

# Regional Strategies of Brazilian Emergence

Éric ABANATI Gbadi<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Teacher-Researcher at the University of Kisangani, Department of International Studies, Democratic Republic of Congo

**Abstract:** *To manage to exhibit the regional strategies of emergence of Brazil, it is question to study the bilateral and multilateral agreements that the country signed with other powers, the regional integration and its strategies of sovereign defenses of interests. These orientations push us to analyze the horizontal cooperation with the other emergent powers, the forum of dialogue India Brazil- South Africa (IBSA) and the development of the South for a democratization of the multilateral instances in view of re-equilibration of the relations with the powers of the North in order to have assets to evaluate the foreign politics of Brazil as strategies of its emergence.*

**Keywords:** regional strategy, IBSA, foreign policy

## 1. Introduction

To understand the Brazilian international action, it agrees to come back on the systemic changes occurred following the cold War. In the years 1990, the United States had become the hyperpower of a unipolar world, after the fall of the rival soviet, in detaining a simultaneous supremacy in the military, economic and technological domain. However, the configuration of the international system seems today to evaluate toward the multipolarity, in particular with the international affirmation of an increasing number of South countries, which makes face of internationalization "winners."<sup>2</sup> These emergent powers participate actively in the transformation of the world, in requiring a more representative place within the multilateral instances.

To manage to exhibit the regional strategies of emergence of Brazil, we go to study the bilateral and multilateral agreements that the country signed with other powers, the regional integration, its strategies of sovereign defenses of interests and the Atlantic South as stake of strategic and security.

### I. The bilateral and multilateral agreements

Here, it is question to demonstrate the horizontal cooperation of Brazil with others emergent powers, the re-equilibration of the relations with the powers of the North and his/her/its search of a new international statute.

#### I.1. The horizontal cooperation with the other emergent powers

In an interdependent and asymmetric international environment, Brazil made the choice to conjugate its efforts with those of the partners of the world in development, and it to act more efficiently on a set of diplomatic foreheads. The objective was then of re-balance the international relations in making participate more actively the actors of the South in the decisional processes in the international system. This strategy had to allow the South American power to negotiate in better conditions with some countries of the North and to affirm themselves always more as a first-class world actor. It was also for the Brazilians about proposing an alternative model of the international relations, founded on the action for the development and struggle against the inequalities<sup>3</sup>. From then on, Brazil of Lula has, according to Marcelo Oliveira<sup>4</sup>, resuscitated the theme of development and recovered the traditional cleavage North-South<sup>4</sup> to require a redistribution of the cards of the world game, strategic closeness with the emergent powers, having the common interests and the similar domestic problems, through development of horizontal cooperation's<sup>5</sup>.

The desire of multi-polarity and a fair multilateralism was then in the center of the Preoccupations of Brazil and his partners. The potential of the emergent powers in terms of economic, military, scientific and technological development, distinguish them of the others States of the South, these last would fatally before to observe the evolution of the international system in a passive manner. For Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, two major challenges land before the big peripheral countries: the necessity to pass the obstacles imposed by the actual international system and, in the same way, the imperious need to promote an international order less asymmetric<sup>6</sup>.

In the multilateral setting, the countries of the South had gotten used to attend to negotiations and to respect the rules established by the powers of the North. It is exactly in order to participate in elaboration even of these rules that the emergent began to speak of only one voice. In this manner, in reinforcing the decisional power and normative of the South, the international rules were supposed to become just and legitimate. It was there about applying the concept of "multilateralism of the reciprocity", that is know the production joined of norms guaranteeing the reciprocity of the effects<sup>7</sup>. These countries could not admit an unjust and undemocratic world order, made in sort to

<sup>3</sup>Catherine Leterrier, « Du conflit Nord-Sud à la coopération Sud-Sud. Le modèle alternatif du Brésil de Lula », Groupe de recherche interdisciplinaire sur le Brésil (GRIB), avril 2009, p. 21.

<sup>4</sup>Marcelo Fernandes de Oliveira, « Alianças e coalizões internacionais do governo Lula : o Ibas e o G20 », Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, vol. 8, n° 2, 2005, p. 58.

<sup>5</sup>Diego de Freitas Rodrigues, « Cooperação horizontal Sul-Sul : arranjos de concertação política entre a Índia, o Brasil e a África do Sul », Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, n° 53, 2010, p. 45. <sup>6</sup> Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães, Quinhentos anos de periferia..., op. cit., p. 21.

<sup>6</sup> Aucun des effets ne devant profiter aux intérêts de certains au détriment des autres.

<sup>7</sup>Amado Luiz Cervo, Inserção internacional: formação dos conceitos brasileiros, São Paulo, Editora Saraiva, 2008, p. 112.

<sup>2</sup>Sebastian Santander, L'émergence de nouvelles puissances : vers un système multipolaire ? Paris, Ellipses, 2009, p. 9.

lead collective actions within the multilateral institutions in forming the South-South innovating coalitions, destined to restructure the world order modeled by the traditional powers.

Through the creation of these coalitions and their action in the multilateral instances, the strategy of the Brasilia authorities consisted therefore in requiring a new sharing of responsibilities between the nations, in order to establish " a real redistribution of the internationalization profits, in the commercial sphere that financial, politics and geopolitics " <sup>8</sup>. In the same way, these different coalitions of the emergent played the role of " active cores " in other groups gathering a number of more important countries as the G20. Brazil and its partners used these different groups thus to act in a more efficient manner in the multilateral instances and to require the measures or the institutional reforms going in the sense of their interests.

