

willingness, in accordance with the Qadariyah concept, in relation to the human actions, and adopted the Mu'tazilah concept in a terms of freedom and human responsibility.

Furthermore, what was held by the several other authors, such as al-Subki in his book *Tabaqat al-Syafi'iyah al-Kubra*, Ibn Khillikan in a book of *Wafyat al-A'yan*, M. M Sharif in the book of *History of Muslim Philosophy*, Fauqiyah Hussein Mahmud, in his commentary about the book of al-Juwaini, a prominent of al-Asy'ariyah, entitled *Luma' al-Adillah*, HAR. Gibb in *Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam*, Ahmad Amin in the *Noon al-Islam*, al-Syahrastani in *al-Milal wa al-Nihal*, Hodgson in *The Venture of Islam*, al-Hanbali in *Syazrat al-Zahab*, Abu al-Mahasin in *al-astrologer al-Zahirah*, al-Hafiz Ibn al-Asakir in *Tabyin Kazib al-Muftara*, Ibn Fadl Allah al-'Amri in *Masalik al-Absar fi Mamalik al-Amsar*, al-Sam'ani in *al-Ansab*, al-Zahabi in *A'lam Siyar al-Nubala'*, and Jalal Mohammed Musa in his book *al-Asy'ariyah Nasy'ah wa Tatawuruha*, everything just provided a writing that described some biography of al-Asy'ariyah theology figures and suggested an explanation of partly opinion of that figure about the Islamic theology.

2. Methods

This study used a qualitative approach. This was carried out with the consideration that the study related to the philosophical writings and thoughts. The possible method used in this study such as the study of literatures, namely that all associated resources with the study, organized as a texts (books, result of research, magazines and so on). Once all the information collected and considered enough, the next step was to conduct the depth and thorough study. This was carried out in order to the data and information that has obtained to be accurate. After the analysis of this depth study, then the results of this study was presented by descriptive analysis to describe the procession of the searching of God in Islamic theology by the figure/ ideology in Islam.

3. Discussion

1. The Polemics of Al-Ash'ari and Mu'tazilah Regarding to God's nature

Before the emergence of Al-Asha'ira, the problem of nature in the study of the creed, received the great attention from Islamic thinkers. They were composed of a theologian, philosopher and mystics, each of them individually formulated their own opinion about this important issue. Among of the figure who discussed this problem of the nature of God was: al-Dimasyqi (d. 105 AH / 722 AD), he adopted the ideology, that power was on the human itself. Regarding the God, Ghaylan rejected the existence of tsubutiyah nature (positive) on the God; and as the implication, he argued that the Qur'an was a creature. The concept of "faith" according to him was the knowledge (ma'rifah) and the recognition, while the charities was not included in the faith. Similar to Al-Ja'ad ibn Dirham in Madkur (1972) said that God did not have any nature at all, the Qur'an was a creature, and humans was a majbur (forced to do, because it has established by God like that).

Likewise of Janm Ibn Syafwan in Madkur (1972) stated that, in order to maintain the unity of God, human beings should not be considered they have both these natures, because it brought to the shirk (polytheism). Instead, he has an ideology of *Ijbar*, that all human actions were an action and creation of God, it was not the human's own action and creation. Denied the nature of God, was also have the implication for the birth of the opinion that the Qur'an was a creature, because God has not any nature of 'spoken'. In order to maintain the unity of God as well, Jahm argued that all verses of the Qur'an mentioned the natures that can similar with the creatures, should be given the interpretation (dita'wilkan), instead, he rejected that all traditions that in tune with it. Therefore, Jahm accused infidel and belonged to the "musyabbihah" group (the ideology that described God like beings) against to those who received a God's nature as has mentioned in the Qur'an and Hadith.

Because most of these Safwan Ibn Jahm opinion, especially in the matters of the nature of God, was taken over by the Mu'tazilah sect. In the Mu'tazila notion, it said that God will be truly Almighty, only if God was a substance that unique, there was nothing similar to Him. They rejected the beatific vision (God can be seen) was in His creatures, He has a Qadim nature, in the sense of has no any beginning, and this understanding that has driven the Mu'tazilites to negated the natures of God; namely the natures that have their own form, out of the essence of God (Madkur: 1972)

The issues that raised by the Mu'tazilah and Jahmiyyah clans, who have denied the God's natures, made the emergence of a new understanding, namely al-Asy'ariyah ideology, which was spearheaded by Al-Ash'ari, who was regarded as the founder (al-Arabim: 1979). This ideology leaved the Mu'tazilah ideology and rejected the Jahmiyyah and Mu'tazilah, switched to the basic thinking, by synergizing the verses of the Qur'an and Hadith.

