

Turkish Military Drones and Creating a Stronger Role for Turkish Foreign Policy in its Region

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Abstract: *This paper explain how Turkish military drones have created a stronger role for Turkish foreign policy. In recent years, Turkey has been able to be one of the pioneers in the field of manufacturing military drones and has proven its success and ability to solve wars. The study analyzes the role of Turkish military drones in wars such as the Libyan war, how the battle for Turkey's ally was resolved in the reconciliation government, as well as the Armenian-Azerbaijani war, and how it gave preference to Azerbaijan in winning the war, and analyze its role in the Syrian war in Idlib province on the Turkish border in response to a Syrian attack backed by Russia It also analyzes the role of Turkish drones in its fight against the PKK. It aims to clarify and discover how Turkey has become a stronger role in foreign policy through military drones, since every country is trying to become the strongest and race to arm itself with modern weapons through which it can be in a position of sovereignty and power, as the Realists see politics as a struggle, and every country must not trust any other country, even if it is an ally. In terms of methodology, the study is qualitative and uses a case study where it is important to study the case of Turkey and its development in the field of military drones, and the research also uses historical analysis where it is important to know how technology helped in military development, and what are the beginnings of the use of military drones and how it has evolved over the years.*

Keywords: Turkish Military Drones, Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Realism Theory, Libya, Azerbaijan, Syria, PKK, Ukraine, Bayraktar, Russia

1. Introduction

This paper aims to explore how Turkish military drones they have created a stronger role for Turkish foreign policy in their territory. This paper explores and explains when drones began, how they evolved, and why Turkey manufactured them locally and did not rely on importing them from the first countries of the industry, such as Israel and America, as most countries do. The reason why the state of Turkey is the main focus of this study, because Turkey has in recent years been able to be one of the pioneers in the field in the military drone industry, and it has proved its success and ability to resolve wars. The study will analyze the role of the Turkish military drones in wars such as the Libyan war and how the battle was resolved for Turkey's ally in the government of reconciliation, as well as the Armenian-Azerbaijani war and how it gave preference to Azerbaijan to win the war and analyze its role in the Syrian war in Idlib province on the Turkish border in response to a Syrian attack supported by Russia, and also will analyze the role of the Turkish Drones in its fight against the PKK. Drones are generally the most controversial weapon in the world now because they are the most effective weapon in reaching targets accurately while protecting soldiers and military personnel during military operations on the ground. It is important to study the case of Turkey, because in the past the military Drone industry was largely limited to America and Israel, but in recent years turkey's role in that industry has emerged greatly and not only in its industry but also in its use in conflict zones and

through which Turkey was able to resolve the battles, which made it a military advantage, and Turkey proved to be a strong ally on which to rely. For example, in Libya, it has been able to demonstrate military superiority over Russian defense systems. By using drones in wars, Drone has been able to give Turkey an advantage in political and economic agreements and has begun to create a balance of power.

2. Literature Review

The past few years have witnessed shifts in Turkish military policy and how technological advances have aided on military progress. And how Turkey became one of the most important pioneers in the manufacture of drones, not only in its manufacture, but also in its military uses, and how it was a strong ally with other countries. Washburne (2015) in his research paper explains how the military of the United States of America (U.S.A) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has used drone aircraft over the past 20 years. The researcher explains how the U.S. military used Drone in the fight against terrorism and the destruction of Al-Qaeda in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and Afghanistan. He explains how the United States and the CIA kept an official secret of using drones against terrorists until former President Obama revealed the secret. The researcher in this research aims to provide the reader with a background on the use of drones by America and the CIA. It also provides an analysis of the results of the polls. Through this survey, he tries to reveal the impact of the drones on American desire to intervene

militarily abroad. According to this study, regarding the United States in the historical background of drones, it explains how the United States used drones against the Soviet Union during Cold War and how it used them against terrorist groups. It is important to explain the role of the United States of America in the field of drones because it is the first country to manufacture and use them. Katrancic (2020) explains the importance of drones in hybrid warfare. In this paper, he explains how Turkey has been able to advance in this area and how Turkey was able to rely on herself in the production of the drones. The researcher analyzes how drones will be of great importance in future wars and how they will be more efficient than conventional weapons. The study argues that Turkey has important role in the field of drones and it also sheds light on Turkey's role in this field by clarifying its role in the conflicts to resolve in some areas, such as the Libyan and Azerbaijani conflicts. From a legal point of view, it is of course important in the study of drones. Ceran (2014) explains the drones from the point of view of international law. It aims to conduct a contemporary analysis of international law on the methods and means of war, and changes in war technology using military drone. The main analysis of this study is based on three fundamental angles of international law: international humanitarian law, international human rights law, and the fundamental principles of international law. In this study, the researcher analyzes the use of drones by discussing "targeted killing" because it is seen as one of the most major methods of armed use. The researcher uses humanitarian law in problems related to the distinction between civilians and combatants. The researcher explains that one of the most important discussions of the international community about drones is the violation of human rights, the "right to life" is the basic principle. The research also highlights the study of international law on the use of drones because methods of warfare change rapidly and of course the technology used in wars and conflicts. Basturk (2015) explains the intelligence and espionage aspect of drone technology, where he talks about drone technology in intelligence gathering. In this study the researcher explains the importance of drones in sending them to spy and reconnaissance instead of sending people and endangering their lives, as well as drones will be more accurate in collecting information, transmitting videos, and recording data. As for Terkan (2015), he explains that drones are one of the most important means of combating terrorism today. Drones are used in areas where terrorists are present, such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Yemen, and Somalia. FATA is the area where drones are used and where there are tangible results. The study explains the importance of drones and their importance in combating terrorism. The paper talks about the role of the United States, Israel, Turkey, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The study reveals the role of the US Central Intelligence Agency in its activities in espionage, reconnaissance, and attack on the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. The study presents a solution to combating terrorism with drones and developing drones in Turkey. As for Ozcan (2013), in his study, he explains and analyzes the role of military drones since the eighties in their struggle with terrorist groups. In this paper, he analyzes how the rugged terrain on the border between Turkey and Iraq creates a corridor for terrorist groups to cross. The researcher analyzes the role of drones' effectiveness in protecting the Turkish-Iraqi borders. Boyle

(2013) explains how the Obama administration was able to use drones against terrorist groups. It explains how it was effective in killing terrorist activists, and how it was more protective of civilians than other military weapons. The researcher analyzes the Obama administration's use of drones from the point of view that the United States of America using drones to achieve other goals, which are to provide a continuous flow of weapons and financial resources to build governments that systematically undermine their legitimacy. Kamaras (2021) explains and analyzes in this research paper how Turkey was able to do according to the wars in the conflict areas. The researcher also presents the reasons for delaying the procedures for imitating and neutralizing the development of the drone and the deployment of the main strategic competitor to Greece, Turkey, the researcher explains this during the period of escalating military tensions Between the two countries. The researcher also explains the political implications of this. Kreps (2016) points out in the book titled "Drones: What Everyone Needs to Know" that drones are considered the most transformative military innovation, so that humans no longer must engage in war and rely on weapons to control them from a distance. The book collects information about drones including the uses of drones, how they work, what they are, and who uses them. The author mentions about how technology has changed the shape of war, specifically drones. Maass (2015) points out in "From U-2s to Drones: U.S. Aerial Espionage and Targeted Killing during the Cold War and the War on Terror" that the United States, since the events of September 2001, has relied on launching its attacks on drones in the war on terrorism. This article includes a historical and legal view of the United States' use of drones against terrorist groups. The article also discusses in the use of drones what is better between what is necessary for security and what is better politically. The writer Faust (2016) explains the challenges that drones face in terms of privacy, airspace, and accidents. The author is talking about drones and how the armies have been using drones since the nineties. How is new technology for drones discovered daily? Boyle (2015) explains what military drones are, how they are used and how they work. The author explains that in recent years many countries have sought to arm themselves with unmanned aircraft and work on developing, producing, and selling them. The writer explains that from the point of view that this matter will have important and dangerous consequences for the international system, it will make the arms race on drones to reshape ongoing conflicts and competitions through 3 ways from the writer's point of view, the first, as he says: the proliferation of drones will lead to appear, reset the rules and laws that govern surveillance and reconnaissance. And two: drones will increasingly be useful to governments in strategic testing. Third: The author says that the spread of drones will double the risks of conflict spirals resulting from accidents or hijacked planes. Klinik & Celik (2021) in their book explains how Turkey managed to play an important role in the Nagorno-Karabakh war, which ended in favor of Azerbaijan. Turkey was able to play an important role in changing the rules of the game, by supporting Azerbaijan with drones in the conflict, which contributed greatly to Azerbaijan's victory. The book explains Turkey's political, military, and diplomatic contributions to Azerbaijan. The writer also explains the role and impact of military support for Turkey, specifically the