### I.1.1. The forum of dialogue India - Brazil- South Africa (IBSA) and development of the South

The forum of dialogue India Brazil- South Africa (IBSA) has been created in June 2003, to the initiative of the Brazilian authorities <sup>9</sup>. The IBSA is an example of defense mechanism of the interests of South countries, whose main characteristic is cooperation in the key domains of development as the science and technology, the infrastructure, trade, education and health. This South-South cooperation aims, otherwise, to reinforce the position of these countries within the international system through a large political coordination.

India, Brazil and South Africa are, following the authors, designated as " regional powers ", " middle powers ", intermediate powers ", " peripheral powers ", or " emergent powers ". This making abundance of terms to qualify these actors demonstrates the necessity to differentiate them and to classify them in a category apart among the South countries. It is about three big multi-ethnics democracies, influential in their regional spheres, presenting the developed industrial parks and having good scientific and technological capacities, but that, in the same way, are part of the most unequal countries in the world. Otherwise, the IBSA is constituted of countries of three different regions of the world in development, having common and complementary interests within the international system. However, it is not about a homogeneous group if one takes in consideration the meaningful differences between the three countries in terms demographic, economic, social and cultural.

<sup>8</sup>Cette initiative fait suite à la proposition faite par les Sud-Africains, en février 2001, de former un groupe avec le Brésil, l'Inde, la Chine et l'Arabie Saoudite, afin d'organiser un dialogue Sud-Nord avec le G8. Le gouvernement de Fernando Henrique Cardoso avait alors réagi sans enthousiasme et le projet ne s'était pas concrétisé. Voir João Genésio de Almeida Filho, O Fórum de Diálogo IBAS : análise e perspectivas, Brasília, FUNAG, 2009.

<sup>9</sup> Maria Regina Soares de Lima, « A Políticaexternabrasileira e os desafios da cooperaçãosul-sul », Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, n° 48, 2005, p. 24-59.

### I.1.2. The IBAS in search of a democratization of the multilateral instances

India, Brazil and South Africa, as new poles of power, have conjugated their diplomatic strengths in order to accentuate their influence within the international system. A South-South dialogue emerged thus within the multilateral organizations, notably in the setting of the dialogue with the powers of the North <sup>10</sup>. The three emergent powers have in common the wish to cooperate between them, in order to struggle against the international asymmetries and the concentration of the world power to the hands of the traditional powers.

According to Diego de Freitas Rodriguez, the new South-South multilateralism constitutes " a viable means to face the systemic obstacles ", to one moment where the logic of the unilateralism has been accentuated by the American superpower since September 11, 2001.

Paradoxically, this situation entails a redynamisation of cooperation's and partnerships", so much to the level of the interstate direct relations that to within t of the international institutions <sup>11</sup> ". In this setting", the fact to share the values and the common global objectives made of the IBAS a viable initiative and fore-gardist within a multipolar system " <sup>12</sup>. otherwise, the three countries were at the origin of a reformatage of the model of South South alliances. The development of internationalization contributed to make evolve this model indeed, born in the years 1960-1970. Whereas at departure the logic of the closeness between countries in development rested on the idea to reform the world capitalism, today the big emergent ally to integrate the fully system in place <sup>13</sup>, while wishing that are put in place of the " equitable rules of the game."

For the Lula government, the IBSA entered in the field of diversification of the International relations of Brazil and the strategy of closeness with partners so-called "Strategic ". according to Miriam Gomes Saraiva <sup>14</sup>, the group is composed of countries" affecting system ", to know the state-controlled actors who conquered since the end of the cold War a big level of international autonomy and that look for, henceforth, to cooperate together in order to oppose the one-sided actions of the big powers more efficiently <sup>15</sup>. Following this vision, Brazil, South Africa

<sup>10</sup> Diego de Freitas Rodrigues, « Cooperação horizontal Sul-Sul : arranjos de concertaçãopolítica entre a Índia, o Brasil e a África do Sul », Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, n° 53, 2010, p. 46.

<sup>11</sup> Sarah-Lea John de Sousa, « Brasil, Índia y Suráfrica, potencias para un nuevoorden », Política exterior, n° 121, janvier 2008, p. 172.

<sup>12</sup> Diego de Freitas Rodrigues, op. cit., p. 57.

<sup>13</sup> Miriam Gomes Saraiva, « As estratégias de cooperação Sul-Sul nos marcos da políticaexternabrasileira de 1993 à 2007 », Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional, vol. 50, n° 2, 2007, p. 42-59.

<sup>14</sup> Leticia dos Santos Marranghello, A Relação do Fórum de Diálogo Índia-Brasil-África do Sul (IBAS)... , op. cit., p.10.

<sup>15</sup> Ricardo Ubiratan Sennes, « Brazil, India and South-Africa : convergences and divergences in intermediate countries

and India are considered like "intermediate powers", that means the actors who need collective actions to influence the international system, for lack of to be able to make it individually<sup>16</sup>. According to Monica Hirst, the intermediate States possess, jointly, resources of sufficient power to act efficiently within the multilateral system and to influence on the themes of the international diary<sup>17</sup>. In this setting, Brazil has all interest to form some alliances in order to weigh more in the multilateral institutions to contribute to an evolution of the world governance that would be more favorable to him.

Various documents of the IBSA<sup>18</sup> indicate common positions on a certain number of subjects of multilateral order: TRIPS, Objectives of the Millennium, cycle of Doha to the WTO (OMC), reform of the UNO and the instances of Breton Woods. The declarations of the group make reference otherwise to various crisis in the Near and Middle East. On the question Israel-Palestinian, the IBSA sustains the creation of a Palestinian State. Concerning Iraq and Afghanistan, the group asks for the stabilization, the reconstruction of these countries and the respect of the sovereignty of the Iraqis and Afghans on their territories. In the setting of the Iranian crisis, the trilateral instance is pronounced in favor of the right of Tehran to use the nuclear energy to pacific thins<sup>19</sup>. The meetings of the IBSA were besides the opportunity of to debate other themes as the promotion of equality man/woman, the eradication of the hunger and poverty, the condemnation of racism and the defense of the human rights<sup>20</sup>.