The conditions above indicated that the notion of power and absolute will of God, that motivated Asy'ari to chose the Completion as above. "Nature" has the meaning of fixed, eternal and powerful. While the "condition" has the meaning of change and weak. Because of that, if it said that God has not any "nature" (Mu'tazila opinion), but it only has a "condition", it was not in line with the concept of absolute power and the will of God. Therefore, these last two demanded, God must have a "nature", not only have the "condition", because the "essence" was the weak. To maintain the absolute power and the will of God, God must have the nature that eternal and strong.

2. The existence of God in the Perspective of Islamic Theology.

a. Theory about the substance of God

God is the object of discourse, that got any main spotlight from the thinkers of Islamic Theology (mutakallim). In their discourse, there were two notions of God, the God beyond the conception of humanity and God in the conception of human. God in the first sense was the True Reality that cannot be understood. Therefore, he cannot be spoken by humans significantly. This matter brought to the justify of

the statement that "No one can know God except God itself". However, the statement was not meant to ruling out the possibility of human to know the God. The fact that humans - although have a limitation - can understand that God has shown that he was relatively can be discussed with a various meanings.

"There is nothing intrinsic, besides the truly intrinsic substance one". This basic monotheism that has confirmed the position of God as the exclusive Reality (apart from the others and was far beyond the thinking of beings). He is a substance that absolutely cannot be compared with the creature. In this level, His unity - as in the outlook of the negative theological and philosophical - may not allow the duality, both in the existence and his essence (al-Shahrastani: 1934). Ibn 'Arabi in Affifi (1989) stated that God as the Universal Substance is the essence of all essences. He transcends there above of all restrictions and individualizations. The Statement of Ibn 'Arabi gave the implication that God, as a transcendent reality completely unrelated to anything. Even further, He was the Reality of the "dark" in his absolute transcendence.

About the transcendence of God's substances, there were two senses that must be understood about the transcendence of God, which was the absolute transcendence (al-tanzih al-qadim) and relative transcendence (al-tanzih al-hadith). The modus of absolute transcendence was unknown and cannot be determined with the hypothetical (Understanding). Meanwhile, the relative transcendence was the transcendence that existed in the human conception of God - in the reality - has the correlation with their God. If beings were able to give a law, God is essentially free from it at all. Although God can be known through His creation, He was really not comparable with any subject and object, as stated in the Qur'an, Surah Al-Sura verse 11. "*There is nothing similar unto Him, and He is the Most hearing and Seeing one. (Qur'an: 42: 11)*"

The fact that God - in a side - cannot be known absolutely in himself and - in otherside - it can be known relatively through His creation (cosmos) - as seen in a few verses of Qur'an - showed that the existence of differences in a perspective of the God's nature. Thus, differences in turn - as has noted by Murata in Basir (1998) pointed out the existence of a conceptual difference, between God and the substance of God. Ontologically, this difference - as recognized by theologians, philosophers and mystics - was not existed, because the Supreme Substance is only one, that is God. The difference will be found, only when the God was connected with the cosmos as a new reality (creature) and the consequences of God's manifestation. Here the relationship between God and the cosmos can be through the two different senses. In the first sense, God created the universe and can be known through him. In the second sense, God with His independence was not really dependent upon His creatures (the universe). He was keeping his distance from the creatures, were not of his all exclusive, but because He was completely different from them and cannot be covered by their reality.

In Islamic thought, God, and his substance was always spoken of in the principle of negativity and positivity.

Negativity and positivity were the two principles that each of them has a very important position. Negativity was seen as a way to purify the absoluteness of God's substance. Meanwhile, positivity - at the same time - was seen as a way to understand the infinity and multiplicity of God. Both principles were theoretically, that presumably distinguished were actually - in a practice - cannot be separated, because both of them have a permanent networking relationship, where the negativity one was always be an opening or closing the discussion about the positivity of the essence.

b. A theory that concerning to the substance and nature of God

Islamic thought about God was always centered on the substance and nature. Substance and nature were the two aspects of reality that parallelly have a relationship that cannot be separated. This relationship in simply, can be seen from the position of the two aspects, as the two substances that needed each other. The Substances cannot be expressed without mentioning the natures. Instead, the properties may not be granted without the substance. Substance and nature, by that, were a whole unity - though, each of them have a different mode. About this matter, Ibn 'Arabi mentioned that the substance has the nature and the existence of the nature, confirmed the presence of a substance (Affifi: 1989). The substance was the reliant place of the natures and names (asthma). Every nature and name relied upon the name of the substance, was not in the existence (form) of him, but only in his entity ('ayn).

