The Iraqi Kurdish Density after the Kurdish Movement Collapsed in March 1975

Karwan Salih Waisy
UKMUKMAS

Abstract: The Kurdish wishes for a self-governing state were destroyed in March, when Kurdish leader Mullah Mustafa Barzani lost Iranian and U.S. support and was forced to evacuate his forces from Iraq. Approximately two million Kurds now face eventual integration into Iraqi society. Iraq and Iran will be burdened with providing long-term economic support for these refugees. Since aid will be required until adequate tasks and housing could be found. This transition was not expected to be troublesome due to neither Baghdad nor Tehran intends to allow enclaves of Kurdish nationalist, aspiring toward an independent Kurdistan state, to turn out to be reestablished. This article outlines the history and genesis of Kurdish refugees’ conditions as well as Kurdish disagreement and political groups in Iraqi Kurdistan after the Kurdish movement collapsed. This study presented a significant amount of certainly not published details about these parties. Particular attention is paid to link between Iraqi amnesty offer as well as reaction to the Kurds, Iran’s burden and the international aid, as well as Barzani’s health condition.

Keywords: Kurdish Issue and refugees, Mustafa Barzani’s condition, Iraq as well as Iran reactions to the Kurds, and international aid

1. Introduction

After the Shah of Iran signed Algeria agreement with the Iraqi government on 6 March 1975. The Kurdish wishes for an autonomous state were destroyed in March due to Kurdish leader Mullah Mustafa Barzani lost Iranian support and was forced to evacuate his forces from Iraq. Nearly two million Kurds now face eventual integration into Iraqi society. Iraq and Iran will be burdened with providing long-term economic support for these refugees since aid will be required until adequate tasks and housing could be found. This transition was expected to be troublesome due to neither Baghdad nor Tehran intends to allow enclaves of Kurdish nationalist, aspiring toward an independent Kurdistan state, to turn out to be reestablished. The Baathist regime and the Iranian shah remain in a quandary over the disposition of Kurdish refugees destrítute from Iraq following Iran’s official termination of support for the Kurdish nationalist liberation movement. The Kurds of Iraq in Iran numbered more than 140,000 previous to the signing of the Iraqi-Iran Algiers agreement, concluded on 6 March 1975 in Algeria. An additional 30,000 Kurdish refugees fled to Iran to avoid the advancing Iraqi army during the last few days of the fighting along the northern frontier [1].

From the pike statement and the UN point of view over 150,000 refugees managed to escape into Iran [2]. Journalist returning from Kurdish confirm flood of refugees moving into Iran. Kurdish sources told them some 2,000 to 5,000 are arriving in Haji Umran every day on way to border. A more northerly route to border near Ashman, some 20 Kilometers north of Piranshahr (Khanneh) now also is used. Movement along this route was slow due to winter snows, which would argue need for extension of amnesty period past April 1 to facilitate travel. Extension of amnesty would have to be done via GOI which announced it. Many Kurds refugees with professional background (e.g. engineers, doctors) were congregating in Rezazieh and have expressed to newsmen their hopes of seeking refuge in U.S [3].

In his March 19-20 interview with newsmen Mullah Mustafa Barzani apparently did not say genocide was in progress, however that it might begin. New York Time’s Eric Pace and LA Time’s Bill Tuohy confirm other essentials of Hoagland’s story summarized in reference telegram (REFTEL) Bill expect Barzani’s request for asylum in U.S. Reuter’s correspondent Gwen Roberts and Time Magazine Stringer Leroy Woodson participated in Hoagland interview with Barzani. Although Barzani admitted revolt was collapsing and all Kurds would have to flee to Iran or surrender, he did not unequivocally ask asylum in U.S. according to this version, he said that in case of genocide against Kurds he would ask U.S help and feasibly ask for asylum[4].

On 23 March 1975, Pace (protect) told the U.S Embassy officer (EMBOFF), he had field original story about 17 March from Kurdish source alleging Kurdish contact with the U.S consul in Tabriz and Embassy in Tehran requesting urgent aid (state 61211), only to find later that Kurdish emissary had failed to accomplish his mission. Hoagland’s report of Barzani appeal for the United States government (USG) assistant may therefore be based on incorrect Pace story[5].