In all his declarations, the group underlines the importance to solve peacefully the conflicts, with the contest of the UNO, and outlaw all recourse to strength. For some conflicts, the IBSA wish that is privileged the participation of regional organizations (notably the Arabian League for the Israel-Palestinian conflict). Of fact, the IBSA allows Brazil to have supports for his diplomatic interventions on questions of collective security, sometimes while opposing to powers of the North. One can observe notably that the South American power, to the sides of his emergent

partners, condemns subtly use of strength on behalf of the United States and his unilateralism<sup>21</sup>. The IBSA became therefore a real anti-hegemonic instrument to the service of the three emergent powers.

The action of the group on the multilateral plan illustrated the strategy of Lula government looking to form the strong international alliances, in order to weigh always more in the world instances. The closeness with India and South Africa was therefore before all strategic. This alliance political South-South had to allow the three regional powers to repulse the limits of their international action. The objective was, since the departure, to affirm these emergent powers as real global actors, having the capacity to intervene in all domains touching the international relations (security, economy, finance, environment, etc.). The all was thus to influence to best on the international system and to reinforce the world multi-polarity, an essential factor for the democratization of the processes decisional and a better representativeness of the countries in development.

## II. The re-equilibration of the relations with the powers of the North

In spite of the priority conferred to development of the South-South relations by the Lula governments, the strategy of diversification didn't achieve itself to the detriment of the reports with the countries of the North. The Brazilian autonomists have conscience that the developed countries are especially important for the international insertion of their country. In a pragmatic worry, it was therefore essential not put back in cause the political and economic ties with the industrialized traditional partners. Some violent and sterile confrontations didn't drag in this setting, the litigations and divergences that appeared this last decade in the relations bilateral South-North, and even less of diplomatic ruptures. The dialogue and the negotiation have been privileged in all circumstances.

Nevertheless, as Paulo Vizontini" affirms it, "Lula has put in place an international diary intense founded on the nonalignment opposite the North in order to recover his capacity of negotiation"<sup>22</sup>. It was about adopting firm positions facing to Americans and to Europeans without imitating the anti-imperialist radicalism of the camp Bolivarian. Brazil didn't hesitate however not to criticize some actions of the developed countries when it him appeared necessary. The positions of rebelliousness participated thus in the international affirmation international of the lusophone power and demonstrated that the country had the capacity to bring an independent voice.

Progressively, the western powers recognized the new international statute of the South American giant. It is in this setting that inscribed the invitation made to the

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international strategies », dans Alcides Costa Vaz (dir.), *Intermediate states, regional leadership and security: India, Brazil and South Africa*, Brasília, Editora Universidade de Brasília, 2006.

<sup>16</sup> Monica Hirst, « Intermediate States, Multilateralism & International Security », dans Alcides Costa Vaz (dir.), *Intermediate States, regional leadership and security: Índia, Brazil and South África*, Brasília, Editora Universidade de Brasília, 2006, p. 165-194.

<sup>17</sup> Voir la rubrique « Documents » du site de l'IBAS. Disponible sur : <http://www.ibsa-trilateral.org/> (consulté le 16 mars 2013).

<sup>18</sup> Le groupe s'est aussi positionné sur des crises africaines (Soudan, Guinée-Bissau, Sahara Occidentale,

Zimbabwe) et latino-américaines (Honduras). Voir Leticia dos Santos Marranghello, *A Relação do Fórum de Diálogo Índia-Brasil-África do Sul (IBAS)...*, op. cit., p. 46. <sup>20</sup> IBAS, « Documents », op. cit.

<sup>19</sup> João Genésio de Almeida Filho, *O Fórum de Diálogo IBAS : análise e perspectivas*, op. cit.

<sup>20</sup> Paulo Vizontini, « O G3 e o G20: o Brasil e as novas coalizões internacionais », dans Henrique Altemani et Carlos Antônio Lessa (coord.), *Relações internacionais do Brasil-temas e agendas*, vol. 2, São Paulo, Saraiva, 2006, p. 159-193.

<sup>21</sup> CBF, *Relação de transferências para o exterior*, <http://www.cbf.com.br/php/transferencias.php>

<sup>22</sup> <http://www.fifa.com/aboutfifa/federation/associations.html> et <http://www.un.org/fr/members/growth.shtml>

Brazilians to integrate the organization of cooperation and economic development (OCED), traditionally known to be the "club of the rich countries". Nevertheless, Brasilia made the strategic choice not to integrate the organization in order to not to compromise his relations with the world in development. The country wished to keep mediator's picture thus between the North and the South.

Otherwise, the strategy of nonalignment of Brazil opposite the powers of the North contributed to intensify the relations with these countries paradoxically. The Americans and the Europeans had all interest indeed to operate a closeness with this big emergent actor, having a growing political and economic weight on the world stage multi-polarize. These are besides largely the United States and Europe that were to the origin of the initiatives promoting the bilateral relations with Brazil, notably with the setting up of dialogues and strategic partnerships.

### II.1. The quest of a new international statute

The election of Lula in October 2002 marked a turn in the big orientations of the diplomatic Brazilian. Since 2003, the speech had become distinctly tiers-mondist, notably under the impulse of the number two of the Ministry of the Outside Relations, Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães Neto, and some initiatives had been taken to turn the Brazilian diplomacy toward the South countries, and to play the card of the emergent countries. The second mandate seemed to come back to a balance, while taking the efforts in direction of the traditional partners.