drones, on Azerbaijan's Nagorno-Karabakh. Sen & Akarlan (2020) explain the role of drones and their use for various purposes in recent years. It explains the role of drones in terrorist activities in conflict areas and Turkey, how governments confront with the use of military drones in terrorist acts, and analyzes the current anti-drone systems according to their capabilities. It aims to draw attention to those terrorist activities using drones and to guide the defense community about finding solutions to them.

3. Methodology

The study is qualitative research. The study uses case study and historical analysis to find out how technology has helped in military. The goal is to understand how Turkey's use of drones has evolved, how it has created a strong regional role for it, and how it has influenced Turkish foreign policy and created a balance of power in this field.

4. Turkish Military Drones and Creating a Stringer Role for Turkish Foreign Policy in the Region

Turkey has managed in the past several years to excel in the drone industry. And now it has become one of the leading countries that export these drones of various uses and different in their forms and effectiveness to many countries. These countries compete as the largest producer and user of this type of lethal aircraft. Turkey has moved from the stage of self-sufficiency in the production of aircraft engines "Drones" to exporting these engines abroad and entering the door of global competition in the field. This paper explains how Turkey not only manufactured and developed drones but also focused its military strategy on its military activity in the fields outside the lands. The Turkish military uses of drones were not only inside the country or in its war against the "PKK" but had an effective and successful role in resolving wars and battles in several other countries such as Syria, Libya and Azerbaijan. It reviews the Turkish military drone intervention in each of these countries.

4.1 Turkey and the war against the PKK

PKK has been waging terrorist campaigns against Turkey for four decades. Since its inception in the late seventies of the last century, the PKK has been a thorn in the side of successive Turkish governments. The party, which originated in the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, has waged an armed struggle against the Turkish government since 1984 as part of its efforts to obtain an independent state for the Kurds in Turkey. More than 40,000 people have died since the outbreak of the conflict between the two sides, which reached its climax in the mid-1990s. Thousands of Kurdish villages were destroyed in southeastern and eastern Turkey, forcing hundreds of thousands of Kurds to flee to other parts of Turkey. The research reviews the organization of the PKK, history and terrorist acts, and the role of the Turkish drone in the war against the PKK.

4.1.1 Who is PKK?

The party is listed as a "terrorist" organization in the United States, Turkey, and the European Union. It is a left-leaning

nationalist Kurdish political party. After its establishment, it turned into the most important political organization that leads an armed action, where it embraces the doctrine of violence. He enjoys the sympathy of many Turkish Kurds, workers, intellectuals, and peasants. PKK was secretly founded in 1978 by a group of Marxist students who were not influential in the Kurdish political arena, including Abdullah Ocalan, who was chosen as the party's leader, but the number of the party's members exceeded ten thousand fighters in the nineties. The organization initially sought to establish a joint independent entity in the Kurdish-controlled areas of Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran. The party adopts the Marxist-Leninist orientation, adopting the policy of violence in orientation. Among his core goals, which he announced at the beginning, is "the establishment of the independent Greater Kurdish State" (Zeidan, 2019).

4.1.2 Terrorist activity of the PKK

Since 1984, PKK launched its first terrorist act against Turkey where they targeted facilities, civilians, and government officials. The amount of violence during the year 1984 to the beginning of the nineties increased sharply. Whenever the PKK wanted to put pressure on Turkey politically, it would carry out intense terrorist activity to force it now to a political settlement. In 1985, Abdullah Ocalan established several Kurds (the Kurdish Parliament) to send them to Europe in order to obtain legitimacy and international recognition, and also to gain international pressure on Turkey for their political interests (Ünal, 2016).

The PKK resorted to carrying out various forms of terrorism. It provokes the ruling authority at the time through terrorist acts and intimidating the population. The eighties and nineties of the last century witnessed the bloodiest period of terrorism, which tracked down the militants, and was accused of destroying thousands of Kurdish villages and displacing many families to Turkey. Terrorist acts of the PKK were not limited to the Turkish army, but also included Turkish and Kurdish civilians, especially those collaborating with the Turkish government, as well as some foreign tourists. They have dealt blows to some Turkish interests in Western countries (Ünal, 2016).

Abdullah Ocalan was arrested when he was heading to the airport in the Kenyan capital, Nairobi, on February 15, 1999, after 15 years of terrorist action for being convicted of "betraying the country." He was sentenced to death in June of the same year, then the sentence was commuted from execution to life imprisonment. In March 2013, PKK officially announced a ceasefire, following Abdullah Ocalan's call to end. From his imprisonment, Ocalan called on to stop the fighting and withdraw from Turkey. "Today is the beginning of a new era, in which politics must prevail over weapons," he said in a message read in Diyarbakir, in the southeast of the country, adding, "Now we have reached a stage where armed elements must withdraw outside Turkey's borders." The period did not last long as PKK resumed terrorist acts and Turkish cities witnessed terrorism between 2014 and 2016 targeting institutions and tourist areas that left dozens of wounded and dead. But after the July 15 failed coup attempt in Turkey, the government arrested many opponents of it and launched a campaign against any critics of it, including the PKK, and it became

more resolute in the issue of its national security and launched an attack to drive the terrorists out of the region, and prevented anyone from allying with the PKK. The Turkish government has continued to counter terrorism operations of the PKK on a continuous basis to maintain its security, and it has continuously and actively maintained its military presence (Zeidan, 2019).

4.1.3 The role of the Turkish military drone in significantly reducing PKK terrorist attacks

Turkey has tried in the past to import drones from abroad or from countries that manufacture them, which has proven its superiority. For example, it requested drones from America, but the US Congress refused to supply drones to Turkey, because Turkey needs drones to be used in the war against the PKK and attacks from Syria and Iraq that threaten Turkey's security by the groups that America did not classify as a as terrorist organizations. Turkey tried again to import drones from Israel after it proved its success in the wars it carried out, but Israel took many years until it sent the Israeli drones to Turkey, but Turkey found that the planes have technical malfunctions and do not rise indefinitely. At that time, Turkey decided to turn to the manufacture of homemade aircraft, and it proved successful.

