Clan and Islamic Identities in Somali Society

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Abstract: *The papers investigate a wide range of clan and Islamic identity influences on day-to-day living, Somali society, armed organizations in general, and even Somalia's role as a source or haven for violence in the wider world. The influences of clan in politics and Islamic identities on piracy and al-Ashabaab, as well as the connections between these identities, will all be covered in this article, along with the sources, methods, and lines employed. with Somalis common sets of ancestry, traditions, race, language, history, society, nation, religion, or social treatment within Somalis residing area, as Author I suggest that that clan and Islamic identities are crucial variables for understanding of the motivations, intentions and behaviour-Islamic identity is not necessarily unifying, nor is clan identity inevitably a fragmentary force; each are dynamic and changeable forces that have been used to mobilize and motivate clan and militias and sub-state groups, but also have potential roles in stabilization. Radical Islam appears to be a self-limiting force in Somalia, partly because of clan identities; the degree to which it is inherently threatening is disputed.*

Keywords: Clan, Islamic Identities, Somali Society

1. Introduction

Somalia, officially the Federal Republic of Somalia, is a country in the Horn of Africa. The country is bordered by Ethiopia to the west, Djibouti to the northwest, the Gulf of Aden to the north, the Indian Ocean to the east, and Kenya to the southwest. Somalia has the longest coastline on Africa. Somalis constitute the largest ethnic group in Somalia, at approximately 85% of the nation's inhabitants. They are organized into clan groupings, which are important social units; clan membership plays a central part in Somali culture and politics. Clans are patrilineal and are typically divided into sub-clans, sometimes with many sub-divisions. Through the xeer system (customary law), the advanced clan structure has served governmental roles in many rural Somali communities. The Somalis are an ethnic group native to the Horn of Africa who share a common ancestry, culture and history. The Lowland East Cushitic Somali language is the shared mother tongue of ethnic Somalis, which is part of the Cushitic branch of the Afro-asiatic language family, and are predominantly Sunni Muslim. They form one of the largest ethnic groups on the African continent, and cover one of the most expansive landmasses by a single ethnic group in Africa.

2. Background

Somalia is located in the Horn of Africa, bordering Indian Ocean, Ethiopia, Djibouti and Kenya, the majority of the population are ethnically Somali and can trace their genealogy back to common ancestors. Somalis are distinguished by their traditional clan system, Somali language and Sunni Islamic beliefs. The entire Somali population and land area was separated between five countries during the colonial period, British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, French Somaliland, western Ethiopia and NFD eastern Kenya. However, significant numbers of ethnic Somalis continue to reside in the regions they have historically inhabited across the Horn of Africa which now belong to the countries of Djibouti (former French Somaliland), the western region of Ethiopia and NFD northeastern Kenya. Since independence, Somali nationalism has been largely based on the idea that Somalis

across all these regions share a common language, religion, culture and ethnicity, and hence are united under a single identity. For example, Somalia's flag is an ethnic flag that has a star with five points to represent the unity of the Somali people inhabiting the five territories. Somalia fought a very damaging war against Ethiopia (1977-1978) in an effort to reclaim the territory of the predominantly Somali western region of Ethiopia. In Somalis, an ethnicity is a grouping of people who identify the qualities, beliefs, personality behaviors, appearance, and expressions that characterize a person or group, with each other on the basis of shared characteristics that distinguish them from other groups. Those attributes can include common sets of ancestry, traditions, race, language, history, society, nation, religion, or social treatment within their residing area. The term ethnicity is often used interchangeably with the term nation, particularly in cases of nationalism. Ethnicity is social constructed inheritance for membership defined by sharing identity like origin ancestry, cultural heritage, history, homeland, langue, dialect, myth, religion, tradition, folklore, ceremonial, cooking, dressing style, art, or physical appearance. Ethnic groups may share a narrow or broad spectrum of genetic ancestry, depending on group identification, with many groups having mixed genetic ancestry. Ethnic groups often continue to speak related languages. As the author, I suggest that clan and Islamic identities are crucial factors for understanding of the motivations, intentions, and behavior of Somalis. Islamic identity is not always unifying, and clan identity is not always a fragmentary force; both are dynamic and changeable forces that have been used to mobilize and motivate people. (somalia, (Nina Evason, 2019), due in part to clan identities, radical Islam appears to be a self-contained movement in Somalia; yet, the extent to which it poses an inherent threat is debatable.

3. Statement

The objective of this study on clan and Islamic identities in Somali society is to analyze social structure, the clan system, and "genealogy, " or "family history, " and Islamic identities in the hopes that it will support the generation's inherited sense of clan identification and prevent the genetic fallacy. Somalia Over the years, the country's political infrastructure