On 23 March two Kurdish refugees visited the U.S embassy inquiring to go to U.S. they confirmed that Barzani admitted KNLM was collapsing and had counseled Kurds to surrender to Iraqis or flee to Iran. In their opinion almost members of Peshmargas (60,000) and Kurdish forces (40,000) would flee to Iran, because the Kurds had heard that some who tried to surrender near Zozak Mountain had been fired upon. There were further reports that Iraqis were keeping Kurds who had surrender in centration camps. Hence most Kurds saw alternative to fleeing to Iran, although they did not trust Iran very much either. In their view Iran had withdrawn munitions’, supplies, and artillery support, leaving Kurds to their fate, plus might someday force Kurds back across border when it no longer wanted to support them. Both men are educated and have worked for KDP, one as information officer at Darband where he
shorted foreign correspondents. They conceded that many Kurds were farmers and shepherded who would not wanted to live in U.S or Western countries also would probably stay in Iran. However, they said there would be many young people like themselves who would want to go to U.S to escape persecution and seek work.

On 27 March 1975, the Washington post declared that: “the Kurds of Iraq have been caught in a cruel vise. Only a few weeks ago neighboring Iran was offering those arms and sanctuary in what appeared their most promising effort in years, if not centuries, to establish an autonomous areas or homeland of their own in an oil-soaked part of northern Iraq”[5]. The editorial goes on to lament the withdrawal of Iran’s support from the Kurdish movement and to chastise for not stepping into the breach. “No Muslim state has offered them a hand or even a word in their current trial, now that Iran has turned its back”[76].

The editorial raises the specter of genocide, though offers nothing in the way of evidence, and then begins to reveal some of the horrors foreseen as a consequent of the termination of hostilities. “Iran and Iraq have achieved certain developments in their bilateral relations”[6]. The Shah’s broad effort to reach a detente in his overall relations with the Arab World has advanced a bit. “Iraqi’s Baathist leadership will be able to wave its nationalist credentials high. It may now turn its gaze south upon Kuwait, which it claims, and west upon Israel as well”, “Moscow, having provided Iraq the arms with which it crushed the Kurds can be expected to question a patron’s due. Then the post concludes with final lament for the end of Kurdish national liberation struggle. “Just about everyone comes out ahead except the Kurds, who are mourning their ravage hopes and their dead”[7].

2. Mullah Mustafa Barzani’s health Condition

Barzani came to be the guest of the Iranian Shah, the very men who betrayed him. He and members of his family moved to a house in the Tehran compound of [Zamzam Kashvar Va’armiyat Ettala’t] better known as SAVAK, the Shah of Iran’s secret police agency [8]. The house, suspicious and comfortable. Lacked nothing material. Still, Barzani found himself living under virtual house arrest, cut off from his followers and from the rest of the world, a prisoner. Frustrated, fretful, and depressed by his failure, he turned out to be increasingly concerned about his health. Ever since the early 1970s, he had suffered a pain in his left leg that caused him to limp and restricted his movement. The doctors diagnosed it as spinal stenosis, a pinched nerve in popular parlance, nothing life threatening, just one of the many potential complications of old age.

Now, conversely, a new and more troubling symptom flared up a pain in his upper right chest. By early July 1975, it turned out to be insistent enough for Barani’s son Idris to question Dr. Najmaddin Karim, a young Kurdish physician from Kirkuk, to examine his father. A cursory examination told Karim that “the old man’s heart was sound. The problem, he discovered, was a painful lump near the collarbone. Karim suspected lung cancer. That was what the symptoms indicated, and Barzani smoked heavily. He never smoked store-bought cigarettes; he rolled his own using the pungent tobacco of the Kurdish mountain. He smoked the equivalent of two or more packs a day and had done so for almost sixty years. A diagnosis, however, could not be made without taking x-rays. Barzani stoutly refused, and he refused just as insistently to see the Iranian specialists that the shah wanted to send him, “I do not want to have any X-rays here”, he told Karim”. If I start treatment here, they will never let me go, they will tell me to finish my treatment”[9].

He wished to go to the U.S to visit the Mayo Clinic for further medical treatment. Consequently, on 24 July, the CIA reported that the Shah of Iran instructed his intelligence chief to arrange with CIA to accommodate Kurdish leader Mustafa Barzani’s desires to go to the U.S for necessary vascular surgery. In a telegram to the Secretary of State Kissinger the CIA recommended that “you approve this proposal. Acknowledging risks, the agency believes there would be greater risks in trying to discourage the visit that this would embitter Barzani and increased the likelihood that our (US) aid to the Kurds might be revealed”[9]. On the other hand, the agency saw some positive gains from his visit it would engender some gratitude, and enable U.S to make a direct presentation to emphasis the desire for secrecy about U.S aid and to disclaim any knowledge of the Shah’s decision to settle with Iraq [10]. The CIA would make all arrangements and pay bills while the CIA and SAVAK officers would at all times escort Barzani and the members of his party. And so it was that Barzani was finally allowed to travel to the U.S, arriving on that steamy afternoon in August 1975[11].

