Abstract: Distributed networking technologies have gained popularity as a mechanism for users to share files without the need for centralized servers. A Distributed network provides a scalable and fault-tolerant mechanism to locate nodes anywhere on a network without maintaining a large amount of routing nodes. This can allows for a variety of applications beyond simple sharing of file. This includes multicast systems, and communications systems, and caches of web. We survey security issues that occur in the underlying Distributed routing protocols, along with fairness and trust that occur in file sharing and other Distributed systems. Here we discuss how techniques, ranging from cryptography techniques, to randomize network guessing, can be used to address these problems. Open nature of Distributed systems exposes them to malicious activity. Defining trusty relationships among peers can mitigate attacks of malicious peers. This paper presents distributed algorithms that enable a peer to reason about trustworthiness of other peers based on past interactions. System peers create their own trust network in their proximity by using local information available and do not try to learn global trust information. Two contexts of trust context, service context, and recommendation, these are defined to measure trustworthiness in providing services and giving recommendations. These recommendations are derived based on priority, history, and peer satisfaction. Moreover, nodes trustworthiness and confidence about a recommendation are considered while evaluating recommendations. Effective experiments on a file sharing application show that the proposed model can mitigate attacks on 16 different malicious behavior nodes.

Keywords: Distributed systems, trust management, reputation, security, cryptography

1. Introduction

Distributed systems rely on collaboration of peers to complete tasks. Way of performing malicious activity is a threat for security of distributed network. Creation of trust relationships among peers can provide a more secure environment by reducing risk and uncertainty in future distributed interfaces. But, creating a trust relationship in an unknown entity is difficult in such a malicious system. The trust maintenance is a social concept and it is hard to measure with numbers. It requires matrix to represent trust in mathematical models. The peers are classified as either trustworthy or untrustworthy is not sufficient in all cases. These metrics should have functionality depending upon which peers can be ranked according to trustworthiness. Peer satisfaction and feedbacks of peers provide information to measure trust among peers. Peer satisfaction provides some useful information about the communicating peer but feedbacks might contain deceptive information.

A central server is a traditional way to store and manage trust data of peers, e.g., eBay. These servers centrally and securely stores trust data and evaluate trust metrics. As in most distributed systems there is no central server, so peers organize themselves to store and evaluate trust information about each other [1], [2]. Management of trust data is dependent to the structure of system network. The distributed system uses hash table based methodologies; each peer becomes a trust information holder by storing feedbacks and interaction about other peers [1], [3], [4].

We present a self-organizing trust model (sort) which focuses to reduce malicious activity in a peer to peer distributed system by maintaining trust relations among peers in their surroundings. In this system peers do not try to collect trust information from remaining all peers. Here every peer develops its own local computation of trust about the peers interacted in the past. Like this, good peers form dynamic trust groups evaluated in their surroundings and can remove malicious peers from system. As peers generally tend to interact with a small set of peers [7], forming trust relations in region of peers helps to overcome attacks in a distributed system.

SORT generally based on three trust metrics. First one is reputation metric which is calculated based on recommendations of peers. It is important while deciding strangers and new nodes among all peers. Second, service trust metrics and recommendation trust metrics which are primary metrics to compute trust relation in the service and recommendation surroundings. The service trust metric is used while deciding service providers. The recommendation trust metric is used while requesting recommendations. While we are evaluating the reputation metric, recommendations are calculated on the basis of recommendation trust metric.

2. Literature Survey

Generally malicious peers have more attack opportunities in distributed trust models due to lack of a central authority. Researches are always being conducted to improve the accuracy and efficiency of the trust management in distributed systems. Some of the innovative approaches are described. In addressing the above issues, we present a new trust based security model with risk management integration via trust, which repossesses the new feature of utility maximization.

In this paper, we focus on the authorization process and the role risk management plays in the maximization of the system.
utility associated with such security process. Thus, we develop, in this work, a trust based information-theoretic model for integrating risk into security via trust, in order to maximize the utility gain obtained from honest and competent transactions from the trusted entities of the same system.

The risk can be defined as the possible utility loss due to the potential security policy violations by malicious behaviours of untrustworthy entities in a distributed system. Through the enforcement of the security decisions from the proposed model we leverage the knowledge on trust relationships to guide security decisions with risk management (allocating a particular risk level for a given interaction). This enables the underlying application to gain maximum economic benefits while keeping the security risk at a defined level. Finally, using a mobile agent system as an example, we study the new feature of the proposed model through simulation and present the experimental results which confirm the new feature of the proposed model.

3. Related Work

Most existing distributed systems are built on traditional security models, including the two most widely used models the mandatory access control (MAC) and the discretionary access control (DAC) models [5]. While these models aim at the enforcement of access control of system resources, they are not concerned about the system utility on which they do have a direct impact. This is because malicious behaviours can happen even after the authorization stage [9].