Turkey has changed its military strategy and has incorporated drones into counterterrorism operations because they are low-cost weapons and tools and enable them to gather intelligence in real time and to enable them to carry out precision strikes. Turkey began using the Turkish armed military drone in the counter terrorism against the PKK terrorist organization in 2015. The Turkish drone had a very effective role against the terrorist organization, as the drones restricted the movement of PKK fighters, and drones also had a strong role in the intelligence operation, which carried out immediate monitoring and was sending reports to the Turkish side about the movements of the PKK terrorists enabled the Turkish armed forces to identify the locations and hideouts of the PKK terrorists. The Turkish military drones were able to track down and target the senior cadres of the PKK, including Sofi Nouredine, the so called head of the PKK in Syria. Turkish drones targeted and killed him. Turkey has targeted and killed many PKK terrorists with Turkish drones like Salman Bozkur. He was working in illegal trade in Iraq and then became the head of a drunken camp in Iraq affiliated with the PKK. Turkish drones have the ability to identify the characteristics of fighters, the drone, through the screen in which it is located, evaluates the behavior patterns of individuals, and sends information directly to experts, who can distinguish between fighters and civilians. Through this technology, it was able to carry out successful military operations, for example, in the Ghar region of northern Iraq, it carried out an operation targeting 5 terrorists of the PKK (Cantenar, 2021).

Turkey's strategy against the PKK after 2015 was to launch drone attacks due to the weakened attacks. In its military strategy, Turkey was interested in military aviation, and was able, through domestically made drones, specifically, to excel in the air. In 2017, Turkey implemented its offensive plan. It carried out offensive operations inside and outside Turkey to combat terrorism. Several Turkish drone strikes have been carried out on PKK bases in northern Iraq and

northern Syria in areas, camps and hideouts of PKK terrorists. The strikes were to the point because they were the center of gravity. Most of the bases of the PKK were concentrated in those areas were setting up their bases and training camps and also storing their weapons in the steep terrain and places between Turkey and Iraq that were difficult to penetrate from the ground Turkish armed forces, and therefore these places were providing safe places for the PKK terrorists. Where the mountains and highlands are located from the Iraqi Iranian border towards the Turkish-Iraqi border. It helped the PKK to establish its bases there such as Qandil, Hakurk, Zap, Avashin Bassian, Matina, Hevtanin, Sinat, Gara, and Sinjar. But Turkey was able, through locally made drones, to launch targeted strikes on those places and hideouts, as they were the logistical and geopolitical hub for the PKK terrorists because it is between northern Iraq and northern Syria. Turkish military forces have not only expelled the fighters from their hideouts but also established checkpoints backed by Turkish drones. Where the Turkish forces can easily monitor the movements, these operations with military drones have enabled Turkey to militarily outperform the PKK. Through the drones, it was able to reconnaissance, surveillance, monitoring and destruction of the bases and the PKK terrorists, and it was able, through reconnaissance operations, to provide support to the Turkish ground forces, and thus helped them in targeting the fighters (Öztürk, 2020).

The Turkish drone had a major role in monitoring the terrorist acts of the PKK along the border, which enabled the Turkish military forces to achieve military success against the PKK terrorists continuously. The Turkish drones contributed very successfully and greatly to the success of preventing the PKK terrorists from establishing camps for them or creating places to hide, and even were on the lookout for them, as they prevented them from infiltrating and entering Turkey. The Turkish military forces were able, through the Turkish drones, to carry out two military operations using the Turkish military drones against the PKK, these operations were in northern Syria and northern Iraq in the year between 2018-2019, the operations were Operation Olive Branch and Operation Peace Spring. The purpose of these operations by Turkey was to help it prevent the PKK terrorists from establishing a corridor along the Turkish-Syrian border. And it was able to reduce the number of PKK terrorists and terrorists by 83% (Pusane, 2021).

The Turkish military forces were able to eradicate and expel the PKK terrorists after the attacks launched by the Turkish drones on the camps of Hakurk, Hevtanin, Matina, Avashin Bassian and Sinat. This made the Turkish Air Force largely overcome the hideouts and training places of the PKK terrorists and made them unable to launch any attacks against the Turkish side (Ozkizilcik, 2021).

The Turkish military drones had the greatest credit for the victory in their military operations against the PKK. The drones carried out intelligence operations from reconnaissance and knowledge of the locations of the combatant members, as well as sending reports in real time, which helped the Turkish armed forces from the attack. It prevented her from setting up new camps. It targeted the major leaders or the head of the party and thus weakened it.

If a comparison is made between combat drones and helicopters, attack drones cost less in their sorties than helicopters. Also, drones are difficult for fighters to detect and thus bring down, unlike helicopters, and it is also difficult to monitor them through weapons or other devices. The drone also reduces human losses, as if the drone falls, there will be no casualties, death, or hostages. The planes could also have slowed the defense of the PKK terrorists (Öztürk, 2020).

4.2 The role of Turkish military drones in Idlib

The year 2011 witnessed the so called 'Arab Spring'. When the Arab Spring took place in Tunisia and overthrew Ben Ali, then it flared up in Egypt and overthrew Mubarak, then it moved to Syrian demanding freedoms and rights first but evolved to demand the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad's regime.

4.2.1 The situation in Syria

The response of Bashar al-Assad's government to the demonstrators was never peaceful, as the number of deaths, detainees and enforced disappearances increased dramatically. Until this time, it did not indicate the path of those who were forcibly disappeared. After the Syrian government's harsh response to the demands of the Syrian opposition, the situation in Syria turned into a civil war, as the Syrian opposition realized that peace with Bashar al-Assad's regime was futile, so the situation worsened, and opposition factions supported by the United States in the first two years formed the Free Syrian Army, which was leads the opposition. Although the Free Syrian Army was armed, it was the only armed group with legitimacy in Syria. But later, DAESH emerged in Syria to join the civil war. It was able to control areas previously controlled by the Free Syrian Army. It emerged after the United States of America stopped its support for the Free Syrian Army and became supportive of the PKK and the Syrian branch YPG. Later, Russia and Iran joined in intensively supporting the Bashar al-Assad regime against the armed groups in Syria and the opposition factions. Turkey was supporting the Arab Spring revolutions and their demands. Where in 2016, Turkey and the Free Syrian Army conducted Operation Euphrates Shield (ESO) in Syria, which was against DAESH and against the PKK. The Free Syrian Army was able to obtain once again the areas that had been seized by terrorist groups, such as the Aziz-Jarablus-Al-Bab line (Güler& İpek, 2021).

Russia realized that Turkey's support for the opposition factions was a danger to it. Because it does not want the opposition factions to triumph over the regime of Bashar al-Assad, as it had fears that the opposition would come to power with the support of Turkey. Russia decided to make an agreement with the Turkish government. That is, a cease-fire agreement is signed between Turkey and Russia in Syria. In 2017, Russia, Turkey and Iran signed the "Astana" agreement and declared de-escalation zones, which aimed to reduce the area and reduce the degree of conflict in Syria (Bakeer, 2020).

At the time, Turkey was considered the protector of the opposition factions in Syria, and among the de-escalation zones was the city of Idlib, which was also considered by

Turkey as its protector. Turkey carried out Operation Olive Branch to secure the area. It launched a drone attack on the areas controlled by the PKK and was able to prevent the PKK from controlling the coast and prevented the PKK terrorists from building a corridor. Along the Syrian-Turkish border. It secured its borders and secured the city of Idlib (Pusane, 2021).

The agreement on the boundaries and conditions of the de-escalation zone in Idlib was reached in Turkish-Russian talks in Sochi, September 2018. The official text of the Sochi Agreement was not published by any of its parties, but some of the understandings included in the agreement were known directly or indirectly. The agreement includes that the regime of Bashar al-Assad will be prevented from displacing millions of Syrians towards the Turkish border (Bakeer, 2020).