completely collapsed and the political violence turned into clan-based violence perpetrated on and by ordinary citizens. This broke down mutual trust throughout society on a large scale of Killings, lootings, property confiscation, sexual violence and the destruction of property led to large numbers of internally displaced people within the country, and to refugees fleeing to neighboring countries. Famine and drought have also contributed to widespread poverty and displacement. The main objective of this paper is to investigate the relationship between clan and Islamic identities in Somali Society. For this purpose clan elders play a very important role in Somali society and everyday life for both clan and Islamic identities. They are negotiators, mediators and counsellors. Elders can also act as clan representatives. Somalis generally seek advice from a community elder about an issue of conflict, blood compensation before any further course of action. Being an elder is more closely linked to a person's status and authority rather than their actual age. For example, clan chiefs are (Ugaas, wabar, imam, suldan) and religious leaders are considered influential elders due to their authority, The power and authority elders hold has been immensely important in upholding law and order in areas of Somalia that do not have functioning governments. When an incident occurs, elders sit together and try to resolve the issue with a collective decision that de-escalates the situation non-violently. Certainly, in some regions where there is a strong respect for customary law, elders' decisions reached under a tree in a rural area can carry the strength of law, keeping in mind that the elder not have police force but relay of their clan loyalty. However, Somalia continues to face challenges. The prolonged lack of a strong functioning national government over decades contributed to instability in the region, allowing the civil war to evolve into a jihadist battle space. The Islamic jihadist group Al-Ashabaab controls large parts of south-central Somalia and carries out high-profile attacks in the capital and elsewhere. Famine and drought also continue to be the biggest causes of displacement throughout the country. Today, the strength of law and order in Somalia differs between regions and also has five autonomous regions that have created their own political institutions in part to secure peace from clan rivalries 1) Puntland, 2) Galmudug, 3) Jubaland, 4) South West Somalia and 5) Hirshabelle. Unlike the secessionist region of Somaliland, these regions are not trying to gain international recognition as separate nations. Meanwhile, south-central Somalia continues to suffer the most from clan-based violence and Islamic insurgencies. The majority of internally displaced people reside in camps in south-central Somalia, including around one-third in the region surrounding the capital of Mogadishu.

3.1 Social Structure and Clan System

Clans are patrilineal society that are frequently subdivided into numerous sub clans. The sophisticated clan structure has played governmental functions in many rural Somali villages through the xeer system (customary law). Somali society has a long history of interethnic marriage. Ethnic Somalis are united by language, culture, devotion to Islam, and to a common ancestor, the Samaale. Genealogical ties have also provided the basis on which divisions among Somalis have occurred, division historically being more common than unity. One's genealogy is a defining factor in Somali culture. Society is characterized by a large extended family clan system. Membership to clans is determined by paternal lineage (through the father). People can trace their lineage back for generations and are generally able to determine how they are related to a person, how they should address them and pay respect to them, simply from learning their name and clan membership. Genetically, there are nine Samaale families; and other independent groups each clan can be further divided into numerous sub-clans that can consist of tens of thousands of people alone. Within these sub-clans, there are even more group divisions based on kinship alliances of smaller extended families. The group divisions within the clan system are not necessarily based on geographic differences. It is common for a variety of sub-clans to live within the same area. The phrase "4.5 system" is frequently used in internal Somali discourse, however it is unclear to outsiders what idea underlies this terminology. I wish to give a quick explanation in order to keep up with the current advances. From Arta Conference in Djibouti (2000), political system is heavily influenced by the 4.5 clan system, the parallelism between the media and politics is biased. One of the key questions after the civil war was how to distribute power in the country in the future. After several peace and reconciliation conferences, a power-sharing formula was first agreed at the Arta Conference in Djibouti (2000), and later in Mbagathi, Kenya (2002-04) The "4.5 formula" was born, This formula is genetic fallacy, also due to the lack of other political size, the formula pushes large people of Somalia into a "0.5" "caste" and thus also marginalises them socially and politically. Group authors, the basis for political representation in Somalia since the early 2000s has been the "4.5 formula", wherein of the country's 245 parliamentary seats, majority seats would go to the four group clans.

3.2 Samaale Genealogy (legendary father).

"Genealogy", a "family history", or a "family tree". In the lineage sense, traces from generations of one person, whereas a "family history" traces the ancestors of one person, this terms are often used interchangeably. A family history may include additional biographical information, family traditions, and the like. Samaale was the son of Hill Samaale's, father Hill is also the father of Sab, the ancestor of most southern Somali clans (most notably the Rahanweyn of are attached families, family history, and the tracing of their lineages. Samaale is the oldest common forefather of several major Somali clans and their respective sub-clans, Samaale lies at the basis of the largest and most widespread Somali lineage and (the second largest lineage belonging to Samaale's brother Sab, the ancestor of most southern, pastoralist and cultivating clans). The main branches of the Samaale, and Sab of Rahanweyn clans are consisting of nine + one families of biological related identity the:

1) Gardheere Samaale (was first son, consist of Garjante, Garre, Cawrmale, Dagoodi Saransoor, Gaaljecel Saransoor, Masarre Saransoor & Ciise Saransoor).
2) Irir Samaale (consist of Dir iyo Hawiye)
   - Dir consist of Isaaq, gadabursi, ciise, gurgura, surre, gaadsan, akishe, bajimaal, biimaal, barsuug, wardaay, jiido, Layiile, Magaadle, dabruube, jaarso & gabooye.