Substance and nature were the two substances, that each of them has its own form. A substance which stated the essence of God was the substance that mandatory of al-wujud. The nature according to al-Nassar and 'Ammar al-Talabi Jam'i (1971), in one side was seen as the substance that has been created (makhluq = hadith) and on the other side, was seen as the substance that has not been created (ghayr makhluq = Qadim). Here, it was seen that the natures, have two different aspects, namely internal and external aspects. Therefore, the discourse about the substance and nature, can be seen from internal and external viewpoint. In the level above, the theological thinking, presented a polarization of view about the existence of nature and substance. This polarization departing from the different perspectives referenced. The first perspective and being referred by the Mu'tazilah group stated, that the nature to be identical with the substance. In another speech, the natures given by God were His own substance. In their view, God (his substance) and His nature were Qadim. These two substances were qadim, each of them respectively may not stand alone. Therefore, they rejected (negated) the natures, as the outside substance of the God's substance. God lived, knowing, powerful, and so on was not by his nature, but with his substance.

The second perspective stated, that the different natures of the substance. This perspective generally followed by theologians, who believed the existence of the god's nature as the substances that were outside of the God's substance. According to Nicholson (1976) in their concept of Tauhid, the God's natures, can be equated with his substance at all, because the natures were a hadith (new), while the substance was a qadim. Therefore, both of them must be separated. The

third perspective stated that the natures were not identical with the substance and also not different from it. This Perspective that stated by Al-Ash'ari and supported by his followers, were a solution to the two different perspectives above. In their understanding, the word "identical" meant that the nature and both of substances, must be existing by itself and not to rely depended on to the other one. Because God was a substance that has the natures in the form of His absolute and that natures depended on Him, the substance and nature cannot be equated. Both of them were different substances in each mode, in accordance to each locality. However, the natures intrinsically can not be separated or distinguished from the substance, because both of them were *azali*. The natures stand on the substance of God, but they were not his substance and also not differed from his substance.

From the explanation above, it can be taken the two senses about the relationship between the substance and nature. The first notion, was that the substance and nature, from an internal standpoint, was a unity in a reality of God. The unity of them, can be described like a painting, where the essence and its properties was a unity from that painting of reality. The second notion, was both the substance and nature, from an external viewpoint, has a different mode in its entirety. This mode was related to the differences of each existences.

A substantial difference, between the substance and nature asserted that both of them can be Expressed differently. In the level of divinity (*uluhiyat*), a substance Expressed as a substance that have not any effect (*athar*) at all. Therefore, it cannot be perceived, either by reason or by intuition. This was different from the predicate natures and the effect can be found and felt in the external world. The Substance – as the Ash'ariyah viewed – was a substance that always hidden, while the natures were an existence that sometimes hidden and sometimes evident or manifest. Al-Ash'ari (1976) stated "Substance" was a simply a personal (*nafs*), that was impossible to be known its condition without the inherent natures on it, because the natures was an identifier for him.

c. Theory about the nature and the Name of God

The relationship between the nature and name, was no longer than a relationship between the "abstract" and "concrete" or between the unknown and the known in a language. The nature Said to be abstract, because it only can be felt by the senses and it have not any concrete yet, that could be understood in mind. When the phenomenon of the substance, captured by the senses, it was still a nature and have not "articulated" yet. The name appeared as the initialization of the nature and it introduced significantly. The name was something that initialized "the naming one" (*musamma*) in the sense of, described it in the imagination, bring it in the wishful, considering it in mind, saving it in memory, and realizing it in the mind of Al-Ash'ari (1976). The clearly one, the name was the substance's name with its nature. The "Knowledge" (*'ilm*) was the nature of the substance and "who known" (*'alim*) was the name of the substance and nature., "Life" was the nature of the substance and "living" (*hayy*) was the name of the substance and nature.

In the level above, the names and attributes in his entity were identical, because both of them were unity that cannot be separated. The names functionally referred to the natures and even the substance itself. However, the two aspects of the God, in these forms were not deemed identically, because - after all - the names appeared after the natures. Each nature has a different mode and manifestation in the external world, although the mode and its manifestations were still related to each other.