4.2.2 The Syrian regime's attack on Idlib

In 2020, the Syrian regime forces, with Russian and Iranian support, launched an attack and regained many areas that they had lost after the outbreak of the Syrian revolution. The opposition factions were left with only some scattered areas, especially in Idlib governorate in the north of the country. Despite Turkey's efforts to limit the Syrian regime's attacks on civilians by signing agreements to reduce escalation in Astana in 2017, and in Sochi in 2018, the regime forces launched several attacks, during which they were able to nibble the areas subject to the gradual de-escalation, and it became clear that the regime, and from Behind him, Russia and Iran, they bypassed those agreements, and they took advantage of them to prepare for new military operations to liquidate what was left of the Syrian revolution. Indeed, the opposition lost areas such as Eastern Ghouta in Damascus, Daraa in the south, and the northern countryside of Homs, and the Syrian regime relied on a scorched-earth strategy, by launching air strikes and targeting hospitals and power stations to force the opposition's militants to withdraw, given that it does not have aircraft or air defense systems. These attacks resulted in the displacement of hundreds of thousands, who preferred displacement to remain under the control of the regime, since the latter usually launched massive revenge campaigns from the population and forced young people in those areas to recruit in its ranks, and therefore the displaced crowded into the rest of Idlib governorate. But the regime forces then launched attacks to regain control of the entire province, and indeed entered the city of Saraqib, Maarat al-Numan and other large areas in early 2020, which would have meant a major humanitarian catastrophe, as it would have meant the displacement of millions to the Turkish borders, as well as thousands of casualties (Güler& İpek, 2021).

4.2.3 Turkish counterterrorism operation in Idlib

For these reasons, the Turkish counterterrorism operation in February 2020 gained great importance in thwarting that plan. At the dawn of March 1, 2020, Turkey launched Operation Spring Shield in the Idlib region, northwest Syria. The operation came weeks after the large Turkish military build-up in the vicinity of the Syrian governorate, or what was left of it under the control of the armed opposition, weeks after the advance of the Syrian regime forces and associated militias in what has been known since September

2018 as the de-escalation zone. The operation also came just two days after the Syrian regime forces targeted a Turkish mobile military convoy in the vicinity of Idlib, leaving 36 dead and dozens wounded among the ranks of the Turkish force. The offensive of the Syrian regime forces gave Turkey a strong boost to Ankara's announcement of military intervention. The de-escalation zone, which Turkey participates in supervising, included most of Idlib governorate, parts of the northern countryside of Hama and the south-western countryside of Aleppo, provided that Turkish military observation points would be established in the entire vicinity of the area to ensure the ceasefire and the implementation of other understandings regarding the area. And because the region embraces not only its residents, but also hundreds of thousands of displaced people from other Syrian regions, the security and safety of the population has become a vital issue for Turkey, which fears the influx of another wave of Syrian refugees across the border, in addition to the three and a half million Syrian refugees, which it has been hosting for years. Ankara also fears that the loss of Idlib may lead to a Syrian-Russian demand to evacuate the areas under direct Turkish administration in Al-Bab, Jarablus, Afrin and east of the Euphrates, which will lead to a direct threat to Turkish national security, if Syria remains an arena of conflict and the armed groups linked to the PKK remain. Active in more than one Syrian region. However, the regime forces launched several attacks, during which they managed to nibble the areas subject to the gradual de-escalation, and it became clear that the regime, and behind its Russia and Iran, exceeded those agreements (Bakeer, 2020).

4.2.4 Turkish military drones in Idlib

Turkey did not withdraw and decided to respond to these attacks. Where the Turkish military forces carried out "Operation Spring Shield" and carried out a large-scale bombing of the sites, mechanisms, camps and warehouses of the Syrian regime forces and the associated Iranian militias, Turkey launched this bombing using and relying mainly on Turkish military drones in aerial bombardments. Although Russia controlled the Syrian airspace, due to the genius of Turkish aircraft, Turkey was able to largely destroy the equipment, devices and weapons of the Syrian military forces affiliated with the Assad regime. It used Turkish Anka-S and Bayraktar (UCAV) aircraft, both of which are Turkish-made. Bayraktar is the most famous Turkish-made drone because it is considered a tactical aircraft. The Turkish military has used the Anka-S aircraft for surveillance, espionage, and attacks as well because it is considered more flexible than Bayraktar. Turkey's losses in its drone during Operation Spring Shield are considered very small. The Turkish bombardment inflicted heavy losses on the Syrian regime forces, Hezbollah members and the Shiite militias led by officers from the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, weakening these forces and their ability to fight and withstand (Crino & Dreby 2020).

At the time, the Turkish Minister of Defense, Hulusi Akar, who was also the chief of staff of the Turkish army before his appointment as defense minister, and who is supervising the "Spring Shield" operation, said that the goal of the operation is to secure the Turkish observation points, secure the borders, and maintain the security and safety of civilians

in Idlib, forcing the regime to respect the Sochi Agreement and return its forces to behind the de-escalation zone lines (Daily Sabah, 2020).

The Turkish Air Force launched an air attack with Turkish military drones for three days against the Syrian and Russian military forces. The Turkish Air Force showed great efficiency, revealing superior firepower. The Turkish drones were able to prove and achieve a resounding success in that operation, as Turkish drones shot down two Sukhoi planes of the Syrian regime without penetrating Syria's airspace. Then a third warplane was shot down. The Turkish drones destroyed dozens of tanks, fighting vehicles and self-propelled guns. This led the regime to retreat from deploying its air force on the battlefield, and Turkish fire control helped the armed opposition forces advance on more than one active frontline, including Jabal al-Zawiya, southern Idlib, and Aleppo countryside. Monitoring Syrian military contacts carried out by opposition groups revealed great panic among the regime forces and the militias associated with it. The regime and the Shiite militias, under heavy Russian air cover, attempted to retake the city of Saraqib. But the attempt faltered, after the opposition militants inflicted heavy losses on the regime forces, backed by Turkish drones (Roblin, 2020). The facilities of the Syrian Nairab military airport were destroyed, and the airport was completely out of action (Haaretz, 2020).

The Iranian Center for Military Advisers in Syria issued a statement blaming Turkey for targeting the sites of Shiite militias led by Iranian advisors. What was understood from the Iranian statement is that Iran and its allies are determined to continue participating in the Syrian regime's military efforts (Rudaw, 2020). Moscow also issued A vague statement on the evening of the first day of the Turkish operation says that Russia will not be able to guarantee the security of Turkish aircraft after Damascus announced the closure of the airspace in the de-escalation zone, and what was understood from Moscow's statement that Russian aviation will return to flying in the de-escalation zone and providing support to the regime forces after the absence of The first five days, which will make it difficult for Turkey to target the planes of the Syrian regime, or for Turkish aircraft to fly in the skies of the de-escalation zone (Reuters, 2020).

Turkey was able to achieve a victory using Turkish military drones over the Syrian forces backed by Russia and the Shiite militias. It also forced the regime to stop its military campaign and sign a ceasefire agreement in March 2020, in addition to providing for the protection of civilians, an end to their suffering, and the delivery of humanitarian aid to the displaced. Several displaced people have returned to their homes. Turkey has warned the Syrian regime against violating that truce and has threatened to intervene more than once if that happens (Roth, 2020).

The Turkish intervention also created an image of Turkey as a protector of civilians, while the regime did not shy away from killing and displacing its citizens. The bombing of Turkish drones by the regime forces, as these scenes were unfamiliar to the regime forces, which have been practicing this action against civilians by bombing them with barrel

bombs for years, considering the civilians' inability to respond.