Brazil can play indeed on the two pictures, and tent permanently to make, it while putting the accent soon on one, soon on the other. He tempts to maximize his advantages, notably of big producer of agricultural products and bio-fuel, to minimize his fragilities, mainly his technological and financial dependence, and to enliven dynamics of re-composition of the positions in relation to the other countries, more developed countries on one side, poor countries to the other, in playing his intermediate situation.

Since some years Brazil affirmed itself like one the major protagonists within the WTO (OMC). He threw two actions, one against the protection granted by the United States to its producers of cotton, the other by the European union to its producers of sugar, and won them all two (the person responsible of the file wanted to attack Japan also on its protection of the national market of rice, and regret again today of it have been dissuaded by his chief). All is not adjusted, the United States drag the feet, but in the two cases Brazil hopes to win parts of markets, its comparative advantages allowing him to produce more and less dear than his/her/its competitors. It is especially sensitive for sugar, with a barrel of oil above 90 dollars, the alcohol becomes competitive and some already see Brazil as tomorrow of Saudi Arabia.

It is also appeared in the big international meetings as one of the leaders of the demands of countries of the south, (G20, G33...), notably to the meeting of the WTO (OMC) in Cancún, in 2003, where he widely contributed to block

the meeting while organizing the resistance of the countries of the South and to prevent an agreement that seemed acquirement. There were not any continuations unfortunately hardly, nor at the time of the wreck of the negotiation of Doha, nor in the other international forums, nor in initiatives on struggle against the hunger, a time, supported by Lula and Jacques Chirac. The countries partners made notice with the charming politeness of the diplomats that, Brazil should meditate maybe on the failure of its program Fome Zero ("zero hunger", include without glory and without noise in the programs of aid already mentioned) before giving some lessons to the rest of the world.

The constant demand of a permanent seat to the security council of the UNO stagnate, she is weakened by the ambitions of the Argentinean neighbor, or of Mexico. It is little likely that shit succeeded, Brazil cannot pretend to succeed hardly where Germany or Japan failed. The efforts made to place Brazilians to the head of big international organisms turned also short, in fault to collect the agreement of it neighbors, that is also its competitors.

These reverses in the multilateral diplomacy, in spite of the agreed effort in sending of the troops to maintain the order in Haiti (and so to pay for its ticket of access to the rank of the countries that counts in the international relations), illustrate well the ambiguous position of Brazil, emergent country, situated at sometime in the platoon of head of the big world economies and again under-developed country by a lot of aspects. In fact Brazil acquired a considerable specific weight, by its population (more of 190 millions of inhabitants), by the power of its agro-industries and its industrial device, without equivalent in the southern hemisphere, but he didn't find its place again: nor in the court of the big, where its weighs little, nor as leader of the small, where poorest find it too big, and where the other emergent countries play their own game.

But in a domain at least its superiority is not contested, soccer, as testify its exports of players all over the world.

One can measure indeed in an objective way the radiance of Brazil from the given very precise up to date holdings by the Brazilian Confederation of Soccer, who records (and publish) the number of soccer players transferred from Brazil toward the foreign clubs<sup>23</sup>. The data for 2008 show that not of 1 176 players of soccer have been transferred in 94 countries of the world. Many are hired naturally in European countries, to the first rank of which Portugal, where the players don't have any problem of adaptation because they already speak the local language. But one also finds Brazilian players of soccer in parts of the more unexpected world, as Middle East, where they appear in good number of clubs created by the oil emirates, and until China, in India, and to Vietnam. One even finds well some there must endure the cold weather, in Iceland and to the islands Féroé. The only exception is

<sup>23</sup> Le Brésil est ainsi devenu, en 2007, le septième État à être approché par l'UE pour mettre en place un partenariat stratégique, après les États-Unis, le Canada, la Chine, l'Inde, le Japon et la Russie.

Africa, of which one knows well that it would wish to participate in this world movement, so much soccer is there popular, but that it doesn't have the means of it.

While analyzing the variations of its effective total of soccer players in relation to 2004 (year where 857 players had been transferred), one observes some reductions of these fluxes, notably in South America and to Japan, but also a very strong increase of the fluxes toward Europe of the East, for that the economic growth and the integration to the European union also to be translated result in a capacity to import Brazilian players. One sees it well, the prestige of Brazil, five times winner of the World Cup, is henceforth global. After all, as likes to tell it João Havelange, Brazilian and president during twenty-four years (1974 - 1998) of the Fifa (international Federation of soccer) this one counts 208 countries members, whereas the UNO has only 192 of them<sup>24</sup>.

## II.2. The regional integration

During the two mandates of the president Lula da Silva (2003-2010), the diplomacy Brazilian worked to the backing of the relations of the country with its traditional partners, especially with the United States, Japan and the western Europe, but undertook also the construction of new dynamic axes, which the research of partnerships with countries as South Africa, India and China. These adjustments on the whole of bilateral relations strengthen the bases of universalism in the Brazilian foreign policy and draw the contours of the international action of the country: the funding of the economic relations (of the point of view of the commercial fluxes and investments) and the backing of the high-level of political cooperation.

### II.2.1. A complex international insertion

The years that separate the end of the cold War of the attempts of September 11, 2001 constituted a particular moment of the international life. While the free trade and the democracy imposed themselves as the supreme values for the organization of economies and the political life of the national States, one also observed the apparition of new fashions of working of the politics between the nations and new themes that became quickly central in the international relations.

Indeed, one could also observe a lot of brutal oscillations in the behavior of the central actors of the international relations, especially of the United States, that a tendency to the valorization of the political and economic multilateralism, while passing by the creation or the sophistication of regionalization projects. In the same way, the international diary began to be characterized by the predominance of new themes, as the human rights, the environment and the environmental governance, the lasting development, the equitable trade, the energizing questions, the food security, the new questions of security and the challenges while ensuing for the defense, the nuclear non-proliferation, democracy, migrations, etc.