In seeing the relationship between names with natures and also with substances, Moselem thinkers provided three categories of the God's names, namely the names that related to the substance of God, the names that related to the attributes of God, and the names that related to acts of God (Nurcholis: 1984). The first type of the names were the names of the substances which referred to God in himself. Among the names of this type was the name of Allah, the name of al-Haqq, and the name of al-Ahad. These names were only given to the essence of God and - therefore - they cannot be applied to any essences or realities of beings. The second type of names were names that proclaimed the particular reality of God's intrinsic, though it has not related to the creatures at all. Among the names of this type were the name of the Knowing one, the living one, the Willing one, the Almighty one, the Speaking one, the Hearing one, and the Seeing one. The whole of these names applied to God, but opponents of these names cannot be applied to him.

The names of the third type were the action names that referred to the relationship of God with all His creations. Among the names of this type was the name of the Loving one and the fuming one, the gentle one and the strong one, and the beautiful one, the Almighty one, the Guiding one and Misleading one, the Forgiving one and the Vindictive one. The opponents of these names applied to the creature and may also be subjected to God. Furthermore, according to Nurcholis (1984), the natures and names of God can be seen in two senses. In the first sense, the natures and names of God were seen contradictory. Although the natures and the names of God were intimately connected, they still revealed the existence of polarization. Merciful and the merciful one, or wrath or the wrath one, as an example, were two properties or conflicting names. Polarization or contradiction in the natures and the names of the God was certainly closely related to the human tendency, to understand of them at the level of the cosmos. While at the level of divinity, the natures and the names of the God that appeared contradiction, have a different understanding from the human understanding that has given. Here, the absolute multiplicity of God's natures were different from their relative multiplicity in the external world.

The second notion stated that the natures and His names were not always seen as the contradictory or have an opponent. The fact that certain names, such as the name of *Allah*, the name of al-Haqq and al-Hayy were only applied to Allah, that confirmed if the partly of that natures and the names of God cannot be given an opposed. Therefore, the nature of death (*al-mawt*), as an example, may not be contradicted with the nature of life (*al-life*) and cannot be imposed on the God. Similarly, the nature of the blind (*al-'ama*), cannot be contradicted by the nature of seeing (*al-*

bazaar) on the self of God; and so on. Thus, the positivenatures or the namesto the God, were not always to be accompanied by the negativenures or names.

d. The aspects of transcendence and immanence in the nature of God

The Basic Islamic teachings about God, as mentioned in the Qur'an, if God was onlyAllah and He has the beautifulnatures or names. A description about the God and His natures in the Qur'an - in accordance with its characteristics - were largely symbolic characterized. Therefore, it can be explained by a variety of interpretations, as far as the intelligence ability to intuition, can be reachedit. In the terms of Islam, the natures can be defined as something that was predicable, based on the certain references. Therefore, the natures cannot be discussed, without expressing their relationship with the existing references in the cosmos. This relationship that formed a polarized perspective, that eventually uttered the different views about the nature of God.

In the one of sense, the natures of God were far, beyond of the human's range. Here, the natures of God cannot be known at all, although by approaching it cosmicallyto everything that was new (huduth). This meant, that the natures of God as transcendent (unmatched), have not any any relationship with anything. They were absolute substnasi essentially, belonged to God only and only He who known. They cannot be understood and there were no words that can described it. Here, the senses, mind, intellect, and the human understanding placed in the position of "impossibility". Explicitly, the God's natures was not really negated or denied from the whole creation. The creature has not had any power to described the natures of God, which in this context was seen as hidden (hidden = ghayb) in their absoluteness.

Basically, a perspective that emphasized the negativity of the natures of God was a doctrine that may want to showed the unity of God. In addition, it was practically used by the transcendentalists (munazzih) to control the form of the doctrine that has excessivedfrom the anthropomorphic (mushabbih) and chomporealist (mujassim) which analogizing the qualities (natures) of God with the qualities of His creatures. All qualities provided by anthropomorphic and chomporealist, deemed as the incorrect by the transcendentalists, by said that God and His qualities above (were not comparable with) human qualities and other physical objects (Affifi: 1989).

