

The Influence of Project Monitoring and Evaluation on Effective Utilization of CDF Funds in Baringo Central, Baringo County

Michael Kepkemoi¹, Josephat Kwasira², Cyrus Muigai³

^{1,2,3}Jomo Kenyatta University of Agriculture and Technology, P. O. Box 62000-00200, Nairobi, Kenya

Abstract: *The study sought to determine the influence of project monitoring and evaluation on effective utilization of Constituency Development Fund (CDF) in Baringo Central Constituency, Baringo County in Kenya. The target population of 100 projects funded by CDF was used under different sectors. Stratified simple random sampling method was used to select 100 respondents drawn from Baringo Central constituency. Data was collected by use of questionnaires and was later analyzed using descriptive and inferential statistical analysis tools. According to the study findings there was a high positive correlation between Monitoring and Evaluation and effective utilization of CDF funds, at 0.01 confidence level with a Pearson correlation of 0.985, p-value < 0.01(0.002). This implies that the more monitoring and evaluation of CDF projects the more effective and efficient is the utilization of the funds. The study recommended that to ensure effective utilization of CDF, monitoring and evaluation should be done more frequently and political inferences should not avoided in any CDF projects hence a need for an independent body to carry out monitoring and evaluation of the constituency CDF projects. In addition the CDF committee should not be headed by political leaders but qualified project managers who are rigorously vetted.*

Keywords: Monitoring and Evaluation, Constituency Development Fund(CDF).

1. Introduction

Constituency Development Fund (CDF) was established in 2003 through an act of parliament in Kenya after Local Authority Transfer Fund (LATF) failed to improve service delivery to the society (GoK, 1998). It aimed at improving service delivery, alleviating poverty, enhancing economic governance and ultimately contributing to socio-economic development. Under the CDF Act, an amount not less than 2.5% of government's annual revenue is set aside for the fund (Awiti, 2008). These funds are released directly to the constituencies and do not have to go through any rigorous bureaucratic process. Therefore, the decisions about how these funds are allocated and spent are heavily influenced by elected members of parliament (MPs). The degrees to which these funds are controlled by parliamentarians, and the degree to which local citizens participate in them, vary from country to country (Albert, 2010).

In as much as it could be seen as a model of decentralization, it is subjected to central government controls as it is highly dependent on the national budget, its management is under national politicians and it does not involve raising revenue at the grass roots as it is with the local government authority that has the authority to raise and spend revenue. It is therefore perceived to be free money given by the central government to be spent in the constituency (Kimenyi, 2005). Official discourse about CDF holds that poor people are able to get access to services (improved roads, water, school equipment and health services) that did not reach them directly from the government through line ministries. Despite this rosy picture painted about C.D.F., there is doubt as to whether the fund is being used optimally or it has been hijacked by politicians to advance their patron-client networks (Kimenyi, 2005). It is against this background that the study was necessitated on the determinants of effective utilization of constituency

development fund (C.D.F.) in Kenya which was introduced and launched in 2003 by the Kibaki government under the C.D.F. Act (Kimenyi, 2005). The main objectives this study is to investigate the project monitoring and evaluation on effective utilization of CDF in Baringo Central Constituency.

2. Literature Survey

Africa's failure to achieve development has been characterized by escalating poverty, unemployment and inequality within and across a majority of African states (Mbabazi, 2005). The common explanation to this has been said to be the top-down approach to development that was adopted by most African leaders under the guise of national unity but in reality as a means of stifling opposing views and opposition politics as power became concentrated in the hands of an increasingly detached elite organized into single party, military or civilian-military diarchies of various kinds. The disenchantment with this centralized approach, following its dismal contribution to development has since seen the call by donors for a people centered approach (decentralization and community driven development) to African development (Olukoshi & Nyamnjor, 2005).

The experiences from other parts of the world have been used to justify the call for the above mentioned approach in Africa. For instance the Caribbean, East Asia and East European countries have embraced decentralization as an important component of the development agenda and have fared better than Africa (Burkiet *et al.*, 1991); (World Bank, 2000). The explanation is that decentralization strengthens local governance, democratization and greater efficiency and equity in the use of public resources and service delivery for development (Ribot, 2002). The success of project is critical to achieving development agenda in the local communities across the world. It is also understood that

monitoring and evaluation of projects is fundamental if the project objectives and success is to be achieved. Monitoring and evaluation of project improves overall efficiency of project planning, management and implementation. Various projects could be initiated to transform social, political and economic well-being of citizens in a particular country. UNDP (2002) reports that there has been growing demand for development effectiveness to improve people's lives.