- Hawiye consist of six major families: 1) Gorgaate Hawiye - consist of mudulood Hiraab including large families' abgaal, wacdaan, moobleen silcis, wadalaan & ujeejeen). + Madar kicis Hiraab of Habargidir, duduble, & sheekhaal.2) Karanle Hawiye (consist 4 families including kaariye karanle, gidir karanle, and sixaawle karanle iyo murursade karanle) 3) Xaskul Hawiye 4) Rarane Hawiye - in southern Somalia) 5) Gundhabe Hawiye (consist of Baadi cade, Murale, and jijeele iyo jiidle).6) Jambeel Hawiye Jambeel (waa beesha jambeel ama jambeele ee dagan gobolka Bari ee Puntland.)

3) Meyle Samaale (is Xawaadle consisting number major sub clan).

4) Maqaarre Samaale (is Dabarre and Irrole, two major identity inhabitant in south east of Somalia - Diinsor District).

5) Yabuur Samaale (is Hubeer families' inhabitant in south east region of Somalia).

6) Gurre Samaale (are the part of clan inhabitant in western of Ethiopia /Waa beelaha Gurre ee dagan Somali galbeed)

7) Gariire Samaale (are the part of clan inhabitant in western of Ethiopia /Waa beelaha Gariire ee dagan Somali galbeed)

8) Harmaalle Samaale (Waa beelaha Ajuuraan oo kaliya).

9) Xariire Samaale (are the part of clan inhabitant in western of Ethiopia /Waa beelaha Xariire ee Dagan Somali galbeed).

10) The majority "Rahanweyn" Digil & Mirifle - the second brother of samaale "SAB"the largest Agro-Pastoralist in south west of Somalia-The Somali groups of the Digil-Mirtle and Rahanwein, in the South are also seen by many as different from the 'real Somali' (descendants not of the alleged Sab is of ancestor Samaale) and to speak the Af-May language, a variety of Somali not readily understood elsewhere, e. g. in northern and eastern Somalia. For linguistic diversity in Somalia, I refer to the work of Heine (1992), Nurse (1992), and especially Lamberti (1986). Tunni the Tunni are a Somali clan that make up part of the wider Digil-Rahanweyn branch. It is one of the major clans that inhabit in the South West State of Somalia and can also be found in Jubbaland. The Tunni, composed of five sub-clans (Warile, Da'farad, Hajuwa, Dakhtira, and Goygali).

11) Independent clans-Somalis clans non-affiliated with Samaale
   - Darood (Darood are commonly divided into three major groups: Ogaden, Marehan, and Harti. The Harti are composed of the Majerteen, Dulbahante and Warsangeli.
   - Jareer indigenous people-Jareer-The main subgroups of the Jareer/Gosha, Shiidle, Kaboole, Makanne, Duubo, Jaaji, Mushungulu (the only group sure to speak a Bantu language), Eyle (or Aylo), How these groups relate to each other and what self-terms they use is unclear. Many of them are often linked or co-opted to the Somali clans (via sheegato, or 'adoption'). Zanj (descendants of pre-Somali settlers, live between the two great rivers,

mainly in the Garbaharre and Jowhar districts), details of the following:
- Makane
- Shiidle (walamooy, reer issa, reer bare) lower and middle shabelle
- Shambaro (in the Lower and Middle Juba area: Shambara (Manyasa, Miyau, Majindo, Makua, Mlima, Pokomo, and Manyika).
- Reer shabelle (Jidle, Reer Ciise, Gasar, Baajimaal, Reer Geedow. Calimaad and Dagiine in shannille of western Somalia Ethipia and middle and lowershabelle region)
- Mushunguli
- Baajuun
- (Yahar, Tuure, Gaheyle, Hinji, Arabs, Midgaan, Harla, Boon, Eyle, Mahri, Tumaal, Indian, Eritrean, Bantu, Reer Bare, Mashunguli, Yaqaalu, and Eyle.

3.3 Groups 'outside' the Samaale clan framework

Somali society is not homogenous in either an ethnic, linguistic or even religious sense, although virtually all Somalis adhere to varieties of Islam. There is no complete survey of ethno-linguistic and socio-cultural diversity within Somali society in the past and present, but recent research has emphasized that there exists a large number of groups that do have not a place in the traditional Somali genealogy (ct. Luling 1984, Besteman 1992; ct. Lewis 1994b: 41 43). They are either occupational caste groups (traditionally considered 'inferior) known as minority, descendants of Swahili and Bantu-speaking communities near the coast, or hunter-gatherer groups of diverse origins, who live mainly in the riverine areas. These peoples were usually endogamous and rarely intermarried with the 'mainstream' Somali population. The names of these groups differ in the various regions of Somalia. They have often suffered greatly in the upsurge of violence in the past few decades, with abuse, killings, land grabs and other depredations. Many of them have fled the country, for instance to Kenya, and a large number Bantu-speakers (e. g., the Bajuni) have found asylum in the United States. Groups 'outside' the Samaale clan framework considered as being outside, but appended to, the clan framework are the following: Baidari: Yibir (hunters and magicians)
- Midgan (leather workers, tanners and hunters)
- Tumaal (blacksmiths)