Through the domestically made Turkish Anka-S and Bayraktar TB2 drones, Turkey was able to turn into the second largest user of drones in the world. Turkey, in Operation Spring Shield, presented the world with a new military genius and doctrine. Turkish homemade drones were able to overcome the enemy's defenses and inflict great damage on it, and this was without the need for a large air force. Turkey launched a powerful air attack without breaking into Syrian airspace, using radar-guided missiles. The drone strikes were very accurate, good and accurate. Turkey's powerful air offensive against Bashar al-Assad's regime has put Russia in a very awkward position. Because the systems and technology used by the Syrian defense system are Russian made. This put Russia in a position of humiliation because Turkey was able to outperform the Russian Pantsir system. The Russian defense system is characterized by being of high accuracy because it was designed to protect air and land facilities targeted by enemy air attacks. The Turkish drones were able to destroy the Pantsir system forcefully. This strengthened the Turkish domestic drones, and distorted Russian defense technology not only to Turkey and Syria, but to the world, because many countries around the world have purchased the Pantsir system from Russia. The success of Turkish drones in Operation Spring Shield in Syria is credited to the KORALEWS system, which was developed by Turkey's ASELSAN. As the KORAL system is considered to have multiple functions, as it can perform difficult and complex operations, it determines the direction of different types of radar signals at the same time and is also based on its classification and to which party it belongs. The KORAL system uses deception, confusion, and paralysis of the enemy's defense systems. In this way, Turkey was able to surpass the Russian defense technology, as Turkey blinded the Russian radar systems (Bakeer, 2020).

4.3 The role of the Turkish drones in the Libyan civil war

The situation in the countries of the Arab Spring revolutions before the revolutions was suffering from dictatorial governments and the suppression of freedoms, and it was devoid of any human justice. Therefore, the so called 'Arab Spring' took place to improve the situation in the country. The beginning of the flame was from Tunisia, and Tunisia was able at that time to overthrow the Tunisian government, then it moved to Egypt and the people were able to overthrow the ruling regime. Then the revolution moved to Syria, but it was not a successful revolution. Rather, the situation turned for the worse, and it was the beginning of a new civil war. Bashar al-Assad did not tolerate peaceful demonstrators. Then the revolution broke out in Libya and lasted for a while until it was able to overthrow the regime of Muammar Gaddafi, who ruled the country at the time, but it also turned into a civil war.

The Libyan revolution began peaceful, but the regime's repression prompted it to take up arms and internationalize, as the peaceful demonstrations of Libyan cities demanding freedom and change had turned into an armed uprising in

response to the armed repression of Gaddafi's forces. After the massive number of weapons attacks launched by Gaddafi against the opposition, the Security Council passed a law imposing an embargo on Libya, for example establishing a no-fly zone to prevent Gaddafi from launching attacks against the opposition. The decision led to the ban on flights, only flights carrying humanitarian aid were allowed. The Security Council froze all the assets of the oil and the Central Bank. He paved the way for the international military intervention against Gaddafi. Indeed, the international military intervention led by NATO took place from March 2011 until October of the same year with the death of Gaddafi (Özpek & Demirağ, 2014).

4.3.1 The situation in Libya after the fall of Gaddafi

Almost a year after the fall and death of Muammar Gaddafi, the General National Congress was elected to replace the Transitional National Council, which was established after the fall of the Gaddafi regime. But the General National Congress failed to establish security stability for the country. Various other militias took over parts of the country and declared them the de facto rulers of those parts. By the end of 2015, Libya had two parliaments and two governments. In contrast to the pro-Islamist legislative and executive authorities in Tripoli, I worked in Tobruk (eastern Libya), with the support of the army of Khalifa Haftar, a former general in Gaddafi's army, an internationally recognized government and parliament elected in general elections. But in 2016, the Government of National Accord was established, which is supported by the United Nations, headed by Fayez Al-Sarraj, which began its work in the capital, Tripoli, in March of the same year. The United Nations and the European Union signed a statement supporting and confirming that the Government of National Accord is the legitimate government in Libya. It was not only the United Nations and the European Union that supported the Government of National Accord, but also Italy and Turkey. In 2017, Turkey sent weapons to Tripoli to the Government of National Accord to support it against Haftar. On the other hand, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Russia were providing military support and assistance to Haftar in order to achieve victory and overthrow the Government of National Accord. These countries have provided military support to Haftar despite the embargo, which called on Turkey to provide support to the forces of the Government of National Accord (Tekir, 2020).

Libya is very important to Turkey, as in the old days Libya was part of the Ottoman Empire. The oil and gas in Libya are important to Turkey. Economically, there is trade between Turkey and Libya, as the trade price between them is two and three billion dollars annually. Turkey is also a major ally of the Government of National Accord. Turkey is also interested in the Libyan revolution by demarcating the border with Libya (Shay, 2019).

4.3.2 The civilwar in Libya and the role of Turkish drones

The militias of retired Libyan Major General Khalifa Haftar launched a massive air attack on the capital, Tripoli, in April 2019. These air attacks took place with the help and support of Egypt, the UAE and Russia. To control the entire country.

This led to the outbreak of battles that affected tens of thousands of civilians. Haftar's forces were a few kilometers away from the center of the capital to the extent that intelligence sources spoke of a plan to evacuate members of the Government of National Accord (GNA) from Tripoli, after the superiority of Haftar's militias, backed by Russian Wagner Group mercenaries, in addition to the support they receive from Egypt, the Emirates, France and Russia (Shay, 2019).

But the course of the battles changed after the intervention of Turkish drones, as Turkish drones were able to resolve the war in Libya, according to the military agreement between the internationally recognized Government of National Accord and the Turkish government, in addition to the signing of an agreement to demarcate the maritime borders in the Mediterranean between Turkey and Libya, i.e. between the President Erdogan and the internationally recognized Government of National Accord, as shown in Figure 4, an agreement that Turkey has long sought since before the outbreak of the Libyan revolution. The border demarcation agreement is important for Turkey because it gives Turkey the political and legal right in the eastern Mediterranean and also guarantees its rights. When its own ships are excavating, Greece also prevents it from demarcating the borders with Egypt and Greek Cyprus because this will make the Turkish region located on the Gulf of Antalya short, and also that the border demarcation agreement is important for Turkey because it will increase its influence on the geopolitics in the eastern Mediterranean and will thwart plans to isolate Turkey, just as the agreement makes Turkey a trump card in any upcoming dialogue regarding its rights as well as the future of Libya. B to pass through Turkey because it is considered the safest and safest option after attempts to deprive Turkey of linking the eastern Mediterranean gas fields to European markets. Figure 5 shows cooperation in the field of gas in the eastern Mediterranean. Turkey was the only country officially recognized for its intervention in Libya. Turkey has provided military aid to the Government of National Accord, such as armored vehicles, anti-armor missiles, and drones; This is according to a joint defense agreement announced by Erdogan, in July 2019, when he said: "We have concluded a military cooperation agreement with Libya, and we will provide them with weapons if they request and pay for them, as they have faced a problem in terms of meeting their defense needs." This agreement allows Turkey to build military bases in Libya, and Turkey can be allowed through that agreement to use the Libyan airspace, and Turkey can also, through that agreement, enter Libyan regional waters (Al-Rantisi, 2019).

4.3.3 Turkish Drones decided the war in Libya in favor of GNA

Turkish-made drones played a major role in the Libyan war, as they are considered the main reason for the success and superiority of the Government of National Accord over Haftar. Where it was able to resolve the battle in favor of the Government of National Accord. Libya is considered a desert country, so land defense weapons will not have a good result compared to air defense weapons, Salah Bakush, a Libyan political analyst, and former advisor to the Libyan Supreme Council of State: "Libya is a vast country with

open spaces and semi-desert areas even in coastal areas where no one can hide movements Troops. In this case, you need a lot of air cover to survive militarily. If you don't have air cover, you will be easily rammed by the other side with better air power. That's what happened to us until we got the Turkish drones." Speaking of the Turkish drones Turkey sent to help Tripoli, Fathi Boushagha, who was the interior minister in the Government of National Accord, said: "We rescued the Turks at the right time." Officials in Libya admitted that had it not been for the intervention of the Turkish Drones in the war, the war would have been resolved in favor of Haftar and his supporters, as before the intervention of the Turkish Drones, the air forces of Haftar or those supporting him were able to destroy and cause great chaos in the forces and lives of the Government of National Accord. But the Turkish Drones intervened at the right time and were able to resolve the battle in favor of the Government of National Accord, which was on the verge of losing had it not been for the Turkish Air Force and the Turkish Drones. This enabled the Government of National Accord to control a number of Libyan cities. Like what happened in Syria, Turkish air attack systems and Turkish drones were able to destroy the highly accurate Russian Pantsir air defense system, and even blinded it and launched attacks on it, enabling it to destroy it completely. The Turkish drones also destroyed a wide range of sites, fortifications, weapons, and systems affiliated with Haftar's militia, forcing it to withdraw permanently from its positions south of Tripoli, in addition to the Al-Wattia base and the city of Tarhuna (Sofuoğlu, 2020). This forced Haftar and his supporters to establish a permanent armistice in October 2020, as the Libyan parties engaged in political negotiations, which made great progress, represented in setting the dates of the elections, approving the constitution, and electing a new executive authority (Aljazera, 2020).