In 2005, the Ministry of Planning and National Development commissioned work on the design of an appropriate framework for Monitoring and Evaluation (M & E) in the National Development Programme. This was a collective effort by the government, Private Sector and Civil Societies, Republic of Kenya implementation of M and E (2005). This proposed M & E framework has not been fully operational. Otherwise, there is a strong case that CDF should come up with participatory M and E component in its management.

This view is supported by Wanjiru, (2008) who indicated in her Social Audit of CDF that monitoring and reporting should be strengthened and deepened in all CDF projects. It is a fact that CDF Act, 2003 emphasizes on the Monitoring and Evaluation just like DFRD did. The mode of doing it is not well specified. The Act gives technical department, District Development Officer (DDO) and Constituency Development Fund Committee (CDFC) authority to monitor the project. The Act further allocates 2% of CDFC fund to be used for monitoring and evaluation exercise but this money is only spent after the CDFC recommendation through minutes CDF Act, (2003 revised 2007).

This makes M & E to be somehow difficult and sometimes cosmetic as it is the CDFC to decide which project to be monitored, which one to be evaluated, how much funds to remove and who to do the exercise. The Act gives room for CDFC to elect themselves instead of getting a different body to manage M & E within the CDFC projects. It also allows the unfaithful CDFC not to institute monitoring and evaluation to some projects they either have interest in or have interest of hiding something.

Mulwa (2007) stated clearly that any judgment that emanates from evaluation would largely depend on the value system from which evaluating party originates. Conventionally, evaluating party is usually part of evaluation missions contracted and dispatched from the donor world. In the case of CDF Act (2003) revised (2007) the CDF identifies projects, implement, then monitors and evaluate or call technical person at their own peril. This can be a weakness that needs to be addressed. CDRA, (2001) reported that "Not everything that counts can be counted and not everything that can be counted counts". He insisted that for monitoring and evaluation to be undertaken, indicators have to be put in place i.e. Which the outcome of a project can be understood and measured, gauged or standardized, against which change is measured.

Feuersten, (1986) even went further and came up with nine types of indicators cited as follows: indicators of availability, indicator of relevance, indicators of accessibility, indicators of utilization, indicators of coverage, indicator of quality, indicator of effort, indicator of

efficiency and indicator of impact. These indicators can be very instrumental in managing monitoring and evaluation of CDF projects, indicators of quality, utilization, availability and even effort are very important in assessing project development. Other indicators stated by Feuerstein, (1986) are equally important since they can assist detect related shortcomings.

Odhiambo, (2007) while referring to Feuerstein, (1986) explained that locally managed and controlled funds have great potential to bring about positive development outcome at the local level especially if community participation is sufficiently enhanced and political interference reduced.

It is true that there is no proper system put in place to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of the use of these funds this is so because the appointing authority is not restricted to nominating people with such knowledge. Grossman, (2005) on his part argued that a program's effectiveness can be measured accurately only if one knows what would have happened without it.

The ability to measure and demonstrate outcomes and impacts relies on the use of indicators that are based on reliable data, and on the capacity to systematically collect and analyze that information. The conditions in which M and E are carried out vary widely, depending on the demand for information, the extent to which it is used to inform decision making, and the reliability of the systems that are in place to capture and convey that information. Throughout much of the developing world these conditions are "less-than-ideal." Information is irregular and often lacking altogether. In these conditions there is a lack of effective demand for information on the part of policy makers. The conditions are often especially pronounced in rural areas, where the costs of data collection are very high, and that quality of existing data is particularly low.

A recent attempt to decentralization in Kenya has been in the form of devolution of development funds with an aim of bringing fiscal decision making down to the community level with the aim of stimulating citizen participation in identification, prioritization, design and implementation of their preferred development projects. This is based on the assumptions that it will lead to efficient allocation of resources. However doubts have been raised as to whether the constituency development fund has met its stated objectives. For instance there is lack of transparency in allocation of funds for development projects, it is not clear how decisions are arrived at on what development projects to be implemented and the formation of the Constituency development committees (that are the centre of decision making) is characterized by political patronage (Transparency International report, 2005). These committees are constituted at the discretion of the Members of Parliament, a phenomenon that reflects centralized state control over development management as opposed to the alleged devolution of decision making power to local people. The extent to which CDF has met its objectives remains a research imperative, therefore calls for a systematic assessment of the structure of the fund and how the fund has been put into use together with its contribution to development in Kenya hence the proposed study(Oyugi,

2006). Moreover, the fund is being handled by national politicians who are accountable to the central government through the national management committee (the supervisory body of the fund). Although the Government had good intention when setting up the kitty, there is still public outcry pertaining the management and utilization of the funds in most of the constituencies..(Okungu,2006)Some MPs, knowing the level of ignorance, poverty and helplessness in their constituencies have for all practical purposes made their cronies believe that this constituency fund is their money given to them by the government to use as they see fit. In the end, these MPs have formed all sorts of companies using their cronies, relatives, friends, wives and even girl-friends to defraud the public of this fund. According to social Audit report 2010 Baringo central was rank number five nationally on the best practices on the effective utilization of CDF fund thus necessitating the study in seeking to establish the determinants of effective utilization of constituency development fund in Baringo Central Constituency to which the conclusion of the study can be cascaded in other constituencies.

