

# Wars Fought Abroad, Prices Paid at Home: The Economic Legacy of WWI and WWII in Colonial India

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**Abstract:** *This study explores how World War I and World War II despite being battled not on the Indian terrain primarily designed the financial, social and institutional course for colonial India. The research paper asserts that the imperialistic British Empire altered colonial India into an economic and logistic ground for its transnational war machinery through coercive taxes and tariffs, war loans, deficit financing and the accumulation of sterling balances that immobilised India's foreign exchange assets. During the two World Wars: price controls, grain procurement and logistical failures activated market distortions, culminating in the Bengal Famine of 1943. Alongside, labour mobilisation and migration, industrialisation-based bottlenecks, and scarcity-driven "accidental industrialisation" modified labour markets and the industrial revolution. This case study analysis further explores provincial imbalances and long-run structural transitions in India's post-independence planning. Across the board, these battles functioned as outer shocks that produced internal transformations, demonstrating how conflicts fought abroad imposed enduring economic burdens on colonial India.*

**Keywords:** Colonial Indian economy, World War impact on India, Bengal Famine 1943, Wartime industrial change, British imperial policy, Sterling balances, Deficit financing, Labour markets, Industrial distortions, Accidental industrialisation and Invisible battlefield

## 1. Opening Statement

While World War I (1914 to 1918) and World War II (1939 to 1945) did not originate on Indian soil, the effects of these battles were experienced powerfully across colonialised India. These transnational wars, although they occurred at remote locations, behaved as financial earthquakes, whose tremors traversed the enormous, asymmetrical layout of the British colonial Empire. Regardless, the absence of battlegrounds in the colonial empire did not indicate the lack of economic and social burdens on the respective colonies. Rather, colonial India evolved as the silent, unacknowledged financial frontier of the British colonial empire's war effort.

Employing deliberate imperialist strategies formulated by extraction, force and unfair trade, the British rule channelised India's financial resources, workers and other resources to maintain the colonial ruler's survival during the twentieth century's most devastating global conflicts. The financial legacy of the two world wars in India is neither unanticipated nor peripheral; it is a prominent factor in understanding how the subcontinent's financial course was derailed for several years and how the foundations of post-independence regulations were established well before the nation's independence in 1947.

The most immediate medium via which the war period shocks were passed along to India was the British administration's forceful mobilisation of colonial funds. During both these world wars, particularly during World War 2, the colonial British Empire depended primarily on Indian taxation revenues, public debts and financial growth to finance its military agendas and techniques.

The imperialistic rulers increased land revenue structures, raised customs tariffs and proposed "War Loans", luring them to build loyalty, despite the coercive financial force these measures put on Indian households. The cumulative impact was a financial command that pulled out capital from India, at a phenomenal speed and pivoted it towards British military expenses, together withdrawing domestic investments which could possibly be utilised to fund social

welfare activities, build public infrastructure and increase agrarian productivity levels.[1]

This monetisation of the world war deficits, especially through the invention of sterling-denominated credits held by India, activated inflationary waves that negatively harmed purchasing power parity for the nation. For Indian citizens, the inflationary impact was not merely an ideational macroeconomic criterion; but was a daily corrosion of lifestyle prospects determining food availability, occupation stability and also survival itself.

The means of sterling balances, amassed to a great extent during World War II, sticks around as one of the most significant yet under-researched financial legacies of the imperial global wars struggle. As the United Kingdom could not reimburse the Indian subcontinent in the form of trade goods, it paid in sterling IOUs positioned in the British Bank. These financial book balances were the Indian subcontinent's assets, but basically immobilised yielding the subcontinent to be an involuntary creditor to its imperialistic ruler.

While the United Kingdom funded a battle that would eventually maintain its international rank, the Indian subcontinent was merely left with only documentary claims that it could not willingly transform or use for domestic investments.[2] This foregone prospect of these blocked accounts led to ineffective postwar healing, foreign exchange deficiencies and the premature dependency on exterior support during the 1950s. Not only was it an economic technicality, but the sterling balance scheme was also an academic illustration of imperialism's asymmetrical interdependence of the colonial ruler and the colonies.