Other groups outside the framework have a primarily non-clan identity, when they identify on the basis of, e. g., place of residence or linguistic/historic affinities. Some among these groups are also of non-Somali origin. They mainly live in southern Somalia. Some groups speak of their sub-groups also as 'clans', but they differ from the units in the segmentary structure of the system outlined in Section of samaale.
1. The main group consists of the 'Benadiri': Reer xamar -The Reer Hamar (people of Mogadishu and the Benadir). They are often called 'Gibilcad'
 (= 'fair-skinned') and are divided in the following subgroups:
(1) DhabarWeyn
(2) Shanshiya, orShanshi

(3) Moorshe
(4) Qalmashube
(5) Bandhahwau
(6) RerFaqi

Shangani:
(1) Amudi
(2) Bah Fadal
(3) Rer Sheikh
(4) Abakarow

Ashraf:
(1) Hussein: ReersharifMagbul, Sharif Ahmed, Sharif Balaaw,
(2) Hassan: Mohamed Sharif, Sharif Ali, Sharif Ahmed, Ashraf Sarman

The Merca 'clans':
(1) RerMaanyo
(2) Ahmed Nur
(3) Ali'iyo Mohammed
(4) Duruqbe,
(5) Gameedle

Baraawa (people of the town of Baraawa, divided in:
(1) Bida,
(2) Hatimi and
(3) Ashraf)

Bajuun (fishermen and sea traders of Swahili origin, mainly in the Kismaayo area and the Bajuni islands off the coast)

Ribe (hunters, in the middle Juba area)

A recent U. N report said that the Bantu Somalis might number 1/3 of the population in Southern Somalia between the rivers. I think we need some anthropologists not warriors. So we can fix this great nation and put it on the highway of again. Or maybe the power of Islam can reunite our motherland.

3.4 Somalia Genetic fallacy

As an author, I discovered that many academic scholars misjudged the Somalia Genealogical identity, claiming that the Somali people are only Darood, isak, and Hawiye, this is genetic fallacy. Somali peope are not only Darood, isak, Hawiye. For example, Dir and Hawiye are a part of the Samaale clans, which they referred to as irir Samaale. Ethnic Somalis are united by language, culture, devotion to Islam, and to a common ancestor, the Samaale, and sab brothers + independent clan groups. Genealogical ties have also provided the basis on which divisions among Somalis have occurred, division historically being more common than unity. Genealogy constitutes the heart of the Somali social system. It is the basis of the collective Somali preference toward internal division and domestic conflict, as well as of the Somalis' sense of being distinct of consciousness and difference that borders on prejudice. Whatever I. M Lewis and other Western historians said about ancestral clan identity of Somalia background is looking misguided of genetic misinterpretation because these historians only spoke to few clani.e. (Dir or Darood or Hawiye informers) and just

copies their versions without talking to other Somalis, this is bias history telling only taking few clan/ people on not knowing the rest of clan identity, this is genetic fallacy. As a matter of fact, I. M Lewis version of Somali History is based on what he learned from three Northern Somali clans not the rest of samaale families. (Somali peope are not only Darood, isak, Hawiye) example Dir and Hawiye is part of samaale clans they called irir samaale), I think, if an expert decided to write history and identity of other peoples far away from his home he has to question the entire people of Somalia not only few clans), the citation of I. M Lewis is not genuine to somalia clan classification only one part of Somalia. If I want to understand about sub clan divides in Great Britain (UK), which is divided into English, Welsh, Scottish, and Irish, plus other, for example, I must travel to each of these regions and complete questionnaires about how their societies are organized and divided in sub identities. Do I know everyone in the UK, for instance, If I only question about Scottish or Irish, the answer is no. I. M. Lesis and the European team done this in the past on Somalia clan genetic identities. The Samaale is oldest common ancestor of several Somali clans, is generally regarded as the source of the ethnonym Somali. "One other theory is that the name is held to be derived from the words soo and maal, which together mean "go and milk". As Author I found some scholar writing false argument about Samaale forinterpreting into" go and milk", this theory totally false I think it is child history telling, Samaale is legendary father of Somalia people not go and milk or Somaal this is identity genetic insult.

3.5 What are 4.5 clan divisions in Somalia?

4.5 clan divisions in Somalia are members of political dominant clans and members of non-dominant clan groups, In 1991 the nation fell into a long period of increasingly disorganized conflict between forces of clans, militias, warlords, separatist, religious functions and rebellion movements, A period of militia warfare, large-scale criminal activities and clan violence in a stateless context, clan affiliation is as important as ever, providing the continuous basis for 'survival' and mobilization of people. Since then, there have been clan lines with well-known political warlord clan figures, in which members of political dominant clans groups exploit the other members of non-dominant clans groups by combining them into a point-five group that may be more vulnerable by engaging in acts of setting up clan mathematical fraction integrated all clans into 4.5 which is beyond the reality, the current insecurity and conflict in Somalia has close relation with new clan structure that come into effect in 2000 in ARTA at Djibouti peace process. In 2000 Djibouti conference, this was a series of meetings held in Arta, Djibouti, The conference was aimed at bringing together representatives of the warring factions of Somalia to end the civil war. Arta, 2000 Djibouti peace conference formulated new formula of 4.5 political clan divisions which are not related the true genealogical structure Somali, the representatives of warring factions were generated the clan formula of 4.5 was from Djibouti for their interest and also for political solution this was misguided total Somali genealogy divisions, this peace process was attended only warring factions with their clan alliance had an access participation peace process. This mathematical fraction of