During those months, Haftar's militias tried to abort any political progress and threatened to continue the battles. Haftar threatened to target the Turkish forces operating in Libya, but Turkey issued warnings that led to Haftar's retreat from his plans. About her soldiers and her allies (Güler, 2020). In the end, the Government of National Accord was able to achieve victories thanks to the military support and military air support through the Turkish-made drones that Turkey sent to the Government of National Accord and enabled it to regain some Libyan cities and defeat Haftar and his supporters Egypt, the Emirates and Russia and destroyed the Russian defense weapons and thwarted any hopes They must conquer Tripoli.

4.4 The role of the Turkish Drones in the Armenian-Azerbaijani war

The conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan dates to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, as Nagorno-Karabakh is a disputed region between the Azerbaijani and Armenian governments. The conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan are due to religious, ethnic, and national reasons, borders and institutions, as well as factors related to the Soviet past (Smith, 2003). Despite the many attempts to try to find a solution to the conflict between them, including the attempt to reform step by step and a comprehensive solution, as well as the solution of the joint state, as well as the

integration of Nagorno-Karabakh into Azerbaijan and granting it autonomy. Unfortunately, none of the attempts or solutions succeeded (Carter & Turnock, 2000). Azerbaijan and Armenia concluded an armistice in 1994, as the Minsk Group of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), headed by the United States, France and Russia, made attempts to find a solution and mediate but did not. The problems between Armenia and Azerbaijan end despite the existence of the armistice and despite all the mediation and the proposals of the Minsk Group (Askerov, 2020), but there were also major clashes between them in 2016, which was called the "Four-Day War" (Shiriyev, 2017).

In 2020, there were clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan due to the dispute over the control of Nagorno-Karabakh. The clashes lasted about 40 days and led to many deaths and casualties on both sides. Azerbaijan seized the city of Shusha, which is of strategic importance, and withdrew from the entire Karabakh region. Armenia was able to win the battle in its favour, and they concluded a peace treaty. The agreement gave Azerbaijan the right to keep the regions of Fuzuli, Gabriel, Zangelan and Kobatli, which it liberated from the Armenians, and made Armenia withdraw from the cities of Agdam, Lachin and Kalbajar. Azerbaijan was able to restore and liberate 7 regions of the Armenians (Caliskan, 2020).

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4.4.1 Turkish role in Azerbaijan-Armenia war

Azerbaijan has strengthened itself militarily before the 2020 clashes, as it increased support for its ground forces and worked to strengthen the structure of its air force, importing drones, attack helicopters, mortars, rocket launchers, anti-tank missiles and ballistic missiles, in addition to various air defense systems, support aircraft and combat tanks as well (Özgen, 2021). Because the Minsk Group could not implement the Security Council resolutions on the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and the failure of all negotiations that lasted for thirty years, and also because of the Corona pandemic, countries gave priority to COVID-19 and ignored the issue of Azerbaijan and Armenia. Azerbaijan has lost confidence in the international community. At this time, Turkey appeared and provided support to Azerbaijan (Gundem, 2020).

Despite the old war between the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis, they could not resolve any conflicts in the past because both depended on the Soviet military legacy of the last century. But what turned the scales of the game was that

Azerbaijan decided to use modern weapons and military equipment instead of the Soviet heritage, while Armenia relied on this legacy in the war. As Azerbaijan has relied on the senior Turkish military in its strategies and in the plans and operations carried out by Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan was able to excel militarily because of direct Turkish support. Turkey and Azerbaijan have a special relationship between the two countries based on ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic affiliations, and Azerbaijan is a strategic partner for Turkey, so Turkey has increased Azerbaijan with all its military resources (Kramer, 2021).

The military support provided by Turkey to Azerbaijan is the main reason and the most important factor in resolving the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in favor of Azerbaijan. Turkey provided military support to Azerbaijan in accordance with the Strategic Partnership and Mutual Assistance Agreement between them. Turkey and Azerbaijan pledged to exchange all means in case of aggression, threat or attack from any third party. They signed this agreement in 2010. Based on this agreement, Turkey provided political support, Military and diplomatic for Azerbaijan. Turkey has given statements that it will provide all support to Azerbaijan so that it can resolve the conflict in its favor (Yalçınkaya, 2021).

4.4.2 The role of the Turkish drones in resolving the II Nagorno-Karabakh War

The Turkish-made drones were able to resolve the conflict in favor of Azerbaijan, and they had a major role in the offensive operations against the Armenian forces. Turkish drones were also able to play a prominent role in the war and made Azerbaijan win the war. (Gatopoulos, A (2020) Azerbaijani President Aliyev himself praised Turkish drones as paving the way for Azerbaijan to win the war and praised Turkey's strength and military capacity. Many analysts also emphasized that Azerbaijan was able to win thanks to Turkish military technology and tactics (Synovitz, 2020). According to several reports, military analysts emphasized that Azerbaijan was keen to use Turkish drones because it knows that it will win the war on Armenia, and that the drones will give Azerbaijan a military balance in its favor in the region (Ozdemir, 2020). Turkey presented a complete robotic warfare doctrine to the strategic partner Azerbaijan and the concept of operation (CONOPS), and also gave it Bayraktar TB2 (Kasapoglu, 2020).

Through the Turkish TB2 drones, Azerbaijan managed to attack the enemy defenses in Nagorno-Karabakh and destroyed them. The Turkish drones were also able to carry out the operations of identifying and targeting targets without human intervention in an accurate manner. Azerbaijan has installed video cameras in Turkish planes to film and broadcast its offensive operations against Armenia. Armenia used traditional military defense methods and relied on trenches, while Azerbaijan used Turkish drones, which proved their technical superiority over the Russian defense equipment used by Armenia (Shaikh & Rumbaugh, 2020).

Turkish-made TB2 drones destroyed the equipment and weapons of the Armenian army. The Turkish drones initially eliminated the Russian-made Armenian air defense systems. The drones destroyed the early warning radars. In addition to

establishing a maneuvering area for unmanned aircraft. It carried out massive drone attacks against the Armenian ground forces. The Armenian ground forces were deprived of the umbrella of their air defense, and therefore the Drones were able to gather intelligence and then launched a strong and successful attack on the Armenian strategic elements. The Turkish drones proved the success of their high performance in resolving the battle in favor of Azerbaijan, as they were able to outperform the Russian air defense systems that Armenia used and destroyed, which forced the Armenian forces to withdraw gradually until the victory was crowned with the signing of an agreement stipulating the restoration of Azerbaijan control over all its seven regions, which were Occupied by Armenia, as well as the liberation of more than half of the breakaway Nagorno-Karabakh region. The Turkish drones also played another role, which is to reduce the losses in the ranks of the Azerbaijani army to a large extent, according to the Azeri president (Koker, 2020). The Turkish drones relentlessly hit the Armenian targets, including the ground defense equipment and air systems, and the Azerbaijani Air Force sent a cutting radar to the Armenian side by firing crop flicks, and indeed the Armenian defense systems swallowed the bait and revealed their location, attacked, and destroyed them Turkish Drones by TB2s (Witt, 2022).