On 26 September, Barzani sent a letter to the CIA director William E, Colby in Iran request to meet with a policy level America official, Colby noted that Barzani wanted to meet with a senior America official and that Colby planned to have an appropriate Agency official to see him. Since that memorandum was written, officer with Barzani state that “He wanted to meet an official at the policy making level and will not be satisfied with a senior intelligence officer. Bârzanî felt very strongly that he must present his people’s case to such an official before he died (estimated at six to eight months) and has indicated that it would be inappropriate for him to leave the United States until he has done so. Because the program of U.S assistance to Barzani has been tightly held, Colby requested from the U.S president’s assistant for national security affairs Kissinger’s permission to discuss Barzani’s desires with undersecretary Sisco[12].

Barzani’s visited to the United States came to an end in late October 1975. On the morning of his flight back to Iran, the CIA minders delivered a six-month supply of medication to him. The Kurdish commanders thought it a cynical gesture. The agency, they were sure, had been told by its physician’s that “Barzani could not last more than a year”. They did not expect to see him again, and the medicine was their way of saying goodbye.

After Barzani left Washington, Muhammad Dosky, executive of the Kurdish-America Society avoided on the record interview for fear of causing the Barzani’s trouble back in Tehran, conversely he did quietly spread word about Barzani’s illness and how he had been treated by the CIA
during his U.S stay. In November 1975, Dosky went to Daniel Schorr, a CBS television newsmen, and gave him a story. Schorr broadcast it on the CBS evening news, and on 16 February 1976, the Village Voice published excerpts from a secret congressional document that confirmed both administrations’ covert aid to the Kurds and its shamefully abrupt cut off [13].

On 27 April 1976, Dosky, has informed Alfred L, Jr (Roy) Atherton deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asia affairs that Barzani, accompanied with three supporters, wished to visit the Mayo Clinic for medical treatment. In fall of 1975, Barzani was brought quietly to the United State for hospitalization at the Mayo Clinic. He reportedly has lung cancer and was undergoing chemotherapy; as previously mention he was given six to eight month to live by his doctor. Dosky estimated now his illness condition has deteriorated and we understood new needs further treatment.

Dosky has affirmed that neither Barzani nor his accompanies would engage in any political activity and that Barzani in no way wished to jeopardize the United Nations High Commissions for Refugees (UNHCR) refugee program for up to 1,400 Kurds (approximately 400 to 500 to the United States) nor affect the conditions of his family and other Kurds who were now in Iran. Atherton estimated that “We believe there is a fair likelihood that Barzani will adhere to these restrictions, but realistically we have to face the possibility of political activity or a request for permanent residence for himself and his extended family [fifty persons] in the United States”. [If he did in fact wish to settle here, we could recommend that he apply to the UNHCR for “mandated status” which would permit him to enter as a refugee. This route would perhaps raise fewer problems than granting him political asylum] [14].

Whether Barzani was or was not politically active, his presence could have revived domestic press and congressional interests in the Pike Committee investigation and in the U.S 1972-1975 policy covertly assisting the Kurds the U.S could have expected the Iraqis to be very irritated, especially if Barzani remained in the U.S, likewise this could have caused a setback to the present slight forward movement to its relations. The Iraqis had already demonstrated here and in Baghdad U.S willingness to receive UN mandated Kurdish refugees from Iran, the U.S administration did not know what the Iranian attitude would be, or whether an exit visa would be granted to Barzani or subsequently to his family members, but it did not believe the Iranian government would have wished to receive critical world press reaction if Barzani’s trip blocked [15].

In early May 1976, Dosky called on Sidney Sober, a deputy assistant secretary of state for the Middle East. Sober initially brushed aside Dosky’s appeal for a U.S visa for Barzani and for the State Department’s intervention with the Shah’s government to allow Barzani to leave Iran. He admitted that “we can’t interfere in Iran’s internal affairs”, Sober declared, “The shah does not allow such things to happen”. Dosky decided he would have to get tough. “Last year I told CBS certain things about how the U.S has treat Barzani,” Dosky declared, “But there is a lot more to tell. Now Barzani is a dying man. If you do not allow him to come back for a medical treatment, I am going to tell whole story” [16].