4.5 are not based on equal clan political power sharing no clear agreement on the 4.5 clan structures., the 4.5 formula gives equal quota to the four "clans who fights" clans, and a half-point to a cluster of "majority clans. The beneficiaries are of those clans who generate 4.5 clans are: Hawiye, Rahanweyn, Dir (including Isaaq clan) and Daarood. Example as stated above (Hawiye and Dir are Samaale clan groups), see genealogical divisions of Somalia. The beneficiary of the peace process in Djibouti was warring factions who benefit and gain power and resource from collapse central government including the first 10 years of civil war from 1991 to 2000, warring factions in the conflict of warlords has got an opportunity to attend the peace conference in Arta of Djibouti having the resource to attend, the participants were clans in who fights gain land size, wealth and political influence, In 2004 after lengthy negotiations and a complex power-sharing agreement, the clan formula of 4.5 became again more mature and virtually outfitted.

3.6 4.5 is Genetic fallacy of Somalia clan structure

The genetic fallacy is also known as the misjudgment of origins of genetic identity or a fallacy of irrelevance known as the fallacy of virtue is when arguments or information are accepted or rejected based only on where they came from, rather than what they actually say. Black and white is very clear to understand 4.5 clan formula of Somalia is genetic fallacy that fundamentally undermine genetic rights of Somalia people, of this argument of 4.5 mathematical fraction are dismissing the validity source of origin of Samaale legendary father of largest population of country. The Somalia clan structure of 4.5 is mathematical decimal point which is false dilemma, and deceitful strategy gives the impression of creating an absurd argument, This irrational 4.5 ideology emerges in the 2000 Art peace process when people take for granted a very deep-seated assumption about clan political compromise, especially of those who benefit from resources and power rooted by the central government. Spherical reasoning is inferior to the genetic fallacy because it is rarely not exist. In the wake of weak state, corruption continues to be higher in countries where policies and institutions are weak, corruption is part of the problem this problem effect the instability, Somalia continue to struggle with a legacy of unexperienced institutions, unfortunate enforcement of law and administration of justice, chronic poverty and inequality, and political acceptance of corruption support by clan political culture of 4.5, of these conditions have inevitably created an network in which the dividends for committing corruption are significant. It was during the 2000 Djibouti Somali Peace and Reconciliation Conference that the 4.5 formula for clan power and political sharing was developed. This was the beginning of Somalia's corruption. The 4.5-clan formulas of political power sharing are based on a genetic fallacy that, in my judgement, is to blame for the corruption of the Djibouti peace process in 2000. The remaining Somali clan families, who have been marginalized and are currently facing the most confusing challenges, are affected by the 4.5-clan formulas of political power sharing.

Political hybridization (legislature, executive, and judicial), in which one person holds multiple positions, such as those of minister and member of parliament, illustrates a breakdown in the checks and balances system and a lack of transparency and accountability. It is customary for the member clans of the 4.5 to be honored with the most important government positions, which is where the common corruption occurs. Much of the time the truth does indeed lie between two extreme points of 4.5 fabricated clan structure at Art peace process, this misjudgment compromise of it is also untrue. There is no clan groups called Point Five (.5) in Somalia genealogy identities. Not by exaggerating, this is distorting, or just completely fabricated genetic identity fallacy this was generated by greedy's people of their wishful thinking to dominate the rest of Somali clan identity, it's much easier to present true position as being reasonable, but this kind of dishonesty serves to undermine honest rational debate.

3.7 Social Structure and Clan System

One's genealogy is a defining factor in Somali culture. Society is characterized by a large extended family clan system. Membership to clans is determined by paternal lineage (through the father). People can trace their lineage back for generations and are generally able to determine how they are related to a person, how they should address them and pay blood compensation and respect to each other, simply from learning their name and clan membership. There are major clans in Somalia (Samaale and sab which are the majority of Somalia, additionally there are independent groups non-affiliated to Samaale of this groups are Darood, reer Hamar, shambaro, shiidle, Reer Shabelle, Makane, Arabs), each clan can be further divided into numerous sub-clans that can consist of tens of thousands of people alone. Within these sub-clans, there are even more group divisions based on kinship alliances of smaller extended families. The group divisions within the clan system are not necessarily based on geographic differences. It is common for a variety of sub-clans to live within the same area. For instance, the following clans, the Gaboye, Tumal, Yibir and Galgala are ethnically associated with the Samale, which forms a dominant clan in Somalia. However, cultural stigma and traditions have excluded them as outcastes from the Samale clan. They engage in the activities of blacksmithing and shoemaking, as well as being hunters/gatherers. They live mainly in central and northern Somalia. For example, the Galgala have assimilated into the Abgal in Jowhar and Mogadishu. However, they identify themselves as Nuh Mohamud, a sub clan of the Majerten clan. Some Gaboye, Tumal and Yibir assimilated into the Isak in Somaliland, while others yet have assimilated into the Darod in Puntland and central regions. There are also other Gaboye, Tumal and Yibir, Yahar who assimilated with Hawadle, Murasade and Marehan clans in several region. With the exception of the jareer community, Makane, Shiidle, Shambaro, Reer shabelle, Mushunguli, Baajuun and Eyle who have distinct "non-Samaale" physical appearance, all other minorities (cast groups) have physical appearances similar to that of the dominant clans, as well as having ethnic and cultural similarities. What distinguish the assimilated minorities are their distinct cultural stigma and traditions have excluded them as outcastes from the Samale clan and lower social class in terms of economic livelihoods.