The notion of utility and its application in distributed computing is not new. Marsh introduced the notion of utility as a member of a set of input parameters used for constructing his trust model for distributed systems, where utility was actually used as one of the input parameters for the trust calculation used for cooperation decisions [14]. The notions of utility and trust have also been used by other researchers in security context for grid based computing [13]. However, risk management has not been considered in these Studies. Sonntag. Have proposed a payment based scheme for mobile agent based e-commerce applications.

In this scheme utility is considered. Depending on the trustworthiness of the requesting entity, different prepaid amounts may need to be submitted by the agent’s home server to the remote server in order to gain access which otherwise could not be granted. The prepaid amounts are set to be more than the lost caused by any potential malicious behaviours. This proposal has introduced the notion of dynamic authorization in a sense that permissions to agents are granted according to the trustworthiness of the agent and these permissions demand prepayments to insure against potential damages (utility loss). However this scheme does not deal the utility maximization explicitly.

A formal model of trust based on sociological foundations is defined by Marsh [11]. In this model, an agent uses own experiences when building trust and does not consider information of other agents. Abdul-rahman and Hailes’ trust model [3] evaluates trust as an aggregation of direct experience and recommendations of other parties. Trust metrics are defined in discrete domain. A semantic distance measure is defined to test accuracy of recommendations. Zhong [13] proposes a dynamic trust concept based on McKnight’s social trust model [12]. Uncertain evidences can be used when building trust relationships. Second-order probability and Dempster Shaferian framework helps in evaluating uncertain evidences. Reputation is first used as a method of building trust in e-commerce communities. Resnick et al. [1] point out limitations and capabilities of reputation systems. Ensuring long-lived relationships, forcing feedbacks, checking honesty of recommendations are some difficulties in reputation systems. Dellarocas [2] explains two common attacks on reputation systems: unfairly high/low ratings and discriminatory seller behavior. Controlled anonymity and cluster filtering methods are proposed as countermeasures. Despotovic and Aberer [10] study an online trade scenario among self-interested sellers and buyers. Trust-aware exchanges can increase economic activity since some exchanges may not happen without trust establishment. Terzi et al. [2] introduces an algorithm to classify users and assign them roles based on trust relationships. Yu and Singh’s model [12] propagates trust information through referral chains. Referrals are the primary method of developing trust in others. Mui et al. [14] propose a statistical model based on trust, reputation and reciprocity concepts. Reputation can be propagated through multiple referral chains. Josang et al. [4] discusses transitivity of trust with referrals. Recommendations based on indirect trust relations may cause incorrect trust derivation. Thus, trust topologies should be carefully evaluated before propagating trust information.

4. Existing System

In the presence of an authority, a central server is a preferred way to store and manage trust information. The central server securely stores trust information and defines trust metrics. According to the trust information from the central server the trust of peer is detected.

4.1 Background, models and solution

In this section, we present some background on structured Distributed overlay protocols like CAN, Chord, Tapestry and Pastry. Space limitations prevent us from giving a detailed overview of each protocol. Instead, we describe an abstract model of structured Distributed overlay networks that we use to keep the discussion independent of any particular protocol.

For concreteness, we also give an overview of Pastry and point out relevant differences between it and the other protocols. Next, we describe models and assumptions used later in the paper about how nodes might misbehave. Finally, we define secure routing and outline our solution.

Throughout this paper, most of the analyses and techniques are presented in terms of this model and should apply to other structured overlays except when otherwise noted. However, the security and performance of our techniques
was fully evaluated only in the context of Pastry; a full evaluation of the techniques in other protocols is future work.

4.2 Routing overlay model

We define an abstract model of a structured Distributed routing overlay, designed to capture the key concepts common to overlays such as CAN, Chord, Tapestry and Pastry. In our model, participating nodes are assigned uniform random identifiers, node IDs, from a large id space (e.g., the set of 128-bit unsigned integers). Application-specific objects are assigned unique identifiers, called keys, selected from the same id space.

Each key is mapped by the overlay to a unique live node, called the key’s root. The protocol routes messages with a given key to its associated root. To route messages efficiently, all nodes maintain a routing table with the node IDs of several other nodes and their associated IP addresses. Moreover, each node maintains a neighbor set, consisting of some number of nodes with node IDs nearest itself in the id space. Since node ID assignment is random, any neighbor set represents a random sample of all participating nodes.

4.3 DMRep

On a structured distributed system, a data structure can represent a random sample of all participating nodes. Since node ID assignment is random, any neighbor set distinguishes a newcomer and an untrustworthy one.

flood every peer in the system with queries about other peers, the principal advantage of this approach is that it has an efficient way of storing and retrieving trust data and does not deal with intrusions, collusions, and selfishness of peers. Each key is mapped by the overlay to a unique live node, called the key’s root. The protocol routes messages with a given key to its associated root. To route messages efficiently, all nodes maintain a routing table with the node IDs of several other nodes and their associated IP addresses. Moreover, each node maintains a neighbor set, consisting of some number of nodes with node IDs nearest itself in the id space. Since node ID assignment is random, any neighbor set represents a random sample of all participating nodes.