A frustrated Sober responded, “wait, let me look into this and I will get back to you”. Two days later, Sober told Dosky that, “The State Department would authorize a visa for Barzani. Totally he had to do was send his passport to the U.S embassy in Tehran, conversely how was Barzani to get the Iranians to give him a passport? Dosky questioned. That’s not our affairs, Sober answered back. Dosky blew up.

“Politically you have murdered Barzani. Do you intend to do it physically too? The man is sick, he needs to come here for treatment. To deny him this treatment killing him. There is no reason for this. Your relations with Iran are very good. Barzani is not going to do any harm to you or to Iran if he is allow to come here for treatment”.

Dosky could have saw that he had created an impression. “I will call you back in a day or two”, Sober assumed. Forty-eight hours later, Dosky was back at the State Department. “All right”, Sober said, there were conditions for Barzani’s stay in the U.S. This he would have to come at his own expense, likewise he would have to commit himself not to meet with media or make political activities. Dosky agreed, however, pointed out he had conditions of his own: this time Barzani would not be controlled by the CIA. He would have been free to go where he liked and to meet with anyone so long as he did not have contact with the press[17].

The U.S administration considered that there were no obvious advantage in having Barzani come there. Conversely, if they denied him a visa, they could expect Dosky to go public and to various congressmen. Senators Jackson and Kennedy as well as George Meany of the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) have previously indicated strong interests in Barzani and the U.S could have anticipated severe criticism from various groups and the press for its failure to recognize the overriding humanitarian aspects of the visit or his subsequent desire to remain there[18].

In June 1976, Barzani deplaned at John F. Kennedy airport for the second time. Dosky found him a house on the outskirts of Georgetown, where he stayed for approximately a year before moving across the Potomac to McLean. Barzani returned periodically to Mayo, and in between visits there was given radiology and chemotherapy treatment at Georgetown University Hospital and at Sibley Hospital. The cancer was kept in check and he was capable to lead a more or less normal life. In there, he met with Senator Jackson and Proxmire, with George Meany. Congressman Stephen Solarz of New York and others. Still, he chafed under the State Department’s ban on public appearance, the more so as journalists insistently pressed him for interview [19].

In a telegram from T, Patrick, Killough acting principal of the United States Interests Section in Baghdad to the Department of State on 30August1976, showed that “seems prudent to resign ourselves to probability that if Barzani ever decided he does not went to leave States, we will not make him, for he could marshal too much sympathetic and influential option in his favor to make the effort sustainable.
To this future, therefore, the USG should have prepared to reconcile itself. If this is the case, it is realistic to concentrate on what limitations, if any, USG can expect Barzani to accept on his political activities in U.S.A. If he could be persuade to keep quiet on Kurdistan or even seek reconciliation with the Iraqi government, we might be able to trade that with the Iraqi government for change in latter’s stance on matter of no little interests to U.S” [20]

Barzani’s cancer remained essentially in check until the very end of 1978, when it began to spread rapidly. His condition worsened and he became bedridden further was flown back to Mayo early in January 1979. He died on 1 March 1979, at the Georgetown Hospital in Washington. The body was taken to a funeral home in Washington, in addition to the next day hundreds of Kurds crowded the waiting room to pay last respects to their leader. On 5 March 1979, the coffin bearing Barzani’s remains was placed in the aisle of the first-class cabin of an Iran Air Boeing 747. It throughout a long trip brought back to Iran. He was buried in Iranian Kurdistan in Oshnavieh and then his body moved into Kurdistan[21]

3. Iraq’s Reaction

The central government’s settlement of destitute Kurdish families began almost immediately, much to the astonishment of some observers who though reprisals against Kurds who surrendered would be extensive. Only a small number of Kurds were reportedly executed on their arrest or return back to Iraq. The Baathist government moved rapidly to restore normal conditions in northern Iraq by granting amnesty to all Kurds except those closely associated with Kurdish leader Mullah Mustafa. Despite repeated extensions by Baghdad of the amnesty; deadline to persuade repatriation, only an estimated 70,000 Kurds, including some professional and intellectuals, had returned to Iraq by the end of May.