3.8 Occupational Castes (Minority Ethnicities)

In Somalia, various occupational caste groups, such the Gaboye, Tumal, and Yibir people, are minority groups within their respective tribes. In Somalia, these groups are referred to as "midgaan" and are viewed as social outcasts. They experience prejudice at all societal levels, are prohibited from union with another Somali, and are more likely to experience violence. The ability to obtain equal rights that they had previously been denied makes for a tremendously empowering experience for these people when they settle as refugees elsewhere. There are also some minority ethnic groups who are not part of the Somali genealogical clans, but have been living in Somalia for centuries. These include the Somali Bantu, Bajun, Barawani and Hamari people. Little statistical information is available on minority groups in Somalia. However, it is believed that there is a higher concentration of minorities in south-central Somalia. They are scattered throughout society and do not have the political symbol and military organisations that the majority Somali clans have. Somalia's minority clans which may today comprise as much as a third of Somalia's population (UN OCHA Somalia 2002) - suffered painful exclusions and helplessness. The Somali "minority" clans are the "Jareer community", a large group of southern riverine farmers whose lineage is believed to pre-date " indigenous" that of the majority clans; the Benadiri, a mercantile class of Arabian descent; and a group of several trade-practicing clans known collectively (and derogatively) as the" Midgan". Each of these minority clans is considered "Casting people" by the majority clans; even in contemporary Somali society, they suffer profound discrimination, social exclusion, and are still virtually excluded from political participation, intermarriage and employment. In traditional Somali society (and in many parts of Somalia today), there was no neutral justice system, and individuals depended upon their clan militias to provide redress for any wrongs committed against clan members. Majority clan members possessed militias; minority clans, whose members have historically practiced unarmed and therefore disadvantageous trades (such as shoemaking and building), do not. Minority rights' advocate Martin Hill has argued that in a culture where might makes right, the impact of living unarmed has been profound: the minorities' historical lack of clan militia has effectively excluded them from access to the Somali justice system - a reality encapsulated in the Somali expression looma-aaran, meaning "no-one will avenge your death. "

3.9 Social tradition system

Somali national identity is rooted in the memory of "greater Somalia, " the sweeping pre-colonial ethnic territory of the Somalis (which stretched from the northern region of Kenya, through Ethiopia's western Somalia, to the coast), and in the Somalis' strong sense of ethnic, religious and linguistic unity. Somalia, whose residents share one language, ethnicity and religion, was once hailed as the most unified state in Africa. The clan system, and the practice of pastoral democracy, is a fundamental part of the Somalis' shared cultural heritage. Somali clan identity is deeply rooted and emotional, springing both from pragmatic self-interest and, after decades of brutal clan-based violence, a shared sense of

victimhood and grievance. Somalia had fallen apart into the traditional clan and lineage divisions which, in the absence of other forms of law and order, alone offered some degree of security, after twenty years of anarchy, Somalia has few functioning institutions. The clan system has filled the governance vacuum, and now provides the foundation for all political, economic and social transactions. [quoting Mohamed 2022]. The Somalis resent this arrangement - when polled, they express unambiguous and universal opposition to "clannsim, " regarding it as a perversion of Somali culture, a vicious form of tribalism, and a product of the country's extended poverty and social collapse. These traditional social systems are strong, have a sense of local ownership and generate durable competition among the local people. This system have been used in solving disagreements and conflict, allocating resources and agreeing on contributions to important matters in the community but have not been well utilized by the condition of society. This social tradition is based on the idea that in order to increase local tribal institutional service. Furthermore recognizing that in Somalia, culture and religion influence of social tradition services utilization, it is reasonable to assume that part of the solution of the problem lies there in the clan (Reer or Family link) and the Somali customary law (Xeer is customary law) are traditional institutions that have been used in mobilizing communities for war, blood compensation, emergency relief and society political participation. Obviously, it related with anthropological, historical, and political and advocacy perspectives, Clan and Islamic Identities in Somali Society have been noticed as a social and political system of organization and governance (Ssereo, 2003). Over the past three decades, the challenges of state-building, power struggles, and democratization in Somalia have been examined in several academic books, articles, and beyond (Last & Seaboyer, 2011). The global response also relocated from massive military and humanitarian interventionism to pressing global democratization (Chevreau, 2017). Literature on clan relationships in Somalia primarily focuses on mediation, conflict and insecurity (e. g. World Bank (2005); Last and Seaboyer (2011); De Waal (2017)). Group identity, even when artificially created in lab experiments, show significant influence on social and economic preference.