Furthermore, World War II executive commands heightened this problem. Harsh price ceilings, a mandatory grain procurement system to feed military troops and transportation upheavals caused due to military diversions produced market contortions that shattered Indian households' well-being. The colonial rule's procurement of rice from surplus provinces and its negligence to stabilise

allocation in provinces that faced shortages, spun a structural deficiency into a man-made disaster.

The Bengal Famine of 1943, which resulted in a calculated loss of three million lives was not an inevitable catastrophe but the monetary consummation of wartime regulation delinquencies, logistical mismanagement and speculative hoarding exacerbated by the colonial ruler's managerial negligence.[3] The famine indicated with total transparency that imperialistic price interventions were conceived mainly to ensure military need stores, sabotaging the entitlements of civilians and shattering the weak equilibrium of the Indian food and nutrition economy.

Labour markets likewise witnessed the footprint of the World War stresses. The military troop recruitment by the British colonial rulers forced millions of Indians to be directed to assist in the battles; as a result considerable labour was withdrawn from the agricultural sector, aggravating the already less-productive rural economy. The amalgamation of man outmigration, increasing rural salaries in certain provinces and declining real salaries because of inflation resulted in a treacherous labour setting.

Also, when demobilisation of the military troops began after World War II in 1945, the hurried reintegration of millions of troops into a static economy produced an intense underemployment scenario and social unrest.[4] The World Wars, consequently, reconstructed the labour market allocations not simply during the battles but again in their long-run demographics and financial outcomes.

Additionally, the industrialisation phase during these battles was again characterised by distortion rather than strategic advancement. Although certain Indian industries grew, especially textiles, steel and chemicals; these developments were steered by scarcity situations, import reductions and the unavailability of British products instead of by technical advancement and intentional expansion planning.[5] This "accidental industrialisation" developed a weak, supply-steered industrial basis that could not compete in the transnational markets; but this did reinforce the idealistic circumstance for post-independence protectionism and state-navigated expansion.

Ultimately, these incremental World War upheavals exaggerated social inequality across classes and provinces. While industrialists, contractors and middlemen benefited from scarcity market conditions, labourers and agriculturalists experienced the negativities of inflation and supply deficits. Provinces merged into World War supply chains; like Punjab and Bombay Presidency witnessed relative wealth, while Bengal, Bihar, and Madras encountered accelerated vulnerabilities. These World Wars did not simply accentuate the Indian economy's fragility; but they recon toured its interior hierarchies and spatial disparities.[6]

Thus, the financial legacies of World War I and World War II in imperial India cannot be limited only to fiscal coercion. It embodies a structural change inflicted through imperial strategies that reshaped the Indian financial scenario, agrarian market behaviours, industrial abilities and post-

independence regulations prerogatives. World Wars fought internationally did not leave the Indian subcontinent unimpacted; but they indeed swerved the consequences of the battles transnationally into the Indian economy.

## 2. World Wars Financing and Fiscal Exploitation

The funding of World Wars converted the colonial Indian subcontinent into a crucial financial support for the imperialistic battle technique. Dissimilar to dominions like Canada or Australia, the Indian subcontinent carried no fiscal autonomy; all decisions on tariffs, tax structures, public administration costs and financial constraints were driven by imperialist prerogatives. Therefore, every significant shock of the World War financing process like tariff hikes, forced public debt, deficit spending and the invention of sterling balances was levied upon Indian inhabitants, who had no political mouthpiece in designing the burden they carried forward. Financing these two World Wars evolved to be one of the most powerful agencies through which the imperial power exploited resources from the Indian subcontinent, and its impacts echoed throughout the subcontinent long after the guns became silent.