Turkish-made drones were able to reveal the failure of Russian defense weapons in Armenia, as Turkish drones destroyed dozens of Russian and Azerbaijani Pantsir air defense systems, as well as Azerbaijan destroyed the Russian S-300 air defense system in Armenia (Grynszpan, 2020). It provoked anger from Russia in Armenia after the heavy losses it had suffered. This was evident in criticism of the Russian weapons and their ineffectiveness by Armenian political and military officials, and even the Armenian Prime Minister himself, who criticized the Russian Iskander missiles, stressing that they were useless. The interest also stressed that the Russian-made electronic systems did not work and did not secure the airspace of Armenia, and that the Russian "Repellent" anti-drone systems were destroyed, which led to a political crisis in Armenia between the government and the army as well as a crisis between the Armenian government and its Russian counterpart on the other hand, and created questions On the part of analysts and research centers, about the impact of Russian arms sales after this disappointing performance, and led to concern and anger among the Russian leadership about Turkey's thwarting its plans in more than one country (Sputnik, 2021).

4.5 The role of Turkish drones for Ukraine

4.5.1 The Russian-Ukrainian conflict

Throughout history, Russian-Ukrainian relations have gone through stages of conflicts, tensions, and stability since the seventeenth century. Since the relationship between Russia and Ukraine dates back hundreds of years, both countries have roots in the East Slavic state called "Kyiv Rus". Thus, according to history, the course of Russia and Ukraine was different throughout history, which led to the emergence of two different languages and two different cultures. During the seventeenth century, a large area of Ukraine was part of the Russian Empire. When the Russian Empire fell, Ukraine

was able to become independent from Russia, and then Soviet Russia arose and occupied Ukraine again and annexed it. Then Ukraine and Belarus were able to secede from the Soviet Union and thus led to the disintegration of the Soviet Union. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the relationship between the two countries has been marred by stability and cooperation. In 1997, Russia recognized the borders of Ukraine, which included the Crimea, most of whose residents are Russians (TheTimes of India, 2022). Ukraine tried to join NATO but failed in joining due to Russia's refusal. It tried to join the West. In 2013, Ukraine signed a cooperation agreement with the European Union, but it was later frozen due to what Russia did of economic restrictions on imports To Ukraine The indirect war between Russia and Ukraine began in 2014, when Russia sought to annex the Crimea. At the same time, the Russian forces mobilized the Donbas region in eastern Ukraine, then declared two people's republics in Donetsk and Luhansk, headed by the Russians. Then they tried to conclude the Minsk Agreement It did not work and then they concluded the Minsk Agreement 2 and so far it has not been implemented. Russia always refuses and requests not to allow Ukraine to join NATO, as according to the NATO agreement that any military attack against any member of NATO is considered an attack on the alliance as a whole. And therefore Russia is afraid of Ukraine joining the alliance NATO, as this will prevent it from launching any military attack on Ukraine because it will face the entire alliance countries (Fitzgerald, 2022).

In late 2021, aerial footage showed Russian heavy weapons heading to the Ukrainian border, and a crowd of soldiers, and this was repeated in 2022, as the Russian armies worked to supply the Ukrainian border with thousands of soldiers, and this is considered a warning of the outbreak of a new war. After the Russian army was deployed to the Ukrainian border, Putin denied the Russian president intending to invade Ukraine. But in February 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine (Lister et al., 2022).

4.5.2 The role of the Turkish drone in the Russian-Ukrainian war

Before Russia invaded Ukraine in 2019, Ukraine had purchased nearly 12 Turkish-made TB2 systems, as Ukraine was one of the first countries to purchase Turkish TB2 drones. The Ukrainian government has also allocated land for Turkish drone manufacturing facilities locally as the two countries plan to expand cooperation in the defense industry (Honrada, 2022).

Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drones were able to play a good and tactical role for Ukraine in the Russian invasion of Ukraine. As the Turkish TB2 combat planes are able to carry many munitions, as they can carry four laser-guided munitions, and these laser munitions have good effectiveness in directing the target to ground targets, they can target military equipment on the ground such as Russian tanks, but also target systems Mobile air defense. Bayraktar planes may help Kyiv in draining the Russian army in a long-term war. Given its high advantages, the TB2 can fly for 186 miles and for a period of 27 hours. It can carry four smart munitions, or up to 330 pounds of explosives. The TB2 is fully automated without human control. The TB2 can

provide good air support to Ukraine, as it can fire in depth, as well as transport ammunition for its artillery and supply lines. This is considered important because it slows and impedes the progress of the Russian army. Although the TB2 has a slow speed and low altitude, this makes it a special aircraft, as described by Doug Berkey, Executive Director of the Mitchell Institute for Space Studies, who saw that it could establish a specific area in a specific place and at the right time (Johnson, 2022).

Turkish-made drones were able to play a strong, prominent, and essential role in favor of Ukraine after the Russian invasion. The Turkish drones inflicted great losses on the Russian defense side. As it managed to sink the Russian cruiser, it also managed to cause great damage to the Russian ships (Honrada, 2022). Turkish TB2s destroyed Russian missile batteries and disrupted Russian supply lines by bombing trucks (Witt, 2022).

Bayraktar TB2 Turkish-made attack aircraft in Ukraine can be completely hidden and isolated, and they are fully automated. Expectations at the beginning of the war were that these planes would not survive and all of them would fall within hours, but Bayraktar TB2 was able to fly for long periods, and it also launched missiles in a targeted and accurate manner at Russian defense systems such as Russian missile launchers and tanks, and at a very important target, which is supply trains Russian. Many military analysts also confirmed that the Turkish-made drones that Ukraine used were able to achieve success for the Ukrainian side, and even achieved success for the Ukrainian side and air superiority over its Russian counterpart. Turkish Drones gave the Ukrainian people a boost in their morale, as they composed songs about the Bayraktar drone because of their joy at its effectiveness against the Russian invasion. Ukraine, using Turkish drones, launched attacks on Russian military convoys. Because of the Turkish-made drones, Ukraine was able to control and dominate the Ukrainian airspace, which prevented Russia from sending its drones to monitor the Ukrainian side of the land. Because of the Bayraktar's control of the airspace, this made Russia falter, losses in its line increased, and it lost many weapons such as tanks, missile launchers and supply trucks (Philipps & Schmitt, 2022).

4.6 Turkish Drones in Turkish foreign policy

Turkey has adopted Realism and has relied in her foreign policy on military force and has recently relied heavily on Turkish-made drones. It was clear Turkey's interest in this aspect of its defense policy, and its desire to exploit it to strengthen its relationship with its allies and gain new allies. Where the research reviewed how Turkey applied a principle of realism, which is to focus on its hard power after the threats it faced internally and externally to maintain its security, and Turkish-made drones participated in several conflicts and carried out military operations, in Syria, Libya and Azerbaijan. The Turkish strategic deterrence is part of the strategy explained by Ahmet Davutoglu, the then Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, and former Turkish Prime Minister, and is based mainly on the idea that the influential position that Turkey should assume on the regional and international scene requires the Turkish society

and the state to reinterpret history and geography according to a self-awareness of existence. Psychologically aware of the distinctiveness of the Turkish element, as well as the importance that history and geography have given it; Therefore, the strategy does not stop at searching only for optimal ways to secure Turkish national security, but also how Turkey uses its historical and geographic heritage in its foreign policy to achieve its appropriate regional and international status (Kasapoglu, 2012).