The manner of which these fashions of working and these themes evolved since then and, more particularly, their mutual influences were fundamental to determine the strategies of international insertion of all countries of a certain size and also conditioned their strategies of economic development. It was in particular important in the case of the international insertion of Brazil that proved to be complex and showed proof of some hesitations and oscillation.

At the end of one decade of experimentations in foreign policy, that have all first drives to the reversing of the traditional norms of behavior, to the cutback of the diplomatic network and the heritage of bilateral contacts, and more especially to the valorization of the multilateralism, a new formula saw the day from the years 2000, and more specifically from 2003. A firm action in the multilateral spaces won its balance with the reconstruction of a geographical universalism whose importance didn't quit to grow. The revalorization of the important bilateral contacts that, in the traditional diplomatic practice of Brazil are called "strategic partnerships", is part of this new configuration. Therefore, a new dynamism seized the process of economic expansion, the commercial fluxes and investments, and the political joint capacity is founded reinforced.

The transformations of the international stage from the years 2000 and the new perception of the big emergent markets had a certain impact on the conditions of international visibility of Brazil. The perpetuation of a management more assured of the strategy economic stability in the country also contributed to the affirmation of the picture of an ample and steady mass market. Internationally, Brazil presented itself with a declarative profile, that one can note for example in the determination with which the diplomacy implies itself in the pursuit of negotiations on the various themes of the contemporary diary.

The direct and indirect consequences of the September 2001 events had a decisive impact on the establishment of new priorities in the world diary of security, without intending the necessity to reinforce the multilateralism and the multi-polar international order.

As for the economic dimension, the predominance of a new fashion of organization in view of the commercial liberalization threw a new stage of commercial negotiations under auspices of the world organization of the trade WTO (OMC). For what is of the environmental diary, the impacts, the risks and the costs generated by the climatic changes, that became more obvious during these last years, attracted the attention of the governments of a part of the rich countries on the need to privilege cooperation in quest of energizing alternatives.

The crossing of these three new priorities created an unique opportunity for Brazil, of which the government, more especially from 2003, looked for with enthusiasm of the spaces for a new political joint vision of South-South and North-South. If the possibilities of action as for the world diary of security were restricted relatively, it doesn't

<sup>24</sup> Article 84, alinéa XIX.

go from it in the same way for the debate around the legitimacy within the contemporary international politics and the necessity of reform and enhancement of the multilateral institutions.

Already in 2003, during the meeting of the Conference of the world organization of the, trade in Cancún, Brazil tried to pose thus as leader of the emergent countries, contrary historic practice according to which the rules of the international trade are negotiated and settled by the developed countries. The creation of the Group of the 20 and the ulterior exercise of negotiator's mandate in the pursuit of the negotiations of the cycle of Doha of the WTO (OMC) has represented the moments where one tempted to condition the opening of the markets of services and industrial of the countries of the South to the corresponding opening of the agricultural markets of the countries of the North.

In the setting of the negotiations relative to the climatic changes, Brazil has not only acted as protagonist, but also as possessor of important assets. The technological development and more specifically the numerous competitive advantages that the country possesses in the productive chain of bio-fuels are the factors that nourish an innovative profile within the international action of the country, with big repercussions on its diary of cooperation, with the countries of the South that with those of the North.

In the regional setting, one also observed the growth of the leadership role experienced by Brazil, even though he is contested by some of its neighbors, in particular by Venezuela and Argentina. Besides, the Brazilian government tried to show its preoccupation with the political evolution of the region, while implying itself in experiences of stabilization, as one was able for example to observe it with the involvement to the mission of peace in Haiti.

In the same way, Brazil tried to articulate one fashion of new action in quest of results on different chessboards of the contemporary international politics. The goodwill with which the Brazilian diplomacy dedicated itself to the composition of new alliances constructed around themes and also new diaries let glimpse calculations at the very least unexpected and scheming. One finds examples of these alliances with the Forum IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa) and with the Group of the four, in which the country joined Japan, to Germany and to India to claim the reform of the UN institutions. They represented an attempt to articulate two plans of ideas:

- A vision of the world of a country that discerns itself like an upward and pacific regional power, like a big market to become promoter of a really multi-polar international order, for which the backing of the multilateral spaces is a necessary condition of it;
- An innovating vision of the international politics and a reading essentially positive of that the international moment encourages the discount in debate of the mechanisms of decisions within different institutions. It took place as well according to the relative weight that

of the countries as Brazil represents in the processes of stabilization of their respective subsystems to can that by the fact that these countries (and Brazil in particular) possess fundamentally important diplomatic assets in diaries and processes of negotiation of the highest importance. One could note it with regard to the international trade, but also the environment and more specifically the climatic changes, to mention an example only.

This one is one of the three big ambitions that explain the transformations intense by which passed the system of bilateral relations of Brazil from 2003.

The two other ambitions that intervened to return to the international action of the country milk it Universalist that had characterized it to beginning of the years 1990 are bound to the requirements of the economic expansion process:

- The re-articulation of the traditional commercial spaces (Europe, United States, Japan, South America) and the valorization of economic spaces badly explored traditionally (Africa, China, Arabian world, regions of Asia);
- The opening of spaces of action for the Brazilian industrial groups, especially in the strategic sectors (oil and ethanol for example).

These three lines of action were to the basis of an extraordinary effort of expansion of the bilateral ties in all directions. The first consisted in the sophistication of the cooperation diary with the traditional partners, in particular with Europe and, to one least degree, with China, India, Japan and South Africa. The second was the extension of the diplomatic network, never reached before the levels while giving a political priority to the establishment of new ties with countries and regions with which Brazil had relations of least size historically only. Finally, the setting in parallel of these two measurements of the process of reconstruction of the international insertion to Universalist character permitted the re-positioning of the concept of "strategic partnerships".