3.10 Islam and Somali social order (The Somali Islamic tradition)

Islam is a fundamental pillar of Somali society that provides an important collective social and moral inheritance for coexistence and peace processes. Somalis traditionally have adhered to the Shafi'i school of Sunni Islam. Historically most have belonged to one of the established Sufi orders and in their practices have fused local traditions and beliefs with Islam. Clan ancestors have been assimilated as Awliya or 'trusted ones' and Somali customary law incorporates elements of Sharia. Somalia's post-independence civilian and military governments recognized Islam as the official state religion, but there was no tolerance for political Islam. Surveying suggests that the Somalis are actively seeking an alternative social order and that they regard obedience to Islam, and to the Muslim shari'a law in particular, as the most promising means of resolving the Somali crisis. But the re-emergence of a surprisingly diverse range of Islamist

opposition movements in Somalia from the radical al-Shabaab militia to the moderate "Ahlu Sunna wa'al Jamaa" has failed to capture the public's imagination or loyalty. The venality of the Somali radicals and the age-old rivalries of the clan system are only partly to blame for the failure of Islam to provide a workable alternative to anarchy. More fundamentally, the Somalis are dissatisfied with the ideologies being offered by the various Islamist factions. The Somali identity is deeply Muslim, but that Muslim identity is also uniquely Somali. In 1975, when religious leaders challenged the Somalia central government led by the military over a new Family Law giving equal rights for men and women, ten Muslim scholars were publicly executed. By the 1980s more radical"The Salafi movement or Salafism" interpretations of Islam had begun to gather speed as Somali Muslim scholars returned from Egypt and Saudi Arabia against a backdrop of widespread corruption, economic downturn and growing civil unrest. In 1991 the when the central military government collapsed and reformist Islamic movements established a real foothold in the country, particularly in the south central regions. When the state collapsed Somalia fell into the same chaos Clans fought against each other; political factions conflicted over the hunt of power; and crimes became a common event. At that time killing binges also became part of daily life and criminals walked without fear of being held accountable for their crimes. All of this violence came at the expense of innocent civilians, whose desperation incited the creation of Islamic courts. As people turned to Islam for security and the moral and physical reconstruction of communities, Islamic foundations and backers outside of the country invested in businesses and social services. At different times Somali political leaders also promoted Islamic movements in search of their own political strategies. Islam is a fundamental pillar of Somali society and provides an important moral compass in Somali peace processes. This article investigate Clan and Islamic Identities in Somali Society including the rise of the Islamic Courts and the influence of Islamic militancy with which Somalis are currently grappling. The violence perpetrated by militant Islamists in Somalia covers the fact that peace and reconciliation are fundamental belief of Islam. According to Islam, promoting reconciliation is an act of goodness and people are encouraged to resolve their differences this way. Suluh (pacification) Peace and reconciliation are among the fundamental beliefs of Islam, which preaches the quality of the conflict resolution method known as Suluh ('Pacification'). This is cited in several verses of the Qur'an along with the importance of promoting reconciliation. According to Islam, promoting reconciliation is an act of goodness and people are encouraged to resolve their differences this way. But according to the Prophet Mohammed (Peace Be upon Him - PBUH), conflict breeds chaos and puts all the other pillars in jeopardy. Therefore, to pacify those in conflict is the most beneficial and Suluh is key to it all.

3.11 Islamic identity

Somalia's population is over 98% Sunni Muslim, and ethnically quite uniform. The total population, Somalis share a common Cushitic language and largely pastoral culture, as well as the belief that they are descended from a common legendary ancestor - "Samale" The ethnic Somali population also comprises ten (10) major clan confederations, about other independent large clans, and hundreds more subclass, These are social units based on extended family-bloodline connections. Somalia had fallen apart into the traditional clan and lineage divisions which, in the absence of other forms of law and order, alone offered some degree of security. Islamic identity and clan identity are considered the twin pillars of Somali society. This duality is fluid with much overlap, as evidenced by the involvement of Islamic customs and laws in the everyday life of the Somali clans. In the post central military government era, however, Islamic identity has exhibited greater rigidity in some accommodations, prompting a degree of deviation from clan identity. The most recent wave of aggressive fundamentalism began in the late 1980s and early 1990s when Arab Wahabbi - i. e., Salafiya - missionaries from Saudi Arabia, Sudan and elsewhere seized on social disorder and poverty occasioned by the collapse of of military Central government's to recruit followers with money and weapons. Al-Islamiah al-Ittihaad (AIAI), in particular, echoed the Salihiya's traditional disdain for the Qadiriya cult of saints and the claims made for their mystical healing techniques - e. g., washing Koranic scripture freshly transcribed by a sheikh into a cup with water and drinking it. For some Islamic movements within Somalia, politics and policies should be lacking of references to clan identity (Elmi 2010: 4). This divergence became particularly evident during the peak of the Union of Islamic Courts / Islamic Courts Union's (UIC / ICU) control of Mogadishu and environs when it brought a brief, six-month interval of stability to much of the southern part of the country in mid-to-late 2006. In recent years, Somalia has drawn much international attention and disrepute owing to the rise of non-state armed groups ranging from Islamist militias (such as al-Shabaab and Hizb al-Islam) to pirates operating along the Somali coast and throughout the Gulf of Aden. As regards the Islamist militias, the greatest fear of the United States and other Western nations is that such groups will provide safe havens for al-Qaeda operatives and perhaps participate in al-Qaeda-directed terrorist attacks in Somalia and the region (Bryden 2003; Dagne 2002; Elliot & Holzer 2009; Ibrahim 2010; ICG 2002a and 2005b; Le Sage 2001; Medani 2002; Menkhaus 2002; Shay 2005 and 2008). This fear is based on the attractiveness of Somalia for al-Qaeda: a virtual absence of state institutions including border, military, internal security and police enforcement; adjacency to the Persian Gulf and Middle East; and a populace that is primarily Sunni Muslim in religious affiliation. Somali piracy is more of an irritant than direct security threat to the United States, its allies, and neighboring countries. That said, military resources have been diverted to combat the threat of piracy (though with ambiguous results), and the Gulf of Aden is part of the important trade conduit that is linked to the Red Sea and Suez Canal and its multi-billion-dollar annual shipments of goods and valuable commodities such as oil. Within Somalia itself, the economic spin-offs from the multi-million-dollar ransoms support countless individuals, households and commercial sectors in Mogadishu and coastal communities ranging from licit sectors such as construction and mobile telephones to illicit sectors such as weapons and narcotics. The most notorious non-state armed group is al-Shabaab (roughly translated as 'the youth'),