### a) Fiscal Overload and Revenue Manipulation

During the World Wars, the period between 1914 and 1945, the British war budgets augmented to unanticipated levels, and the colonial Indian subcontinent evolved as a significant basis of income to support these imperialist payments. This fiscal commitment was funnelled largely through exacerbated indirect taxation schemes, the most regressive and politically suitable setup of income collection. Excise tariffs on goods such as fabric, kerosene, sugar, tobacco and matches were constantly increased, intensifying living expenses, pressurising the lower-income and middle-class households. Customs duties were raised, not for protectionism but to yield income, opposing the United Kingdom's long-standing advocacy of free trade in the Indian subcontinent. The contentious salt tax regulation, symbolically targeted during the Gandhian Civil Disobedience movement, stayed unchanged during the wartime scenes and continued to burden rural impoverished societies.

Land revenue payments of the colonies were revised and proved to be a stable fiscal mechanism. Provinces like Punjab, the Bombay Presidency, and Madras experienced rate increases explained under the guise of "war necessity." The land revenue scheme, being stringent and inescapable, ensured the colonial rulers a predictable flow of revenue even during transnational product downturns. Alongside rigid taxation systems, the colonial regime industriously thrust "war loans." These government bonds were marketed as patriotic responsibilities, particularly during World War I and several princely states were compelled by political force to subscribe for these, even beyond their fiscal means.

By the end of World War I, the Indian subcontinent had pitched in almost £146 million to Britain's war expenses. Regardless, this amount did not totally include the indirect burdens of diverted trade businesses, lost investments and inflation-related effects.[7] During World War II, when the

United Kingdom could not fund imports with gold bars or other products, the fiscal exploitation intensified. Hence, colonial India actually absorbed Britain's battle costs without obtaining equivalent financial compensation.

#### **b) Deficit Financing and Financial Expansion**

If World War I levied hefty taxation on colonial India, then World War II redesigned the nation's economic scenarios. World War II created deficit financing as the British government deferred existing expenditures for Indian exported goods and services, thereafter, colonial India was obliged to recognise these dues as sterling balances held in London. To match war expenditures at home, the Reserve Bank of India, established in 1935, was forced to expand currency issuance on a phenomenal scale.

During the period from 1939 to 1945, the government's expenses increased more than twice, while the magnitude of currency in circulation increased by more than 400%.[8] Such an instantaneous economic evolution in an economy already restrained by supply deficiencies set off an intense inflation crisis. The prices of basic goods rose tremendously post-1942, taking away from real wages and decreasing consumption standards for the bulk of Indians. Economic regulations evolved as a war casualty, with the colony laying greater emphasis on the United Kingdom's geopolitical survival over colonial India's macroeconomic stability.

#### **c) Public Debt and Long-Run Opportunity Costs**

In fact, both these wars altered colonial India from a moderately low-debt economy to one loaded with huge internal liabilities. During the wars the public debts, although proposed as investments, diverted the insufficient capital away from crucial developmental prerogatives. Finances that could have been utilised for irrigation facilities, rural loan societies, schooling, health & hygiene, agrarian studies and the modernisation of the railway and road systems, were instead then channelled towards maintaining the British military logistics.[9]

Such opportunity costs were lost in the bargain. Then India moved into the postwar period, particularly the post-1945 period, with the old infrastructural structure, static agrarian productivity, insufficient educational systems and restricted technical abilities. Furthermore, the imperialistic administration laid emphasis on direct war commitments rather than long-term developmental requirements of the locals. Therefore, this fiscal exploitation was not simply a war overload; it evolved into a structural impediment that contoured India's economic vulnerabilities for years.

### **3. Inflation, Price Controls, and Household Welfare**

The price inflationary trend that encircled the colonial Indian subcontinent during World War I and World War II is a true example of how battles fought internationally translated into harsh domestic hardship in the home country. The wartime economic schemes of the imperialistic ruler characterised by deficit financing, manipulation of colonial India's currency system, compelled purchase of necessary goods at higher prices and the war period emphasis on the mandates of the imperial ruler led to severe price volatility. These market

grimaces decreased real wages, weakened household savings, and contoured India's financial terrain in a path that echoed long post the wars ceased.