## II.2.2. The strategic partnership Brazil European Union

With the reconfiguration of the international relations and the development of one multi-polar system, Europe and Brazil decided to come closer in the centers a "strategic partnership"<sup>25</sup> supposed to be profitable to the two parts in the perspective of a redistribution of the cards of the world power.

## II.3. Strategies of sovereign defenses of the Brazilian interests

This section proposes to examine the reformulation of conceptions, policies and Brazilian structures of Security and Defense of which the setting in work can, to short or

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<sup>25</sup> N° PL-4752/2009.

middle term, to contribute to modify the positioning of the Brazilian state with regard to its pacifist speech.

### II.3.1. The national strategy of defense

The pacifist tradition of Brazil, that was expressed itself notably until there by the establishment of international relations having for constitutional principles the nonintervention and the pacific resolution of the conflicts, had for effect that Brazil never had culture of war since the end of the XIXe century and, even less, of defense culture. After the period of the military governments (1964-1985), the statute of the Armed forces has been depreciated voluntarily, by fear that they don't constitute an obstacle to the development of a democracy re-conquered so with difficulty.

More than two decades after the return of the democracy, the Brazilian government estimated that/it was time to concentrate its attention again on the sector of the defense; he/has notably instituted a commission assigned to elaborate a national strategy of defense, finally approved by the President of Republic September 9, 2008.

This document appears to one moment where Brazil modified the big lines of its foreign politics: he/tries, by all means, to show its refusal to align in an automatic way on the positions of the big powers, in particular on those of the United States; he/it tempts to affirm itself like regional leader and to become, more globally, an actor of weight on the international stage (scene).

It is first stipulated that the strategy of defense must be inseparable of the strategy of development, the two being bound closely. A consequent project of development requires a national independence, which appears by the control of resources for the sectors of production, by technological capacities, including the spatial domain, the one of the cybernetics or the one of the nuclear, by the democratization of the educational offers and economic, in order to widen the popular involvement in the processes of decision in life and in the politics of the country. From these imperatives, the plan of Strategy is based on three main axes.

The first is about the organization of the Armed forces mainly and establishes the orientations and the specific strategies of every military branch and the relations between them.

The plan makes reference then to the restructuring of the Brazilian industry of arming: the reorganization of the Armed forces must contribute decisive way to the progression of the national technologies. Finally, the last axis concerns the composition of the effective number of the Armed forces and the obligatory military service.

From these three fundamental axes, the plan defines twenty-three leading lines having to guide elaboration of the policies of defense of Brazil for the future years.

These leading lines are first about the surveillance and the control of the borders terrestrial and of the territorial

waters and insist, notably, on the capacity to answer quickly all threat or aggression, through the strategic mobility. Brazil being a country to the continental measurements, the strategic mobility capacity or capacity to move quickly toward the theater of the operations, and the tactical mobility or capacity to move inside same of this theater of operations are vital elements to succeed all military operation. On this question, the technological support is also indispensable.

Another essential leading line concerns the reinforcement of three sectors of strategic importance: the space, the cybernetics and the nuclear sector: the sectors that erase the traditional cleavages between development of the defense, civil domain and military domain. The development of the space sectors and the cybernetics permits the coordination the operations of the three Armies, without having resort to the foreign technology and in assuring the security of this type of operation. With regard to the nuclear energy, although Brazil participated in the Treaty of Non-proliferation of the Nuclear Weapons, the country judges not to be able to happen of the development and the mastery of this technology, that can guarantee, besides a necessary energizing polyvalence, of important progress in domains, as agriculture, health as well as the pursuit to Brazilian nuclear-powered submarine project.

As for the question of the flow chart of the Brazilian Armed forces, the national Strategy of Defense calls to unification of the activities of the three Bodies, in addition to the protocols of conjoined exercises, in order to assure their coordination under the command of the political power, to know the President of Republic and the defense secretary essentially.

Being given the characteristic of the Brazilian territory, another key point of the national Strategy of Defense concerns the repositioning of the troops. All along the development of the Brazilian institutions of defense, the biggest part of the military number has been concentrated in or around the regions the more developed of the country. The main units of the army are in the South and the Southeast of the country, where are also installed the technological equipment of the air force as well as the essential of the Marine. The main worries concerning the defense are yet in the north and the west of the country and in the Atlantic south. This distribution evidently has for objective the protection of the regions the most densely populated and where are located the biggest industrial parks of the country.

However, the Marine must be present to the level of the embouchure and in the big fluvial basins from the Amazon stream to the north and the Paraguay streams and Paraná, to the South. Besides, the army owes re-disposer its human resources in the center of the country, in order to facilitate the displacement of the troops in any direction, optimizing the speed of answer thus in case of aggression. Finally, it is necessary to increase the presence of the three Weapons in the border zones.

The Amazonie is another priority of the national Strategy of Defense. In reason of its unique characteristic, the region is a major axis of interest for the Defense; for this reason, Brazil must be careful to reaffirm unconditional manner its sovereignty on the Amazonie. The extent of the Amazonian territory also requires the backing of the logistical capacities in the region to assure the mobility in all circumstance.

Still because of the immensity of the Brazilian territory and considering the requirements of basis for the control, the mobility and the presence, it is also essential to develop the index of the practices and the operational capacities of the fighters, so that the notion of flexibility in the fight, so that the soldiers master the technologies and the requisite operational practices.