4.4 Power Trust

Power Trust [5] constructs an overlay network based on the Power law distribution of peer feedbacks. It dynamically selects small number of power nodes that are most reputable using a distributed ranking mechanism. A reputation system calculates the global reputation score of a peer by considering the feedback from all other peers who have interacted with this peer. A trust overlay network is used to model the trust relationship among peers. The community context factor by using a random walk strategy and utilizing power nodes, feedback aggregation speed, and global reputation accuracy are improved. Advantage of power trust includes power law distribution of peer feedbacks, fast reputation aggregation, ranking, updating, system robustness and operational efficiency. And disadvantages are (1) Power trust cannot be deployed on unstructured networks (2) Does not deal with intrusions, collusions, and selfishness of peers (3) Calculated trust information is not global and does not reflect opinions of all peers.

4.5 Power Trust

Ahmet burak can and bharat bharagava et al. [7] propose a self-organizing trust model (sort) aims to decrease malicious activity in a distributed system by establishing trust relations among peers in their proximity. No a priori information or a trusted peer is used to leverage trust establishment. Peers do not try to collect trust information from all peers. Each peer develops its own local view of trust about the peers interacted in the past. In this way, good peers form dynamic trust groups in their proximity and can isolate malicious peers. Sort defines two context of trust, service and recommendation contexts are defined to measure capabilities of peers in providing services and giving recommendations. Interactions and recommendations are considered with satisfaction, weight, and fading effect parameters. A recommendation contains the recommenders own experience, information from its acquaintances, and level of confidence in the recommendation. In SORT instead of global trust information local trust information is enough to make decisions. Peers send reputation queries only to peers interacted in the past which reduces network traffic and make simulations realistic. Disadvantages are if a peer changes its point of attachment to the network, it might lose a part of its trust network and it does not solve all security problems but enhance security and effectiveness of the system.

5. Proposed Work

We define secure routing and outline our solution. Throughout this paper, most of the analyses and techniques are presented in terms of this model and should apply to other structured overlays except when otherwise noted. We define an abstract model of a structured Distributed routing overlay, designed to capture the key concepts common to overlays such as CAN, Chord, Tapestry and Pastry. The protocol routes messages with a given key to its associated root. To route messages efficiently, all nodes maintain a routing table with the node IDs of several other nodes and their associated IP addresses. Moreover, each node maintains...
a neighbour set, consisting of some number of nodes with node IDs nearest itself in the id space. Pastry node IDs are assigned randomly with uniform distribution from a circular 128-bit id space. Given a 128-bit key, Pastry routes an associated message toward the live node whose node ID is numerically closest to the key. Each Pastry node keeps track of its neighbor set and notifies applications of changes in the set.

Secure routing ensures that (1) the message is eventually delivered, despite nodes that may corrupt, drop or misroute the message; and (2) the message is delivered to all legitimate replica roots for the key, despite nodes that may attempt to impersonate a replica root. Secure routing can be combined with existing security techniques to safely maintain state in a structured Distributed overlay. For instance, self-certifying data can be stored on the replica roots, or a Byzantine-fault-tolerant replication algorithm [10] can be used to maintain the replicated state. Secure routing guarantees that the replicas are initially placed on legitimate replica roots, and that a lookup message reaches a replica if one exists. Similarly, secure routing can be used to build other secure services, such as maintaining file metadata and user quotas in a distributed storage utility. The details of such services are beyond the scope of this paper.

6. Conclusions

Individual, collaborative, and pseudonym changing attackers are studied in the experiments. Damage of collaboration and pseudo spoofing is dependent to attack behavior. Although recommendations are important in hypocritical and oscillatory attackers, pseudos’ proofers, and collaborators, they are less useful in naive and discriminatory attackers. SORT mitigated both service and recommendation-based attacks in most experiments. However, in extremely malicious environments such as a 50 percent malicious network, collaborators can continue to disseminate large amount of misleading recommendations. Another issue about SORT is maintaining trust all over the network. If a peer changes its point of attachment to the network, it might lose a part of its trust network. These issues might be studied as a future work to extend the trust model.

References


Author Profile

Suyog A. Nagare received the B.Tech degree in Computer Science Engineering from Maharashtra Institute of Technology (Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Marathwada University), Aurangabad in 2013 with First class Distinction and Currently perceiving M.E. degree in Computer Engineering from S.R.E.S College of Engineering, Kopargaon (Savitribai Phule Pune University).