Inflation did not materialise as a realistic market consequence, but as a structural outcome of the colonialism strategy to create India as an involuntary economic pillar of the imperial war apparatus. By monetising war expenses and prohibiting imports, the colonial ruler developed a definitive inflationary atmosphere, putting excessive stress on common locals.[10]

The financial stress on household interests amplified as the imperialist policies recon toured production preferences and disrupted supply chains. The diversions of shipping towards Europe and the Middle East, harshly trimmed the nation's import ability for materials, metals, machines, fuels and foods. Indian domestic manufacturers were incapable of compensating for this premature supply squeeze, leading to sharp price increases even in necessary consumer products.

Side by side, military supplies for troops internationally pulled strongly upon India's grain resources and agrarian outputs. During both wars, purchase officials bought vast amounts of rice and wheat, frequently at administratively fixed prices, leading to deficits in local market structures. Such purchase imbalances heightened rural-urban pressures; urban centres, being closer to the government received preferential grain allotments, while rural provinces bore the brunt of deficiencies.[11]

The British administration's response to price controls and rationing schemes was not a device of welfare guidelines, but more a tool for ensuring supplies for their military troops. Price ceilings set on cereals, kerosene, fabrics, and other necessities were enforced inconsistently and repeatedly disobeyed.

In certain provinces, merchants removed products from the market, foreseeing future price rises or responding to uncertainty produced by the imperialistic nation. Hoarding and speculative storehousing evolved particularly during World War II, leading to black-market movements. The imperialistic rulers' incapability to sustain and manage such regimes destabilised household finances, particularly for the metropolitan working societies. With nominal wages primarily static because of colonialism wage regulations, working societies encountered an intense decline in purchasing power, thrusting them towards subsistence scenarios, decreased nutritional inputs and stressful debts.[12]

Such upheavals, when crossed with post-1940 supply chain shocks, led to the basis for the disastrous Bengal Famine of 1943. Inflation in the province of Bengal had deteriorated the purchasing power of the low-income households; for example, when rice prices increased rapidly fourfold, millions of locals were priced out of the food market. Grain purchase for the war troops, along with the "denial policy" that withdrew rice reserves from coastal Bengal to deter Japanese plunder, exacerbated deficits. Inflation converted insufficiencies into starvation, which implies food was available, but at prices totally unaffordable for the low-



income societies. The British Empire's emphasis on military requirements over civilian welfare as manifested by Winston Churchill's refusal to shift Australia's wheat ships to Bengal, implied that inflation evolved as a trigger for mass mortality.[13]

While the Bengal province underwent the most radical impacts, inflationary stresses affected households' welfare across the Indian subcontinent. In Punjab, Bombay, and the United Provinces, increasing foodstuffs and apparel prices transformed consumption habits drastically. Households changed course from wheat cereal to inferior grains, decreased protein input and deferred non-food expenses such as education, apparel and healthcare. Weaker sections of the society such as children and women particularly witnessed food shortages. While the middle-class families, which relied on fixed wages, observed the decline of savings because of the steady rise in living expenses. Inflationary trends accelerated social inequalities, landowners with marketable surplus profited from elevated food prices, while landless labourers, sharecroppers, and metropolitan employees encountered unprecedented vulnerabilities.[14]

Across the board, the inflation during the war crisis declined real incomes, aggravating consumption trends and broadening social inequalities. This inflation developed financial cracks that would contour law debates in self-reliant India, mainly founded on price stability, food security and the state's intervention in markets.[15]

#### **4. Labour Markets, Industrial Distortions, and "Accidental Industrialisation"**

Although the battles were fought far from Indian soil, World War I and World War II deeply impacted the system and operations of labour markets in imperial India. The battle caused labour mobilisation and postwar demobilisation, which caused economic contortions that recon toured labour supply, worker compensation and related occupation situations.