The restructuring of the effective number of the troops is also an important point. The composition and the dividing of the number must be reviewed in order to balance them better and to answer arrangements of the national Strategy of Defense, as well as to prepare them in an adequate way to their mission of maintenance of the public order, according to the Federal Constitution.

Because of its pacifist tradition, Brazil doesn't have a specific enemy to the outside. For this reason, it is necessary to organize the strategic potential of the Armed forces according to its capacities, to preserve the peace but it without forgetting to get ready for the war. On this question of the peace keeping, it is also essential to prepare the soldiers to have increasing responsibilities in international operations, as it is already the case in the Mission of the United Nations for the stabilization in Haiti (MINUSTAH), controlled by the Brazilian forces since its creation in 2004. The Brazilian command of this mission reflects the wish of Brazil to strengthen his/her/its position on the international stage, through a visible engagement for the peace in the world. Still to the international level, the plan of Strategy also foresees that Brazil increases its capacities to be able to answer needs of research and safeguard in the world.

To encourage the integration of South America is another priority of Brazilian defense. This integration, in addition to contribute to the defense of Brazil, moves away the possibilities of conflicts in the region, encourages the military cooperation and the regional coordination of the military industries. The creation of the South American Defense Council, in accordance with the plan of Strategy, foresees the setting up of a consultation mechanism that justly permit to avoid the conflicts, to promote the industrial and regional military cooperation and to avoid the incursions of foreign countries to the region.

The Brazilian military industry must increase its capacities and especially to acquire one technological autonomy, that allows him to answer the national imperatives not only but also to position itself on the international markets, in order to increase his/her/its scale of production. This technological autonomy must be also sought-after through the multiplication of the partnerships, on the basis, as much that possible, of the association and collaboration,

the final objective being the progressive and complete elimination for Brazil of the import of products and services.

Finally, the plan of Strategy foresees the increase of the potential mobilization national military and in order to answer the operational needs and dissuasion of the Armed forces. Flexibility is essential for development of the military operations: in a situation of conflict, the army must have the means to increase its resources quickly in equipment and in work force. It is why one maintained the obligatory military service. The national Strategy of Defense sustains that the obligatory military service is the necessary condition to the mobilization of the Brazilian people for the defense of the national sovereignty. For this reason, it establishes that the military draft is obligatory and concern all social classes. For those that are dispensed of the military draft, the plan foresees that they are encouraged to participate in a civil service, according to their formation. Those that make their service must receive a basic military practice, in order to form mobilizable reserve force to answer the needs of emergency of the army.

These are therefore the main leading lines of the national Strategy of Defense of Brazil. Thanks to these measures, the country hopes to reverse the situation of decline of the Armed forces and to create them so the conditions so that the country affirms itself like decisive actor of a new world order. The social and economic development plan and the efforts sustained of Brazil to participate actively in the international society in order to play a role of first plan there also contribute.

To reorganize and to rearm the Armed forces to raise them to the level of importance to which Brazil can pretend in the economic and political domain and define common strategies of development between these three domains that compose the essential trio for all nations that wishes to participate actively in the international society, such are the objectives of Brazil.

The pursuit of these objectives cannot be explained that through the objective of the war but constitutes clearly a plan of the basis more large and longer-term to attain to the consolidation of Brazil as emergent power in the world.

### **II.3.2. The implementation of the National Strategy of Defense**

The new plan for the national Strategy of the Brazilian Defense (PENDB) has known a beginning of implementation with the law of December 27, 2007 (law n° 11631), defining the national mobilization and creating the System of national Mobilization (SINAMOB). The term of national mobilization has been created by the Federal Constitution of 1988<sup>26</sup>: it has for main basis the mobilization of the national resources and the federal

<sup>26</sup> Herbert Schutzer, « Panorama da SegundaOnda da PolíticaExternaSubsaariana », op. cit., p. 52.



structures in case of war declaration facing to foreign threat. In 2007, the System of national Mobilization joined the plan for the national Strategy of the Brazilian Defense and widens the concept of national mobilization in time of peace, with the decree 6703 of December 18, 2008. The foundations of the plan for the national Strategy of the Brazilian Defense are described in the document of national Strategy of Defense (Brazil, 2008): "Nothing permits to define concrete and precise military threats, represented by forces of opposition of potentially hostile countries or by elements not belonging to a State. Because of the uncertainty of the threats that weighs on the state, the preparation of the armed forces must be oriented to act in the execution of various missions, in different domains, in various geographical zones and to sustain the political action of the state".

Among the measures foreseen by the national Strategy of Defense, there is the hypothesis of the use (HEY) of the set of the Armed forces for the following missions: the surveillance and the protection of the borders of the national territory, in particular of the Amazonian region; the internal devices in case of wars in other parts of the world, where would be used of the massive destruction weapons; the involvement of Brazil in humanitarian missions and peaces; the involvement to operations inside the country to guarantee the law and the order, in conformity with the Federal Constitution and in the cases of armed conflict threat in the Atlantic south.

The convenient measures landed in this document foresee the strategic actions in the following domains: the sciences and technology, the human resources, the teaching, the mobilization, the logistics, the military industry, the command and the control, the formation, the military intelligence, the doctrine, the operations of peace, the infrastructures, the maintenance of the law and the order, the regional stability, the international insertion and the national security.

All measures contained in the plan are under the responsibility of the ministry of the Defense, of the headquarters of the set of the Armed forces and the Headquarters of the three Bodies (Marine, Armed of earth and Airforce).

The first sign of the setting in work of the measures is visible on the economic plan. According to the numbers revealed by the ministry of the Defense, there was a considerable increase of the expenses of the Defense, to order of 44,54% between 2004 and 2009, for a big part bound to the human resources. But Brazil has also bought the weapons, the submarines, the planes and the vehicles of fight.