which is suspected of being affiliated with al-Qaeda. Al-Shabaab is known to adhere to a particularly rigid interpretation of shari'a law and seeks to establish a fundamentalist Islamic republic in Somalia. In addition to its focus on youth-aged recruits, al-Shabaab distinguishes itself from other major Islamist militias in the region by employing websites on the Internet to recruit new members from abroad - including the United States and Australia. These recruitment techniques are alleged to have attracted a Canadian, Mohamed Hersi, a twenty-five-year-old former University of Toronto student. Hersi was recently arrested in Toronto, at Pearson International Airport, and was charged with "planning to participate in terrorist activities [with alShabaab] and counselling another person to do the same" (Freeze & McArthur 2011). Salafist jihadism has increased Somalia's ethno-political combustibility by impinging on moderate Sunni Islam over the past twenty years, particularly in southern Somalia. The Salafists, like more moderate Somali Islamists, believe that Islam and Islamic values should determine individual and communal social, political and economic life, seek a "Greater Somalia" that includes the western Somalia region of Ethiopia and part of Kenya, and reject federalism. In the broader international context, the rise of Somali Islamists, their opposition to a secular and internationally sanctioned government, Somalia's geographical proximity to the Middle East and Central Asia, and its absence of an effective government friendly to the secular West has defined Somalia as a potential flashpoint in the U. S. -led "war on terror. " The U. S. State Department's Bureau of African Affairs, according to an internal report circulated in August 2009, rated Somalia "the hottest of many policy fires burning" in Africa (US DOS 2009: 7). Despite al-Shabaab's utility as a resistance movement opposed to the foreign occupation of Somalia, or Ahlu Sunna wa'al Jama's utility as a barricade against al Shabaab, their reliance on foreign funding has hit a bitter note. Al Shabaab's efforts to unite Somalis under shari'a law have been fatally undermined by the imposition of harsh Salafist practices. Until some version of political Islam can be harmonized with Somali culture, it is unlikely to be a successful vehicle for social or political transformation.

4. Conclusion

The existence of identity separation based on clan or religious differences in a particular state or region is not, by itself, a sufficient material for civil war or regional conflict. It is important to understand that identity formation is fluid and should be understood in relation to political struggles over power, influence and resources. In other words, the exacerbation of clan or religious differences is often part of a deliberate, calculated campaign undertaken by state actors and non-state actors with coherent social, political and economic interests and goals. The influence of clan identities and Islamic identity in Somalia is important. For Ssereo, the clan represents "the unit of political and social mobilization and organisations" for Somalis and that clan identity "under normal circumstances, shared cultural values, traditions and customs as well as language are the basis for unity and social cohesion" (2003: 39). The purpose of this paper has been to integrate quality and degree to understanding of the level of importance and influence of clan identity and

Islamic identity on everyday life in Somalia. To this end, the paper has outlined the shortcomings of linking ethnic differences with biological or primordialist substructures as well as the danger of simply identifying the existence of ethnic heterogeneity and separation as the materials for violent conflict. These shortcomings and dangers DRDC Toronto CR 2011-080. The legacy of economic mismanagement and an ill-conceived attempt to annex the western regions Somalia in Ethiopia resulting in a costly war with Ethiopia in the late-1970s, combined with difficult drought conditions in the mid-to-late-1980s, served as a catalyst for civil strife in Somalia and eventual state collapse by 1991. This resulted in immeasurable suffering among the civilian population in the form of death and displacement. In the aftermath of the collapse of the Somali state, we witnessed a shifting of elite alliances and strategies to control economic resources (Saether 2000: 134-135). The rise of warlords, pirates and militias over the past two decades is not an extended episode of chaos but rather a reordering of Somali society on more overt clan lineages and Islamic identities. The concomitant rise of elites among such groups is another attempt to establish and support patronage lines and new political, economic and social power structures. In the absence of safety and security, civilian populations under psychological duress sought succour with others based on common clan and religious group identities.

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