The colonial rule's military recruitment campaign particularly during World War II pulled millions of males from economically productive sectors, mostly farming. As the colonial Indian economy was a predominantly agricultural-based economy, the exit of labourers from this sector during the peak seasons led to productivity losses. This compaction in the quantum of agrarian workers was not substituted by mechanisation or productivity-boosting investments. Additionally, there was a higher demand for agrarian output at a juncture, when food demand was swelling because of military provisioning.[16]

Rural economies, which depended on household workers and small-scale tenancy schemes, were especially vulnerable. Multiple rural families forfeited male labourers who either enrolled voluntarily due to promised remunerations or were pressurised by regional recruitment channels connected to imperialistic rulers. Therefore, as the agrarian workers' supply decreased, salaries increased in nominal terms in certain sections, but the rise in inflation largely wiped out such boosts. Additionally, females and aged household members were forced to replenish agrarian

worker voids, without corresponding gains in wages or bargaining power.[17]

This migration of labourers extended beyond the agrarian sector. The demands of British rule mandated the augmentation of military workshops, transportation services, pier services processes and additional requirements from the cloth mills. Metropolitan cities like Bombay, Calcutta, Karachi, and Madras experienced an inflow of migrant labourers pursuing wartime employment opportunities. This rural-urban migration trend was not propelled by metropolitan industrialisation energy in the traditional economic implication, but due to the scarcity-induced evolution of the industrial sector serving the World Wars. Nevertheless, this industrialisation boom was only in the short term and uneven in nature, developing pockets of wealth alongside profound structural vulnerabilities. Metropolitan employers leveraged the surplus migrant worker supply to reduce wage hikes and execute severe working conditions, figuring out that labourers had limited choices.[18]

These transformations caused harsh labour-market shockwaves that reverberated ahead with postwar demobilisation. As the World Wars ceased, the colonialist state discharged more than two million troops back into civilian society, developing a phenomenal swell in labourers' supply. Demobilised troops returned to rural provinces which were already worn out by dwindling agrarian production levels and inadequate healing opportunities from the war-induced inflation crisis. Furthermore, they found that their landholdings were encroached upon, tenancy rights were eroded and debt liabilities had intensified. This imbalance between labourers' supply and restricted occupation prospects led to overall underemployment and rural remuneration depressions.[19]

Urban labour markets absorbed some demobilised workers, but the collapse of wartime industries—especially in shipping, munitions, and military manufacturing—meant that industrial employment contracted rapidly. Employers retrenched thousands of workers, cut shifts, and reduced wages, leading to rising labour unrest. Strikes in Bombay textile mills, Calcutta jute factories, and railway workshops reflected deep structural grievances: stagnant wages, insecurity, and the absence of state-led economic planning for postwar labour absorption.[20]

The cumulative impact of war-related troop mobilisation and postwar demobilisation thus cultivated a labour-market trajectory characterised by harsh instabilities, rather than constant structural changeovers. These upheavals indicated the imperial rulers' laying emphasis on colonial battle requirements over labourer welfare, fortifying the discussion that the economic legacies of the World Wars in India were not only fiscal exploitation, but also led to profound social and labour-market destabilisations.[21]

#### **5. Industrialisation Augmentation, Distorted Development, and Economic Dependency**

World War I and World War II facilitated industrialisation in imperialistic India, but this development was restrained

by imperialist prerogatives. These wars created a short-term evolution that was “accidental rather than strategic”, navigated by insufficiencies and emergency purchases, instead of being based on developmental agendas. This expansion was also erratic across provinces and sectors, technologically superficial and was structurally reliant on imperialistic motives, rather than focusing on capital goods, technological advancements and market growth.[22]

During World War I, the disturbances in transnational shipping services decreased the discharge of manufactured imports to India, rousing domestic manufacturers to fill the voids in cloth, leather and metal products, and chemical industries. However, an analogous but bigger operation evolved during World War II.