Moreover, he/it is foreseen to increase the effective number of the Armed forces, to pass of 310 000 men today to 500 000 in two decades - either an increase of 61,29%. A project of law<sup>27</sup> of the federal deputy Raul Jungmann,

actually studied by the Convention, aim to modify the article 1 of the law of July 6, 2006 (law n° 11 320), that fixes effective number of the air force in time of peace, to increase the number of the officers and soldiers (under officers, sergeants, corporals and soldiers).

Another measure had an immediate impact: she/it concerns the reinforcement of the presence of the military forces to the Brazilian borders, and notably to the borders of the Amazonian region. The deputy Raul Jungmann had a law voted (project of law 543/2009), establishing general rules for the organization, the preparation and the use of the Armed services. She led to the creation of the Inter-armed headquarters that unifies the coordination of the actions of the three Headquarters (Air, Earth and Marine) and returns obligatory the presence joined of the Armed forces for the surveillance of the borders of Brazil, obligation that was until there reserved that to the army of earth.

It is necessary to underline the signature of the agreement also between the Government of the federal Republic of Brazil and the United States of America on cooperation concerning Defense, April 12, 2010 (Miller 2010). As the text of the agreement underlines, its objective is "to reinforce the good and cordial relations" between the two countries and to reaffirm the principle of sovereignty and non-intervention in state affairs. In spite of the disagreements on the question of Iran and its nuclear program, the two countries maintained relations of narrow collaboration, in accordance with what is foreseen in the, contained of the agreement, that foresees notably (article 1, paragraph a) cooperation in the" domains of research and development, in the logistical support, to the level of the technological security and the purchase of products and services for the defense ". The c paragraph foresees the exchange of experiences in the domain of the military technology as, for example, the possibility to organize common military exercises.

Three days later, April 15, 2010, during the meeting between Brazil and India, at the time of the fourth Summit of the IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa) and the second Summit of the BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China), the two countries signed a bilateral agreement aiming to develop jointly the military planes of high technology.

These first efficient measures of the new plan of national Strategy of Defense clearly reveal efforts of Brazil to impose itself like a power on the international scene through the reinforcement of its device of security and defense.

## 2. Conclusion

On the question of the security in the Atlantic South, the Lula government looked for to establish agreements of

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coopération de l'Atlantique Sud ». L'organisation regroupe l'ensemble des pays baignés par l'Atlantique Sud (tous les pays se trouvant au sud de la Mauritanie et du Brésil).

<sup>27</sup>La ZOPACAS a vu le jour en 1986 à travers une résolution de l'Assemblée générale de l'ONU (41/11) déclarant la région située entre l'Afrique et l'Amérique du Sud « Zone de paix et de

defense with the African countries. However, these initiatives have been limited strongly by the real capacities of the naval power of Brazil. It is there about a recurrent structural problem preventing "the constitution of a pool Brazilian nostrum and the efficient control of this important oceanic portion"<sup>28</sup>. Yet, the question of the control of the Atlantic South is deeply and historically anchored in the doctrine of Brazilian defense.

The defense of the Atlantic South is a reciprocal interest theme for the South - Americans and the Africans. It is for the actors of the region about avoiding that some outside powers intervene in their common geopolitics space. In this setting, the redynamisation of the Zone of peace and cooperation of the Atlantic South (ZOPACAS)<sup>29</sup>, that is operated itself notably through a meeting of the representatives of the countries members in Luanda in 2007<sup>30</sup>, is an example of this mutual will to protect this strategic space. According to Carlos Gustavo Anjos back, minister of the outside Relations of São Tomé-Et-Principe,: "The plan of action and the declaration of Luanda are instruments capable to revitalize the Zone of peace and cooperation of the South Atlantic and to contribute to cooperation on sensitive themes for the African countries, as the control of the fishing, the security and the protection of resources"<sup>31</sup>.

For the Lula government, the Zone of peace and cooperation of the Atlantic South constituted a factor of support to the projection of Brazil in the South Atlantic. It is therefore logically that the South American power was one of the main instigators of the reinforcement of the organization. Relatively to the themes evoked by the Brazilians in the setting of the ZOPACAS, the questions of defense and security have been accompanied by those relative to struggle against poverty, to the protection of environment and to the defense of the human rights, in order to confer a sense of community and universality to the Brazilian interests in the bi-regional space.

In spite of a certain reciprocal interest, the organization was not finally than little activate, what had for consequence the apparition of new projects of cooperation with outside powers to the region. The Lula government tried however to thwart these initiatives while widening the themes of cooperation of the Zone of peace and cooperation of the Atlantic South, notably in terms of securisation of the region. In their attempt of a bigger cooperation with the African countries, the authorities of Brasilia could lean on their new diplomatic network. Among the 35 countries in which Brazilian embassies are

active on the African soil, nearly all Atlantic countries are covered.

In this survey, it was question to analyze the agreements bi and multilateral of Brazil with other powers, the process of regional integration as well as the strategies of defenses for its interests in order to have assets to value the foreign politics of Brazil as strategies of its emergence.

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<sup>28</sup> La ZOPACAS se trouvait inopérante depuis 1998.

<sup>29</sup> Carlos Gustavo dos Anjo, cité par EdsonTomaz de Aquino, « O Atlântico Sul e as RelaçõesBrasilÁfrica no Século XXI », op. cit.

<sup>30</sup> Ibidem

<sup>31</sup>Notamment l'« Initiative Atlantique Sud » portée par l'Espagne (avec l'appui de la France et des États-Unis) et douze pays de la région, formalisée par la « déclaration de Lanzarote » du 13 juin 2009, ou encore le Forum international pour une « initiative tricontinentale Atlantique » organisé les 29 et 30 mai 2009 par le Maroc.