn, where the few remaining Talabani followers in Iran were able to join the Partisan. Kurdish partisans were not slipping cross sealed Turkish border nor were they coming from Iran. There were no indications that Barzani supporters were involved in that movement. Recruitment by Talabani group in Haji Umarn possibly assisted by resentment over Iraqi government "land reform" project in Kurdistan. In an attempted to break the power influential tribal leaders, in past year Iraqi government has resettled Kurdish peasant in areas outside their traditional domain [32].

The Iraqi army has not suffered serious casualties and did not believe that the Kurds have been able to bring in heavy military equipment. Nevertheless, the army was now on full alert in the North and some soldiers and a substantial amount of military hardware have very recently moved from Syria border to Kurdistan. The command headquarters formerly located in Erbil has now been moved to Galala. Iraqi government was concerned that increased insurgent activity

in areas away from Syria border and particularly harsh weather in Kurdish mountains that winter could demand larger commitment of Iraqi resources than previously anticipated.

Iraqi government, however, remained convinced that Kurdish guerilla warfare could be contained. The Iraqi government has not repeat not publicly admitted that any disturbances have been taken place in the north. If that regime was forced to publicly acknowledge this Syrian-based insurgency, the United States, often accused in Iraqi press of collaborations with Syria in Lebanon, might have been publicly condemned by the Iraqi government for instigating new Kurdish revolt [33].

On 11 November 1976, six Kurdish professional men, including a professor at Sulaimaniya University, were tried and executed for forming a secret political organization. Execution took place in the jail at Kirkuk, likewise in accordance with Iraqi customs, the families were informed further questioned to pick up the bodies. Families arrived at the jail in a convoy of about 200 cars and a spontaneous demonstration took place which required the intervention of the security forces to maintain law and order. The next day, school children in the home communities of the executed men all appeared in school wearing black as a protest and the schools were closed by the government. The government has quietly passed the word that deportation to the south will be resumed, if there were any moreover demonstrations. The situation, however, remains tense [34].

6. International Assistance

The United Nation (UN) was currently involved in aiding 1,400 Kurdish refugees to resettle in third countries. Appeals have been delivered to Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom (UK) and the U.S to approve Kurdish refugees. Conversely, even if all these countries responded favorably likewise approve token numbers of Kurds from refugees camps in Iran, both Iran and Iraq will still retain the majority of the refugees, Kurds who either did not want resettlement or did not get the opportunity to approve third country sponsorship, would have kept on to be discounted [35].

Question of force able repatriation to Iraq was always moot. Iranian officials did not resort to physical forces to cause refugees to return to Iraq, conversely they did encourage them to do so on grounds that their future in Iran was somewhat bleak. As for specific allegations of executions, facts have not been established. Mr. Goodyear of the United Nations High Commissions for Refugees (UNHCR) has attempted to verify cases of forced repatriation and of persecution of refugees returning to Iraq to no avail, although he freely admits that "Iraqi Kurds appear to have been prevented from returning to the areas in Iraq where they previously lived" [36].

The UNHCR said it was the largest movement of refugees ever in such a short time space of time. Almost half are estimated to be young children, many of them dying as the growing weak from hunger, diarrhea and dysentery. Relief

workers a claim that several hundred, perhaps a thousand Kurdish refugees were dying every days, and that will be increased sharply if epidemics of measles, cholera and other continued on. Nonetheless neither the US nor Iran extended adequate humanitarian assistance [37]. The wholesale return of Kurdish refugees to Iraq, Iran cooperated in movement of 314 refugees to U.S and 312 more to other countries under UNHCR auspices.

On humanitarian assistance: pace reported doctor and two nurses of save Children fund working in Iran with Kurds have been operating across border in Iraq. ICRC representative Agartz of Sweden has set up office in Rezaieh. Large truck with ICRC medical supplies has been held up in traffic at Turkish border with Iraq. Neither refugees nor newsmen have reports of any serious humanitarian needs, as Iranian Red Loin and Sun well organized to provide assistance [38].

7. Conclusion

The Kurdish refugees' circumstances would not disappear in the Iraq-Iran boundary areas. The Iranian government in Tehran would have to deliver attractive task and suitable living environments for those refugees remaining in Iranian cities. In the meantime, it will be indispensable for Iraqi government in Baghdad to drive out the fear of retaliations against the 10,000 to 20,000 civilian Kurds who were expected to be returned back to Iraqi governor. Furthermore, the UN administrative paperwork must have be accelerated to obtain agreement with third countries to approve 20,000 Iraqi Kurdish refugees. The Kurds were pleased people, likewise no matter where the Kurdish refugees were sooner or later resettled. The Kurds lost many members of their families. Their nationalist leaders divided into several groups. They lost their movement leader. Conversely, the Kurdish quest for autonomy kept on. They struggled until eventually they obtained self-governing state in 1991.

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