With European and Japanese production being harshly restricted and shipping trails jeopardised, colonial India evolved as an essential supplier of products to the Allied effort. Military demand increased for cotton fabrics, jute sacks, leather boots and belts, quilts, medical equipment, cement and stainless steel. Production in certain industries expanded remarkably, like Tata Steel, the Bombay cotton mills and Calcutta’s jute mills.[23] Yet, this industrialisation did not mirror self-sufficient industrial abilities. Rather, this was the reaction to a scarcity situation, where industries repurposed existing machinery to satisfy military requirements, imported occasional fresh technologies and performed under capacity constraints that hampered long-run productivity enhancements.[24]

Additionally, this expansion was primarily centralised in very few metropolitan centres. Bombay rose up as the industrial core of cloth production, Calcutta evolved as the centre of jute and engineering supplies, Jamshedpur developed as a steel manufacturing hub, while Madras and Karachi operated as shipping and naval restoration epicentres. Such geographical concentration amplified provincial discrepancies and reinforced colonial-era industrial hierarchies.[25] On the other hand rural India, remained primarily devoid of industrial growth, participating only in the inflationary crisis, food insufficiencies and labour market shortage.

The nature of this industrial growth correspondingly mirrored colonial India’s persisting dependency on Britain for machinery, spare components and technical expertise. Despite increased production, enterprises encountered sharp deficiencies of capital goods, as imports of machinery from Britain, Germany, and Japan tumbled. The lack of domestic engineering abilities implied that Indian plants had to extend the life of obsolete tools, mending machinery instead of modernising it.

Nonetheless, this technical stagnation strengthened India’s peripheral role in transnational production, even as its manufacturers functioned at the apex of wartime capacity.[26] The colonialists granted contracts chiefly to big Indian industrial houses like the Tatas, Birlas, Kirloskars, Walchands etc. whose associations and capital abilities qualified them to meet supply deadlines. While these accidental steps helped construct the basis for the Indian post-independence industrial elite groups, tinier

corporations floundered with deficits of raw inputs and working capital. Military prerogatives led to grimaces: consumer products manufacturers usually confronted rationing of raw materials, resulting in deficits of daily use commodities like fabric, kerosene etc. for locals, while manufacturers built in abundance for the war requirements.[27]

The most lasting effect of this accidental war industrialisation was the consequences on post-independence economic policies. Indian planners viewed this industrialisation neither as self-sufficient nor sustainable. The interim increase in production camouflaged a serious structural reliance on foreign technologies and capital goods. Indian economists like K. T. Shah and V. K. R. V. Rao, asserted that the nation must seek import-substitution industrialisation to decrease vulnerabilities revealed by the battles.[28] This logic led the government to initiate the First and Second Five-Year Plans, which emphasised heavy industry development, the growth of the public-sector corporations and domestic authority over critical manufacturing sectors.[29]

Thus, the wars disclosed how intensely India’s industrial sector remained fastened to imperialist financial designs, establishing the phase for a post-independence campaign to create a self-sufficient, state-led industrialisation base.[30]

## 6. The Sterling Balances Mechanism, Unequal Exchange, and the Limits of Sovereign Fiscal Space

A vastly problematic and structurally adverse economic outcome of the World Wars on imperial India was the emergence of the sterling balance mechanism, employing which the colonial ruler transformed the colony into an involuntary wartime financier. Different from direct fiscal exploitation which functioned via tax and domestic borrowing channels, the sterling balance scheme recontoured colonial India’s transnational economic role, limited its expansion course and modified its post-independence engagement with the multinational financial techniques. The expansion of such sterling balances during the battles depicted not simply an accounting exercise, but a planned reconfiguration of colonial financial flows that transferred Britain’s wartime burdens onto India’s external accounts.

During the Second World War particularly, the United Kingdom could not reimburse colonial India’s tremendous grants for different consumer products, military supplies and battalion upkeep. The British Treasury in return disseminated credit notes of non-convertible sterling IOUs, held in the Bank of England under India’s allotment. By 1945, India had more than £1.3 billion in sterling balances, one of the biggest international debts globally during that time period.[31] Officially, this made India a substantial global creditor; but in reality, these declarations were immobilised and their spending was as per the United Kingdom’s authorisation.