Moreover, Baghdad’s resettlement of Kurdish families to the Southern provinces of Iraq and efforts to “Arabize” Kurdish areas caused some 3,000 additional Kurds to flee to Iran in July 1975. An amnesty for Kurds who were former government employees or soldiers has now been extended by the central government until 16 October 1975. The limited attention that Baghdad was paying to Kurdish needs and aspirations has contributed to the disillusionment of many returning refugees. Baghdad, moreover, did not want huge numbers of Kurds now located in Iran to return back since the refugees might once again restart their struggle [22]

Kurdish sources estimated that up to sixty thousand men were captured, following the agreement between the Shah and Saddam in 1975, on suspicion of being member of the Kurdish forces and the KDP, in addition were sent to detention camps in the south of Iraq. Late in 1975, twenty-three Kurds were reportedly captured on charges of being members of a clandestine political organization; after trial by a revolutionary court in 1976, three were sentenced to death penalty and other to six years imprisonment.

In the end of 1975, the majority of the Kurdish refugees in Iraq had taken advantage of the amnesty offered to return Iraq. The policy of the Baathist government toward the question of the Kurdish autonomy has taken a predictable tack. Many returning Kurds were being resettled in small groups in agricultural farms in Sothern Iraq while the central government was encouraging the “Arabization” of the north, for instance it encouraged Arab settlement in the north and intermarriage of Arab and Kurds. The government was further extending its control in the region through the establishment of the state-owned agricultural cooperatives, land redistribution, the funding of development projects, and the construction of new cities. New schools, new industrials, new hospitals, extended social benefits the north. Centralization, not autonomy, will be the key to any future northern strategy with the proof on the unity of Iraq, not the national rights of the Kurds[23]

On 31 July 1976 the Kurdish representative met with the Baathist regime delegation. The purpose of meeting was Iraqi delegation presentation of Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) offered amnesty for “all past happening”. Iraqi delegation had wanted to visit and likewise make pitch to various groups of Kurds by helicopter, conversely had obviously been denied permission by Iranian, who then arranged meeting and withdrew. The RCC amnesty offered would not repeat not be publicly announced and would not include all Kurds presently in Iran expect General Barzani, his sons, Idris and Masoud; and a nephew, Mohammad Khalid. Kurdish refugees in Iran would be taken back into original Kurdish areas of autonomy Arbil, Sulaimaniya, and Duhok. Residents of one area may be returned to another area, however, all would return to the north rather than be relocated in Southern Iraq. Individuals would be given their old tasks back expect for military personnel, who would be relocated in civilian employment. Anyone not accepting this amnesty within the deadline between 30 and 60 days would have their Iraqi citizenship withdraw [24].

Kurdish delegation asked why Barzani and his family were to be excluded. Iraq’administration replied Barzani not welcomed in Iraq due to “something may happen” and in any event, they suspicious Barzani would want to return. Kurds further questioned about relocation of Kurds within Iraq from north to south likewise were assured that had been suppressed. This confirmed what Kurds had mastered from their own sources. The Iraqi representatives moreover pointed out that if the relocation of Kurds now in Iran went well, those in southern Iraq might be given a chance to return to their homes in the north.

Kurdish source told the EMBOFF political leadership of Kurdish community here had been considering the matter and had virtually decided to recommend acceptance of amnesty. Factors cited were: 1) failure of Iranian government to live up to promises regarding relocation, 2) increasing SAVAK arrests without charges of lower level Kurds and other indications of Iranian pressure, and 3) general feeling that by far the majority of Kurds would be better off in Iraq than in Iran under currently prevailing conditions.

Final decision will await Barzani return from the U.S and Kurdish liaison officer questioned, if they knew when that would be, saying Iranian contacts had told them Barzani
would be back “Soon”. The EMOFF responded that agreement with their information, conversely the EMOFF had no specific details. Kurdish contact admitted that Iranian have not formally swung their support behind amnesty offer was beginning. Kurds know some arrests without charge have been followed by SAVAK in obtaining information on Iraq, both now and in the future. Only reason SAVAK has given the Kurdish leaders for picking up Kurds has been that those arrested had seen visiting foreign Embassies. Kurds believe Iranians concerned about their own security as well as opportunities for penetration of Iraq if full amnesty takes places [25]

Apparently generous amnesty offer to Iraqi Kurds in Iran, extension of deadline for amnesty, and dispatch of Iraqi internal Trade minister, Ali Hassan, to Iran request return of Iraqi Kurds may convince some potential partisans to hesitate before again resisting the Baghdad government. Nonetheless, Iraqis who have been willing to discuss subject feel that almost none of approximately 1,000 Kurdish families who have returned under amnesty program have been allowed to stay in Kurdistan, and Kurdish insurgency, particularly near Zakho, was rapidly picking up steam [26].