3. Research Methodology

The study adopted a survey research design to describe monitoring and evaluation as a determinant on effective utilization of CDF funds in Baringo Central, Baringo County.

A representative sample of 100 respondents was selected from the project committees, constituency development Fund committee through a stratified simple random sampling method. Questionnaires with both structured and unstructured test items were used in collecting primary data. Questionnaires provide a high degree of data standardization and adoption of generalized information amongst any population (Chandron, 2003). Both quantitative and qualitative approaches were used to analyze the data obtained from the field.

4. Results and Discussion

Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS Ver. 21.0) was used in data analysis. Both descriptive and inferential statistics were used to describe the data that was collected from the CDF project committees.

Table 4.1: CDFC Carrying Out Evaluation of Projects.

	Response	Percentage
Strongly agreed	70	70
Disagreed	30	30
Total	100	100

Table 4.2: Frequency of Evaluation

Quarterly	40	40
Yearly	30	30
No Evaluation	30	30
Total	100	100

From the results (Table 4.1) , 70.0% said that CDFC carry out evaluation of projects in their constituencies while 30.0% said that they do not evaluate the projects. This

implies that majority of the projects in Baringo central are evaluated. Further it sought to find out how frequent the evaluations were done and results (Table 4.2) indicated that 40.0% evaluated their projects quarterly, 30.0% yearly while 30.0% never evaluated their projects.

Table 4.3: Monitoring and evaluation influence effective utilization of CDF funds.

		Correlations		
		Sharing of information	Use of funds wisely	Transparency
Monitoring and Evaluation	Pearson Correlation	0.985**	0.768**	0.965**
	Sig. (2tailed)	0.002	0.000	0.0001
	N	3	3	3

The table 4.3above indicated that there was a high positive correlation between Monitoring and Evaluation and effective utilization of CDF funds; correlation between monitoring and evaluation and sharing of information was significant at 0.01 confidence level with a Pearson correlation of 0.985, p-value < 0.01(0.002),the Pearson correlation between M&E and use of funds wisely was 0.768, p-value<0.01(0.000) at 0.01 confidence level, Transparency correlated positively with Monitoring and evaluation at 0.965, p- value <0.01(0.0001). From the results there was a very strong relationship between monitoring & Evaluation and effective utilization of CDF funds. These imply that monitoring and evaluation positively influences the effective utilization of CDF funds. This is consistent with Odhiambo, (2007) while referring to Feuerstein, (1986) explained that locally managed and controlled funds have great potential to bring about positive development outcome at the local level especially if community participation is sufficiently enhanced and political interference reduced. In addition, the results are in consistent with Wanjiru, (2008) who indicated in her Social Audit of CDF that monitoring and reporting should be strengthened and deepened in all CDF projects.

5. Conclusion

The findings showed that 70.0% of CDFC carry out evaluation of projects in their constituencies while 30.0% didn't evaluate the CDF projects. This implies that majority of the projects in Baringo central were evaluated,hence successful to some extent .According to social Audit report 2010 Baringo central was rank number five out of two hundred and ten nationally on the best practices on the effective utilization of CDF fund. Further it sought to find out how frequent the evaluations were done and results indicated that 40.0% evaluated their projects quarterly, 30.0% yearly while 30.0% never evaluated their projects.

There was a high positive correlation between Monitoring and Evaluation and effective utilization of CDF funds; correlation between monitoring and evaluation and sharing of information was significant at 0.01 confidence level with a Pearson correlation of 0.985, p-value < 0.01(0.002), the Pearson correlation between M&E and use of funds wisely was 0.768, p-value<0.01(0.000) at 0.01 confidence level, Transparency correlated positively with Monitoring and evaluation at 0.965, p- value <0.01(0.0001).

For future scope the study should be carried out in other constituencies to determine whether monitoring and evaluation has a positive impact on effective utilization of CDF funds. The study can also be carried out to determine the influence of political leaders in a CDF projects. The study recommends for better and effective utilization of CDF funds monitoring and evaluation should be done more frequently. Political inferences should not arise in any CDF projects hence a need for an independent body to carry out monitoring and evaluation of the constituency CDF projects. In addition the CDF committee should not be headed by political leaders but qualified project managers who are rigorously vetted.

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