The immobilisation of funds yielded deep-rooted economic impacts. Firstly, colonial India forfeited the possibility of utilising these reserves to fund necessary postwar reconstruction. The imperialistic Indian economy suffered from inflation, famines, and infrastructure erosion, hence needed extensive food grain imports, capital goods, machines and tools and transport services to stabilise domestic prices and revive production levels.[32]

Secondly, since the sterling balances were sealed in the Bank of England and were not willingly available, India moved into its independence phase with a restrictive balance-of-payments atmosphere. This restriction contoured the strategic alternatives of Indian planners, particularly the priority on import substitution, foreign exchange rationing and capital controls, making policymakers intensely sceptical of international economic reliance.[33]

Thirdly, the United Kingdom urged on bilateral trade pacts that restricted India's capacity to diversify trade and commerce, particularly with the United States. This was when India desired to import American capital goods for industrialisation and the shortage of funds made such buys tough. Additionally, the United Kingdom employed India's sterling balances to subsidise its own postwar debts, comprising settling loans with additional Commonwealth nations, actually changing the direction of Indian surpluses to stabilise the British economy.[34]

Fourthly, India's post-independence economic administration was designed on the belief that foreign reliance was a basis of macroeconomic weakness. The conclusion to collect foreign exchange funds between the 1950s and 1960s, despite sluggish development, likewise echoes the trauma of World War II immobilisation. Therefore, the sterling balances crisis was shaping the political-economic background that informed India's developmental strategy for future years.

To sum it up, the United Kingdom's determination to defer repayments trapped liquidity and had multiple downstream consequences, as it impeded post-war capital formation, postponed industrial restoration and restricted the nation's capacity to fund capital goods imports which were mandated for long-run economic development transformation.[35] This economic-historical recollection impacted the output of the rigorous import-substitution control, the establishment of the Planning Commission, and a mindful strategy to reduce foreign capital influxes.[36] Additionally, the deficit and negotiated discharge of balances evolved as a bargaining mechanism during diplomatic meetings between India and the United Kingdom from 1947 to 1952.[37] By locking India into sterling-denominated claims with limited liquidity, Britain extended its economic influence well beyond political decolonisation.[38] Thus, the sterling balances legacy is visible even currently in discussions on financial self-sufficiency, budget management and the historical origins of the nation's mindful perspective towards outward economic reliance.[39]

## 7. Provincial Inequalities and the Social Impacts of the Imperial Economic Designs

Imperial financial approaches did not impact all territories and provinces within India in the same manner. Rather, they stimulated profound spatial imbalances that continued post-independence. The colonial ruler's investments observed a distinctly exploitative sense, focusing on infrastructure development in provinces that promoted raw material exports, like Bengal (jute), Bombay Presidency (cotton) and Assam (tea).[40] Additionally, extensive interior provinces namely Central India, Odisha, Bihar and the Deccan plateau remained underdeveloped. This imbalance was not accidental but ingrained to suit the imperialistic rulers, who prioritised transportation passageways beneficial for their trade businesses, instead of integrated domestic markets.

The railway development pattern also demonstrated these discrepancies. Although this means of transportation was applauded as a mark of modernity, imperial railroads were planned as "drainage networks" that channelled products from hinterlands to port metropolises, and not as grids that connected Indian provinces.[41] Hence, industrial clumps thrived around colony piers while rural agricultural provinces suffered from chronic underinvestment. This spatial tendency heightened inter-provincial revenue discrepancies, which continued further into the post-independence era.

Such monetary imbalances led to substantial social effects. Underdeveloped provinces underwent greater degrees of extreme poverty, reduced literacy levels and more susceptibility to famines, which the imperialistic rulers attributed to "native backwardness" rather than structural deprivation.[42] On the other hand, commercially-oriented provinces incorporated into international markets, encountering cycles of boom and depression, with societies coming to be reliant on fluctuating multinational prices.

Likewise, differential tariff regulations aggravated social imbalances. For example, the Permanent Settlement in Bengal, supported the landlord societies that exploited increased rents, while provinces under the Ryotwari system encountered unjust land revenue demands linked to unrealistic estimations of agrarian productivity levels.[43] Hence, these regulations developed divergent agricultural societies, which later designed practices of political mobilisation, caste disputes and rural imbalances.