It is obvious that the successive events during the past decade led to an increase in the threats facing Turkey both internally and externally. Internally, Turkey has suffered from terrorist operations carried out by armed groups, most notably the DAESH and the PKK. Externally, the explosion of the situation in Syria has led to waves of displacement of millions of Syrians to Turkish territory, as well as the establishment of military bases on Turkey's borders by foreign powers, such as the United States and Russia (Haugom, 2019), as well as the presence of Iranian militias that control a number of From the regime's areas, Kurdish forces control nearly a third of Syria's area, including the oil-rich areas, and are trying to establish a national homeland for the Kurds on Turkey's borders, which represents a major threat to Turkish national security (Said, 2017). The air campaign with drones on Tripoli would not have failed without the Turkish military intervention in support of the Government of National Accord, and the regime forces' campaign to control Idlib would not have stopped had it not been for the intense Turkish military air strikes with domestically made drones, which forced the regime's army to return to the truce again.

Not only that, but Ankara found ambitions from Armenia in its eastern regions, when Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan spoke about the Treaty of Sevres, which would have given eastern Turkey to his country, which upset the Turkish leadership. Armenian forces also attacked the area where there are oil pipelines and railways important for trade between Turkey and Azerbaijan (Soylu, 2020). Turkey found itself alone without the support of its Western allies in the face of Russia during the crisis of the downing of a Russian plane over Turkish airspace in 2015, amid An American and Western refusal to supply Turkey with air defense systems, advanced military technologies and drones. Turkey decided to adopt another principle of realism, which is self-reliance, and moved towards developing its military industries. Turkey focused its interests in developing and manufacturing drones (Özertem, 2017).

After the world saw what the Turkish drones have done and the great success of those who stand with them, such as Libya, Syria, Azerbaijan and recently in Ukraine. In its foreign policy, Turkey gained a global reputation in the field of military industries, especially drones, and research centers and international newspapers dealt with this phenomenon, and the provision of drones with cameras, led the world to witness the ability of those aircraft to hit their targets accurately, and to destroy armored vehicles and weapons, without Damage to places or people around those targets. Turkish-made drones were able to resolve wars in favor of those who stand by them.

Turkey has obtained global recognition for the quality of its drones, such as the statement of the British Minister of Defense, who expressed his admiration for these aircraft and their ability to transform the course of military conflicts, as well as his admiration for Turkey's ability to manufacture them despite being denied access to foreign technology (Anadolu Agency, 2020). This acknowledgment of the desire of a number of countries to acquire Turkish drones, even if their relationship with Turkey is not good enough, such as Serbia, whose President Aleksandar Vucic said that his country will see what can be done to agree with the Turkish side to acquire these planes "whatever happens," considering that buying them "A very smart investment" (Zakaria, 2020). The image of Turkey has been established as a strong ally that stands by its allies and intervenes to their aid and does not hesitate to use all tools to achieve victory for them. The successes of several countries in their conflicts, and the link between these successes and Turkish intervention as a reliable ally.

The Turkish military intervention was keen to choose the side to which it is aligned, and they share several characteristics, most notably that they have international recognition of their right to the conflict, such as the former Libyan Government of National Accord, as well as Azerbaijan, which enjoys the world's recognition of its right to the Karabakh region and the surrounding provinces. Syria, the intervention in favor of civilians was against a regime that has lost legitimacy and has been expelled from most regional and international organizations.

Turkey was able to turn its successful military interventions with Turkish drones into economic achievements. The Turkish intervention in Libya led to the resumption of oil production and export after Haftar's forces prevented it for months, which contributed to improving the economic situation of the Libyans. Turkish companies were also able to obtain contracts to implement many projects, and the previous Government of National Accord pledged to compensate Turkish companies for their losses due to Projects it was implementing during the Gaddafi era (Al Ashry, 2020). In Azerbaijan, its military victory allowed it to restore its land connection with its Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic, through a corridor that was allowed to be established in accordance with the ceasefire agreement, which will have important economic consequences. In terms of trade, goods transport, internal development, as well as foreign trade between Azerbaijan and Turkey, it is expected to establish commercial railways linking Turkey to Azerbaijan via Armenia. This victory also enabled Turkey to connect by land with the Central Asian countries through Azerbaijan, and trade movement will develop without the need to rely on land (Al Jazeera, 2020).

5. Conclusion

In the second chapter, the research discussed the realistic theory and its relationship to Turkey's progress in the military field, especially the Turkish drones, and how Turkey directly or indirectly adopted the realization of the principles of the realistic theory to become a great power and to be able to maintain its national security and survival. Turkey has also adopted another principle of realism, which

is not to rely on other countries in its military industries, and Turkey has tried hard to achieve this principle after it tried for years to buy Israeli drones, but Israel put intelligence devices in it to spy on Turkey, so Turkey sought to develop drones locally and did pursuit of its own self-interest. And how Turkey's foreign policy has turned into smart power that uses hard power and gains successes through it so that it can use soft power, and that Turkey, after its successful interventions using Turkish military drones, has achieved successes and turned the table in its favor and in favor of the party in whose favor it intervened. Turkey has changed its military strategy and adopted a policy of self-reliance and focus on developing Turkish military industries locally. It relied heavily on the development of Turkish military drones and was able to succeed in its manufacture and also as a weapon of war to resolve wars in its favor and in favor of those who use Turkish-made drones. Turkey has entered with the rest of the other countries in the arms race because it knows that the state seeks to use all its available means, especially military force, because it must increase its military power to ensure its security of survival. The interests of each state differ from the other, but the interest that all states share is survival, as states seek to achieve their national interest.

In the third chapter, the research reviewed the historical background of the drone industry and how it started with a trick when flying balloons loaded with bombs were used. But the world tried hard to introduce technology into that trick and made drones that can be controlled remotely and can carry explosives, can jam radars and be able to carry out intelligence reconnaissance. And that the planes at first were used for reconnaissance and espionage, then with the development it turned into offensive. In the beginning, the drones depended heavily on human intervention, but with time they became unmanned and even able to operate completely autonomously without human control from a distance.

The research also explained how the domestically made Turkish drones were able to resolve wars in favor of the party that intervened in their favour. And Turkey was able to be a strong and reliable ally. The research presented this by reviewing counterterrorism against the PKK and how the Turkish drones and the Turkish military strategy were able to achieve superiority over the PKK and succeeded in controlling most of their locations and limiting their terrorist attacks. It was also able to resolve the war in Idlib in favor of the Syrian opposition against the forces of Bashar al-Assad's regime and its militias. Also in Libya, the Turkish Drones managed to win the battle in favor of the Government of National Accord. Also, the Turkish Drones, after nearly 30 years, will decide the battle in favor of Azerbaijan against Armenia. Even when Turkey did not intervene directly and only exported Turkish drones to Ukraine, Ukraine was able, through Turkish drones, to cause many losses to the Russian invasion and slowed its progress.

The researcher found through the research that Russia, which is known as a great power and is known for its strong military defenses, was a party, either directly or indirectly, to the counter party to which Turkey intervenes. But Turkey, using its military strategy and Turkish-made drones,

managed to overcome and successfully defeat the Russian military defenses each time. As Russia supports Bashar al-Assad, Russia supported Haftar with Russian military defenses, Armenia used Russian-made weapons and defense systems, and of course in Ukraine the weapons were Russian-made. But the Turkish drones were able each time to defeat the Russian air and land defense weapons and to destroy them.

In the end, through research, the hypothesis is correct, as Turkey has been able to achieve several successes through Turkish-made military drones. Turkey has been able to be a strong ally that you can count on. Turkey has been able to be a model for self-sufficiency in the field of military industries. Through its intervention and success in the countries that intervened in its favor, Turkey was able to strengthen its foreign policy, gain a good global reputation, and protect its national security. Through this, Turkey was able to achieve a stronger role for itself and its foreign policy through the successes it achieved with Turkish-made drones. Turkey was able to make a stronger role for itself in the region.

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