It is noteworthy to remember that (A) the Iraqi government regards its Kurdish policy as nobody’s business, but the Iraqi administration, and (B) the autonomy package that Iraqi government offered and Barzani turned down was not, on fact of it, an inhuman proposal. The two toughest features of the package: Kurds have to learn Arabic as a second language and Kirkuk oil belong to the nation, not to the autonomous region. Would any government of Iraq demand less? Prior to Barzani’s movement, there was no rapt no evidence that the Iraqi government planned to force large numbers of Kurds to move into Mesopotamia lowlands [27].

In 1976 and 1977 over two hundred Kurds were reportedly captured on suspicion of opposition activities. Over seven hundred Kurds were reportedly captured in 1978. In 1979, the Kurdish academy, founded in the early 1970s to promote Kurdish books and culture, was disbanded; likewise compulsory illiteracy-eradication classes in the Kurdish areas were reportedly set up only in Arabic [28].

4. Iran’s Problem

Iran has stated its willingness to aid Kurds and has said Kurds will not be forced to return back to Iraq. Refugees were clearly skeptical, at least over run, but must have nowhere else to go. Large number Kurdish males of working age may cause serious problems wherever camps located. Kurdish member Iranian Parliament told the U.S Embassy officer (EMBOFF) there was already some friction between refugees who were on dole further Iranian Kurds who “have to work for a living”. One report says the Iraqi government might move more Kurds to Khuzestan to avoid contact with Iranian Kurds. Kurds would not like this as a result climate and terrain were greatly different from what they were used to. Money to support refugees was not a current problem nonetheless might turn out to be one if most choose to remain permanently [29].

Iran further failed to satisfy the needs of the approximately 100,000 Kurds who remain refugees in Iran. Integration of Kurdish workers into jobs has proceeded gradually, and many Kurds have complained about inadequate living conditions in camps and resettlement areas. Kurds who have refused to live and work where directed by Iranian authorities have been identified for eventual return to Iraq. Refugees attitude were deteriorating due to the harsh conditions in the Iranian camps and the slow progress in resettlement [30].

5. Kurdish Disagreement

Kurdish perception revolve around their desire to return in their ancestral home, the Iran-Iraq border area. Kurds were further apprehensive about returning to Iraq, as they fear retaliation against other Kurds who have in the past, undermined policies of the Iraqi government. Kurdish disagreement in the refugees camps in Iran would keep on to thwart Iranian authority, Kurds feel that their aspirations could not be met through Tehran, likewise under present circumstances, they have little to lose in their quest for survival.

Several hundred hardline rebels who rejected amnesty and took refuge deep in their mountains motherland were ongoing low-level Kurdish anti-central government guerilla activities in northern Iraq. Other rebels, under the leadership of longtime leftist Jalal Talabani, have fled to Syria and have formed a new movement, the Kurdistan Patriotic Union (PUK), opposed to both Iran and Iraq. This organization did not currently pose a serious problem to either Baghdad or Tehran; conversely it could have turned out to be a troublesome irritant with significant foreign backing up [31].

On 2November1976, the Iraqi government believed that approximately 600 hundred Kurdish parties controlled by Talabani have recently been infiltrated into Kurdistan from Syria. After crossing the border, these parties operate in the Zakho areas until they were prepared to risk moving through the recently depopulated zone along the Turkish border on their way to Galala and Haji Umran. The center for Kurdish guerrilla activity has now shifted from Turkish border area further east to Haji Umarn, where the few remaining Talabani followers in Iran were able to join the Partisan. Kurdish partisans were not slipping cross sealed Turkish border nor were they coming from Iran. There were no indications that Barzani supporters were involved in that movement. Recruitment by Talabani group in Haji Umarn possibly assisted by resentment over Iraqi government “land reform” project in Kurdistan. In an attempted to break the power influential tribal leaders, in past year Iraqi government has resettled Kurdish peasant in areas outside their traditional domain [32].