These provincial inequalities impacted labour migration flows from impoverished regions like Bihar, Jharkhand, and eastern Uttar Pradesh and were thrust into plantations, industries and later, post-independence to urban centres.[44] Eventually, the imbalances planned under colonialism did not fade away with independence, but the post-independence administrations inherited an intensely uneven economic geography; forcing them to engage in developmental backlogs that took multiple decades to heal.[45]

## 8. Post-Independence Legacy Planning, Protectionism, and the Burden of Colonial Economic Structures

The impact of the economic legacy of the British Empire in colonial India, in future designed the policies for independent India. The nation inherited an economy characterised by an underdeveloped industrial and infrastructure, erratic market scenarios, limited domestic capital and a foreign exchange rule intertwined with imperialistic monetary structures.[46] Furthermore, the imperialist reliance on imported capital goods played a major role in shaping the nation's protectionist perspective.

Hence, the regulations for independent India in the early stages embraced a public sector-led growth, prioritising import-substitution industrialisation. The First and Second Five-Year Plans emphasised the development of heavy industry, also considering that robust public interventions were the foremost means to overcome the technical and economic shortages left behind by imperialist rule.[47]

Post India's independence, increased tariff structures, licensing mandates and quotas were utilised to foster a domestic industrial revolution and decrease susceptibility to foreign shocks.[48] While critics contended that exaggerated restrictions hindered economic development, it is vital to acknowledge that these guidelines arose from the recollections of imperialism and extraction, where free trade had implied asymmetric exchange dictated by imperialistic stakes.

Additionally, the imbalanced provincial expansion practices drawn due to colonialism, compelled the post-independence Indian administration to embrace redistributive strategies, like targeting public investment in backward provinces, government rural expansion strategies and poverty mitigation programs.[49] The colonial fiscal system also influenced post-independence choices. The nation's restricted income base, incorporated with the demand to fund enormous developmental undertakings, led to deficit financing and the growth of the public sector debt.[50] Thus, the intentions of the post-independence planners were designed in reaction to a century and a half of economic extraction, structural inequality and institutional weakness.[51]

## 9. Concluding Statement- The Invisible Battlefield

The economic legacy of World War I and World War II in colonial India accentuates that war-related funding exploited extensive fiscal resources and the compelled monetisation of deficits, ignited ongoing inflation that deteriorated salaries and household consumption standards. The accumulation of sterling balances by colonial India was commanded by the United Kingdom. It was a means by which unilateral expropriation transformed India into an involuntary creditor whose finances were frozen merely on paper, at the juncture of its self-reconstruction requirements.[52]


The political economy of scarcity during the Second World War, characterised by price controls, grain procurement misuse and transportation breakdowns, crystallised into the disastrous Bengal Famine of 1943, where market negligence intensified the impacts of administrative apathy. Labour markets burst as millions of males were recruited into military service, while "accidental industrialisation" developed a deformed imprint of the industrial revolution, steered by deficits instead of strategic ability creation.[53]

The grimaces of the battles included sedentary agrarian productivity, flimsy supply chains, diluted labour markets and provincial and social imbalances, which defined the bases of post-independence policies. The independent India's early planning included protectionism, import substitution, public-led industrialisation and foreign exchange conservatism; as they were institutional comebacks for a colonial economy constantly destabilised by transnational wars and imperial exploitation.[54]


Hence, both World Wars were not simply historical outbreaks, but transformative economic occurrences that redesigned the course of a developing nation. They disclosed the susceptibility of a colonial economy to external shockwaves and underscored the economic sovereignty for significant political independence. India's post-independence expansion route cannot be comprehended without recognising the invisible battleground on which its economy was constantly arranged.[55] Hence, the paradox came to life: Although India was geographically far away from the European battlefields, it suffered some of the heaviest economic burdens of the transnational World Wars.



## Section X: Appendix- Graphs




Source: Basu, D., & Desai, M. *The Growth of the Indian Economy, 1900–1980*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985.



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
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