The fact that the naturesof God were existed above of all nature, derived from the Qur'an affirmation: " The Glory to your God, the Lord of strength, of what they havealleged" (Surah al-Saffat, 37: 180). Postulate that literally declared the transcendence perspective of God's attributes, actually (implicitly) was also impressed to recognized the human ability, in perceivingthe God's natures. This meant, that God's natures relatively can be discussed and understood. A theological term for this perspective was the immanence or tashbih (similarity or equivalence), which stated that the natures of the God that hidden (intrinsic), can be likened with the natures of being thatvisible (manifest).

It must be admitted, that the effort to understanding of the God's natureswere inseparable from the perspective of 'similarity' or immanence. Therefore, this perspective practicallyhas a very important position as a basic reference. However, the discourse limitations of human about the natures of God was not be a guarantee to achieved the real truth, and finally this thing would be forced the human to returned to the transcendence of God's natures. The two perspective summed up in a verse of : *laysa kamithlihi syay 'wa-huwa al-Sami' al-Basir* (al-Shura, 42: 11). Thus, both of that perspectives must be used simultaneously and proportionally, because the attributes of God - in one mode - can be understood and the other modes cannot be understood. Both of themto be needed to obtainedthe perfect knowledge. Regarding this idea, Ibn 'Arabi said in his poem: If you talk about the transcendence (unmatched) of (God) then you have limited (Him); and if you (only) talked about the immanence (likeness) of (God), then you have limited-(Him). If you talk about both of them, then you were exactlyon the target; and you were a leader and sayyid in the makrifat knowledge.

Whoever declared the dualities (God and the cosmos), then he/shewas a polytheist; and whoever declared the oneness (God) then he/shewas a monotheist.

Bewaredto the immanence if you declared the likeness (God with the cosmos); and bewaredto the transcendence, if you declared the oneness (God).

You were not the one, but you were Him; and you saw him in the objects, as the Absolute one and the Limited one (al-Arabim: 1979).

The idea if discourse of God and His natures can not only used one among of two perspectives (perspective of transcendence and immanence), as the sole reference, can also be based on the fact that the statements of transcendence and immanence, equally stressed on the unification (tawhid) of God in the essence and His natures. Unification meant here, was the absolute of the basic nature of God, that realized through the basic nature of humman or creature. If the natures were transcendent to be recognized, the natures of immanent must also be recognized. It was because the thinking of the natures of God, in the immanence perspective was not always seen as having a tendency to pantheism ideology. Instead, the thinking about it, even more led to the pantheism ideology, where the basic characteristics were essentially owning to the nature of the oneness and the completeness of God. It can be understood from the statement of Nicholson (1976) as follows:

"As far as the transcendence to be recognized, the assertion of immanence was not pantheism, but pantheism- was not a doctrine (that stated) if " a lot "(cosmos) was the Lord, but the doctrine (that stated) if " the many one "were in the (self) of God and that God was existed above of the "a many" one.

Strictly, the transcendent natures were the nature that cannot be communicated. They were in the negativity that pointed to the absolute (itlaq) of God. This transcendent nature – in a view of human - has no any significant meaning, unless if it

was connected to the phenomena world or the external world. In other words, the transcendent nature must be understood in the context of its real phenomenon, if the abstract multiplicity (diversity) of thistranscendent natures, could be known significantly. In this level, the natures of the transcendent and abstract, can be realized as an immanent natures and real, with all subjectivity and its relativity.

Conclusion and Recommendation

1. Conclusion

Asy'ri has chosen the completion as above. "The Nature" has contained a fixed meaning, eternal and powerful. While the "substance" meant change and weak. Because of that, it said that God have not any "nature" (Mu'tazila opinion), but only have a " substance ", it was not in line with the concept of absolute power and the will of God. Therefore, the latter two demanded, that God must have a "nature", not only have the "substance", because that "substance" was a weak. To maintained an absolute power and the will of God, He must be have the eternal natures and strong.

The Mu'tazilah ideology said, that God will truly on and only, if god was anunique substance, there was nothing similiar to Him. They rejected the beatific vision (God can be seen) that existed in His creatures, God was a qadim in the sense of have no any beginning, and this ideology that has driven the Mu'tazilites to negated the natures of God.

2. Recommendation

Based on the explanation above, it is necessary to conduct the further research toward the various of theological thought, particularly in the Islamic theology. Those studies were related to the thought that has not been explained in this study, the impact of the ideology thought on the forms of worship and so on. This is, beside to enriching the science, also meant in order that Muslims have a strong belief on their faith.

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