The Iraqi army has not suffered serious casualties and did not believe that the Kurds have been able to bring in heavy military equipment. Nevertheless, the army was now on full alert in the North and some soldiers and a substantial amount of military hardware have very recently moved from Syria border to Kurdistan. The command headquarters formerly located in Erbil has now been moved to Galala. Iraqi government was concerned that increased insurgent activity
in areas away from Syria border and particularly harsh weather in Kurdish mountains that winter could demand larger commitment of Iraqi resources than previously anticipated.

Iraqi government, however, remained convinced that Kurdish guerilla warfare could be contained. The Iraqi government has not repeat not publicly admitted that any disturbances have been taken place in the north. If that regime was forced to publicly acknowledge this Syrian-based insurgency, the United States, often accused in Iraqi press of collaborations with Syria in Lebanon, might have been publicly condemned by the Iraqi government for instigating new Kurdish revolt [33].

On 11 November 1976, six Kurdish professional men, including a professor at Sulaimainia University, were tried and executed for forming a secret political organization. Execution took place in the jail at Kirkuk, likewise in accordance with Iraqi customs, the families were informed further questioned to pick up the bodies. Families arrived at the jail in a convoy of about 200 cars and a spontaneous demonstration took place which required the intervention of the security forces to maintain law and order. The next day, school children in the home communities of the executed men all appeared in school wearing black as a protest and the schools were closed by the government. The government has quietly passed the word that deportation to the south will be resumed, if there were any moreover demonstrations. The situation, however, remains tense [34].

6. International Assistance

The United Nation (UN) was currently involved in aiding 1,400 Kurdish refugees to resettle in third countries. Appeals have been delivered to Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom (UK) and the U.S to approve Kurdish refugees. Conversely, even if all these countries responded favorably likewise approve token numbers of Kurds from refugees camps in Iran, both Iran and Iraq will still retain the majority of the refugees. Kurds who either did not want resettlement or did not get the opportunity to approve third country sponsorship; would have kept on to be discounted [35].

Question of force able reparation to Iraq was always moot. Iranian officials did not resort to physical forces to cause refugees to return to Iraq, conversely they did encourage them to do so on grounds that their future in Iran was somewhat bleak. As for specific allegations of executions, facts have not been established. Mr. Goodyear of the United Nations High Commissions for Refugees (UNHCR) has attempted to verify cases of forced repatriation and of persecution of refugees returning to Iraq to no avail, although he freely admits that “Iraqi Kurds appear to have been prevented from returning to the areas in Iraq where they previously lived” [36].

The UNHCR said it was the largest movement of refugees ever in such a short time space of time. Almost half are estimated to be young children, many of them dying as the growing weak from hunger, diarrhea and dysentery. Relief workers a claim that several hundred, perhaps a thousand Kurdish refugees were dying every days, and that will be increased sharply if epidemics of measles, cholera and other continued on. Nonetheless neither the US nor Iran extended adequate humanitarian assistance [37]. The wholesale return of Kurdish refugees to Iraq, Iran cooperated in movement of 314 refugees to U.S and 312 more to other countries under UNHCR auspices.

On humanitarian assistance: pace reported doctor and two nurses of save Children fund working in Iran with Kurds have been operating across border in Iraq. ICRC representative Agartz of Sweden has set up office in Rezaieh. Large truck with ICRC medical supplies has been held up in traffic at Turkish border with Iraq. Neither refugees nor newsmen have reports of any serious humanitarian needs, as Iranian Red Loin and Sun well organized to provide assistance [38].

7. Conclusion

The Kurdish refugees’ circumstances would not disappear in the Iraq-Iran boundary areas. The Iranian government in Tehran would have to deliver attractive task and suitable living environments for those refugees remaining in Iranian cities. In the meantime, it will be indispensable for Iraqi government in Baghdad to drive out the fear of retaliations against the 10,000 to 20,000 civilian Kurds who were expected to be returned back to Iraqi governor. Furthermore, the UN administrative paperwork must have be accelerated to obtain agreement with third countries to approve 20,000 Iraqi Kurdish refugees. The Kurds were pleased people, likewise no matter where the Kurdish refugees were sooner or later resettled. The Kurds lost many members of their families. Their nationalist leaders divided into several groups. They lost their movement leader. Conversely, the Kurdish quest for autonomy kept on. They struggled until eventually they obtained self-governing state in 1991.

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Author Profile

Karwan Salih Waisy is a Kurds from Kurdistan Region of Iraq. He is a master’s degree student of international relations of West Asia studies at the Institute of Malaysian and international studies (IKMAS) at the National University of Malaysia.